

[coulw17.001. Tr: BJB. 2 September 90: Edited version] Transcription conventions can be found on the last 2-3 pages of each transcript.

Please Note: This is an edited transcript of an informal seminar meeting. Please do not quote without permission of the parties involved.

JEFF COULTER
Department of Sociology
Boston University

WITTGENSTEIN AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Meeting 17: 1 October 89

TOPICS: Discussion Meeting:
Grammatical/logical VS empiricist
approaches to the study of practical action;
Sequential phenomena VS Turn-taking
phenomena; Review of Meetings 15 and 16,
grammatical/logical approach - connections
between Garfinkel, Sacks and Wittgenstein;
Garfinkel's references to Wittgenstein and their
interpretation; Garfinkel and Wittgenstein
on the concept of 'remedy' and its
relationship to 'rationality';
the nature and status of Ethnomethodological
claims; the concept of 'order', and others.

Jeff Coulter: I'll be honest with you, I don't really know what to do today. I was thinking of persisting with the discussion of the properties of sequences in connection to the kinds of logical arguments that we've been discussing for the past couple of weeks. But I'm not sure that that is really going to be the best way of elucidating the relationship between Ethnomethodological work, and the kind of thinking that is embodied in the later Wittgenstein. In fact, as I've just had an occasion, to have a look at the transcripts of what we've been doing, I think that that tack is a very narrow one to continue with. Although I would be happy to entertain further arguments in respect of

my own position vis-a-vis what is the logical status of some of the claims emerging from Conversation Analysis, and we could do that for a while longer, some people have figured that they do not yet have sufficient grounding in what Conversation Analysis is for that to be something we can proceed with at the same level of abstraction that we've been engaged in. And, on the other hand, I don't really think I can push my own arguments much further in this domain than in the paper on contingent and a priori structures. [Tr: Coulter, J. (1983). Contingent and a priori structures in sequential analysis. HUMAN STUDIES, 6(4), 361-376.] So, really I suppose what I would be saying is that if you want to continue to talk about the "logician", if you like, or "grammatical" vis-a-vis the "empiricist" approaches to the enterprise of studying practical actions, then I would like to put the onus upon you to sort of produce for me some counter-arguments, and we could perhaps go that way for a while. OR, if you'd like to leave that in abeyance, we could talk more about Garfinkel's programme, and some of the studies that are not strictly speaking Conversation Analytic, and I could talk about them from a sort of Wittgensteinian point of view. So I'm not really sure what to do. So I'll take your guidance on that. Where's it best to proceed?

Caesar Mavratsas: Through Garfinkel I think. It would be much easier to see the connection, and what exactly the connection is between Wittgenstein and Ethnomethodology. What we did last time - It was pretty interesting, but we could pick-up on that later on.

[Tr: pause and omits]

Jeff Coulter: Anyone else?

One of the things I'd thought vaguely of doing was to go through the Turn-Taking paper, and do a logicist re-conceptualization of that. [Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., and Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking in conversation. LANGUAGE, 50(4), 696-735. Version in J. Schenkein (Ed.) (1978). STUDIES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION (pp. 7-55). New York, NY: Academic Press] I'm not so sure that's going to be all that interesting, because it's the same set of arguments. It has to do there with the nature of the rule system being proposed. Well, there - a kind of concrete issue - is that Zimmerman and Wilson, for example, have set off now on a strictly

empiricist tangent out of the turn-taking materials, out of the turn-taking analysis, and are interested in producing kind of stochastic models of the phenomenon, or in attempting to predict, or to assign probabilities to the occurrences of things like overlap and interruption. That to me seems to trivialize the thrust of the Turn-taking discussion, or the Simplest Systematics article. And yet it does show that this whole debate going on - that some of us are trying to start, anyway - between the, if you like, the logical or grammatical approach, and the purely empiricist or regularity deriving approach, has real consequences for how things are going to develop. But as I say, my own arguments would just be re-iterations of what we've talked about in respect of sequencing. But, of course, you know that there's quite a big difference between the machinery that is established for the analysis of SEQUENTIAL PHENOMENA, and the turn-taking phenomena, though they inter-lock. That is to say, that the basic sequential structures, like Adjacency Pairs, Insertion-Expansion, Pre-sequence, Repair, and the sequential operators are defined over illocutionary act-types. And the Turn-taking argument is not defined over illocutionary act-types, but the two inter-relate. So, for example, clearly, it is turn allocationally relevant that adjacency first-pair-parts are produced. So, that, in other words, that producing an Adjacency-Pair first-part has turn-allocational functions, i.e., in selecting a next. And then also in selecting, or delimiting, or constraining the possible action that is produced by any next speaker. So there are relations, but they're all logical relations, as I see them. In other words, the bringing together, or concatenating of the Turn-taking apparatus, and the independently specified apparatus for sequence-types, can be concatenated. It's just a question of working through the relevancies of both, and inter-locking them in appropriate ways. It's not been done, to my knowledge, though it is alluded to in various papers. And it would be a technical exercise to work that out, but... So anyway, it's on the table to talk about how.

Dave Bogen: Yeah. I was just going to say I missed at least the first session, and so I'm unclear as to how thinking about the seminar last term, how we made it from Wittgenstein to Sacks. It also seems that in doing that, at least chronologically, Garfinkel's been somewhat by-passed, and that would be natural, because of the sort of linguistic affinities - the affinities between Sacks and Wittgenstein - that they are

approaching social facts as linguistic, but it's by no means clear what the connections are with Garfinkel, other than sort of maybe in terms of logical spirit, or something like that.

Jeff Coulter: Well, in the first session I was running through certain of Garfinkel's study policies, and then trying to make the argument that Sacks' programme of Conversation Analysis could be seen to be an implementation of at least some of those study policies. Whether or not they were consciously so designed is neither here nor there. I suspect Yes and No - is the answer to that. Yes, in the sense that, of course, Sacks used to call himself an Ethnomethodologist, and was influenced by Garfinkel, but perhaps No in the sense that CA takes off on its own, in it's own ways. But, one of the key things, of course, is not to think of Conversation Analysis as the exclusive development from Garfinkel's study policies, though of course it's been the most successful, and cumulative of the enterprises stimulated by those study policies.

Well, the study policies that I was focusing on came out of chapter 1 of STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY. In particular where Garfinkel is talking about indexical expressions, and the contrast between cleaning-up indexical expressions prior to analysis. In other words the idea that a Sociology of practical action, and practical communication, must first, in some sense, reconstruct its objects. That is to say - and this Garfinkel speaks of as "constructive theorizing" - that, in other words, you don't get in pre-Ethno studies of practical action, and practical communication, the REAL MESSY world there. The real stuff that people are saying to each other. You get ethnographic descriptions, you get coded access, if you like, coded access to the phenomena that you're interested in. OR you get the phenomena of interest subsumed under some metaphorical rubric, like the dramaturgical approach, the cinematic approach - all of which Garfinkel speaks of as forms of constructive analytic theorizing. And so what he says is that, in a sense, this is sort of cleaning-up the data, i.e., it's not attending to the properties of the phenomena in their own right, but rather attending to the properties of the phenomena UNDER the auspices of some prior stipulative concern, i.e., for example, how best to group a whole collection of things under a metaphorical auspices. Or in the case of some of the work of logicians and linguists, how to generate clean text, or how to operate upon a form of data, as in the Chomskian

case, that consists of the set of grammatical sentences, where the ungrammatical, or the unacceptable, or the deviant are assigned now to a domain of mere use, and the ways in which the so-called area of pragmatics - and semantics, for a while, but certainly pragmatics - was sort of considered to be an intellectual dust-bin by Chomskian linguistics. A disorderly mess. And so what one deals with is not utterances as spoken, but sentences as generated by the intuitions of the competent speaker.

So, ok, Harold Garfinkel is saying now, basically, if we're interested in a more rigorous, or more real-worldly approach to the phenomena of communication and conduct, then there's no necessity for cleaning up the indexical expressions that are part and parcel of that phenomenon. Instead, he says what we should be looking at are what he calls the "rational properties" of indexical expressions and indexical actions. And then he generates the idea of the in situ character, and the necessity for analysis to be responsive to the situated particulars of the production of action.

Well, then we moved on, I think, after that to speak to what exactly indexicality was about. It has to do with the contextually situated nature of the phenomena in the sense where Garfinkel says: There's no concept of context in general. He moves toward the very radical position that what could possibly count as a context for any piece of conduct is itself, in a sense, provided for by that conduct. Which finds its way into later Conversation Analytic observations as: Talk displaying its own relevant setting.

So, what we begin with is a notion of indexicality of action which provides that it's not that you can now, simply by looking at real activities in real time, provide for their context by invoking some generalized description of the setting or the surroundings INDEPENDENTLY of inspecting the details of Members' displayed orientations to the particulars of context. In other words, it's to introduce a sharp division between 'context' and 'relevant context'. And we started to talk about how, for example, in order to understand what I'm now trying to do, that it's on the eastern coast of the United States is a part of its context in some general kind of unmotivated sense of context, i.e., it is in some sense part of the surroundings of what I'm doing. But what is relevant context for understanding what I'm saying,

what I'm doing, what you're doing in respect to me, it would not [Tr: NECESSARILY] be. Why not? Well, it would not be insofar as it could not be found to be an oriented to- It is not a category. It is not an object of orientation that could be seen to be informing the production and mutual monitoring of what is here going on, either by explicit topic, or implicit orientation.

So the next step is to see that a major aspect of what counts as relevant context for any piece of behavior - and this is where Sacks, in a sense, particularizes the whole problem of the context/conduct gestalt - by seeing that one stable, omni-relevant aspect of relevant context for any kind of conduct is its sequential location, is its position vis-a-vis other conduct. And this gets exemplified in the very early lectures by the famous case of the question that turns into an answer, as you look at it. Where you see before your very eyes the question, without touching the thing. You write the question on the board. Without touching it, you put stuff either side of it, and it becomes an answer, or a quotation.

[Tr: See pages 6-7, Meeting 15.]

What time did you get back?

A: What did she ask you?

B: "What time did you get back?"

A: Oh, hell!]

And from here the development of the interest in the sequential organization of conduct, particularly communicative conduct, is in Sacks, particularly in his early work, always tied to questions having to do with comprehension, having to do with how it is that persons manage to understand one another and coordinate what they're doing together as if they were reasoning about it. In other words, you get a sort of a discursive idealization, in some of the early writings of Sacks, that sets the thing up. So he states like this: It's as if the utterances and their parts are all produced as solutions to problems. So, for example, somebody says something - I have to figure out what he's doing in what he's saying. So, I analyze and monitor it for its sequential position.

And then someone says something subsequent to that, and then the same problem arises as to what he's doing, what he means by what he says. And one thing I could appeal to here is to see what its relationship might possibly be to the prior thing that was done and said. So you get that sort of elaboration, AS IF everything that is produced is sort of the outcome of courses of reasoning, or problem solving activity.

But this is clearly just a pedagogical device, because in the more carefully crafted lectures, and certainly in the published materials, there's nothing of that over-intellectualization of the agent. Instead, as I've argued, you can see a steady transition through the writings of Sacks, and certainly in a lot of the work of Schegloff, toward treating the phenomena of conduct as, so to speak, objects *sui generis*, that is conversational or communicative objects with their own properties, where nothing determinate can be said about the producers, but only determinate things about the properties of the things produced. And where anything that's said about the producers of the things produced is seen itself to be another thing produced, i.e., an attribution, an ascription. Where even the explanation for why somebody said what they said is seen itself now to be something said. So 'giving reasons for actions' are themselves treated as actions. And now you're interested in the properties of reasons as kinds of communicative objects - excuses, justifications, and the rest of it.

So there is this sort of detachment, if you like, from the analysis of the agent as practical reasoner to the, if you like, the logical properties of these objects, i.e., their bits of conduct, their conduct. And in particular, the combinatorial logic of those objects, i.e., in the sequence stuff, as I see it, the sequential stuff is an attempt to work out a combinatorial logic for illocutionary behavior.

So that's one connection.

Well, the Wittgensteinian stuff comes in in part, I think, as a corrective to the ways in which we are to think about what we are doing. But there's no doubt about it that Garfinkel's own work is influenced by Wittgenstein, though he only cites him a couple of times. Some of his pre-1967 papers show extensive study of the later Wittgenstein, including a serious reading of David Pole's work, and some of the writings of Stanley Cavell, and

much else besides.

But in "Formal Structures of Practical Action", Garfinkel speaks of the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS as a book in which what Wittgenstein is doing is looking at philosophers' talk as indexical expressions themselves. [Tr: Garfinkel, H., and Sacks, H. (1970). On formal structures of practical action. in J.C. McKinney and E. A. Tiryakian (Eds.) THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES AND DEVELOPMENTS (pp. 338-366). New York: NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.] That is to say, taking, for example, and probably the best example of this would be Wittgenstein's ON CERTAINTY where he's really sort of debating with G.E. Moore. And so he's talking about Moore's philosophical locutions, explicitly. He very rarely does this in the PI. The only people he takes on explicitly are people like William James, who he more or less quotes, occasionally Russell and Frege, and Augustine. But in ON CERTAINTY, it's clear that he's subjecting Moore's philosophical pronouncements to analysis as indexical expressions. But what he's doing by doing that, that is Wittgenstein, is really making an irony out of Moore's intentions, because of course Moore wants to treat, for example, his claim "I have a hand in front of me" as an example of a metaphysical certitude. Whereas what Wittgenstein does is to say: It can only be given that peculiar status if you detach it from its actual domain of application. Language has gone on holiday there. So now: Under what circumstances would one ever really say that?

So it's not that in these places Wittgenstein is really doing a sort of analysis of philosophers' talk as indexical expressions. What he's doing is saying that they have a metaphysical sort of status to them, or they take on the illusion of profundities ONLY when they are treated as OTHER than indexical expressions. So that what we have to do in philosophy is to see that all of these philosophers' pronouncements that appear either so profound or so remarkably odd should be treated as-- We should look for their real world analogue, and see how they would actually work were they looked at AS indexical expressions. But other than those kinds of allusions, Wittgenstein's later work doesn't really figure prominently in Garfinkel's writings.

Mike Lynch: Can we go back to what you just ran through: Garfinkel's treatment of Wittgenstein, or the reference to Wittgenstein in

the "Formal Structures" paper. I always understood it to be a backhanded complement to Wittgenstein. That on the one hand it locates Wittgenstein's analysis as an important antecedent, but on the other hand it limits its adequacy to the system of talk generated by philosophers, for each others company. And the suggestion then would be that Wittgenstein's work is relevant by analogy, but not by direct procedure. That if you want to understand construction workers, conversationalists - however you want to formulate a system - that you don't want to derive your analysis from how Wittgenstein works his materials, because they are endogenous to the doing of philosophy as a talking enterprise. You want to rediscover what that competent system could consist of not as something to held up against philosopher's talk, but as a reflexively analyzable system in itself.

Jeff Coulter: Fair enough. But the point that I was trying to make about that allusion was - Yes it is a backhanded complement in a sense - But it is its backhandedness that is sort of a bit irritating, because it's not that Wittgenstein was-

[Tr: Brief break to locate a copy of the "Formal Structures" paper to get the reference exactly correct. A number of people leave the room in search, but the discussion continues while they are gone.]

Jeff Coulter: The connection I'm going to go on to make is, of course, with Garfinkel's treatment of rules. That's I think where there's a clear relationship, and where I think Wittgenstein's treatment is more developed than Garfinkel's though they are both on the right track. But I would want to say that Wittgenstein's treatment of the business of rules and rule-following is more elaborate than Garfinkel's. But I must confess I only came to Wittgenstein, and many of us only came to Wittgenstein, on rules through Garfinkel.

Dave Bogen: That's interesting. You're working it up in just the opposite direction in a certain sense.

Jeff Coulter: Yes. But it should also be said that I don't think many Wittgenstein scholars got Wittgenstein right on rules until quite recently. I think there's a lot of mistaken writings out there on Wittgenstein on rules,

particularly the notion that he was a sort of generic rule-skeptic in respect of language and communication. But we'll talk about that in a little while.

[Tr: Some of those who left return with a copy of the paper]

Jeff Coulter: I don't want to make such a lot of this, because it's only a little allusion.

[Tr: Continue to wait for others to return, during which the discussion continues]

Jeff Stetson: Jeff, along that line, could we discuss the a priori and the writings of philosophers such as Bar-Hillel, who try to establish non-indexical expressions?

Jeff Coulter: Sure, we can talk about anything you like. In fact, I wasn't quite sure about how to go from here. But we can take it in any different tack.

One of the things that we should probably get to, which I think makes an important connection, at least for me, is treating Garfinkel on rules, and Wittgenstein on rules.

Mike Lynch: Certainly the "Trust" paper would be the most relevant thing. He makes reference to Wittgenstein in there. [Tr: Garfinkel, H. (1963). A conception of, and experiments with, "trust" as a condition of stable concerted actions. In O.J. Harvey (Ed.) MOTIVATION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION (pp. 187-238). New York, NY: Roland Press.]

Jeff Coulter: There is an allusion. Yes. It's a very strange one. I'll tell you where there's an explicit allusion, other than just like a reference, an explicit allusion in STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY is where he's talking about questionnaires, and the ways in which answers to questions are generated through the introduction of a questionnaire. And he quotes Wittgenstein as saying that: Here we have a language-game. The language-game of asking questions and getting answers. Then he says: But our question is whose game is being played? Now, when you say "whose language-game is being played?", you're not talking Wittgenstein's concept of language-game at all. So what notion of language-game are we deriving there

from... Or is it meant to be NOT an allusion there?

Mike Lynch: Yeah, well, I think what he's talking about though is that a question, insofar as sociologists make it analyzable, is treated as an object within maybe if you want to treat the entire complex of survey analysis as a language-game - but's that () - utilizes a device: question that (has an entirely....sense) when spoken and heard within a conversational order that would otherwise be () competence. So I think "whose" refers to - sociologists have, just like philosophers, have their ways with words.

Jeff Coulter: Yes, I agree. I'm sure that that's what he's after in saying that. Absolutely. But I was just wondering, when I came across it, whether or not it was meant to be a sort of subtle criticism of Wittgenstein, or whether it was meant to be a deliberate mis-use. Because the notion of language-game has no role to play in relationship to persons. It's not WHOSE language-game.

Mike Lynch: Although "who" may not refer to a person in that expression either. It may refer to a collectivity, a distinguishable collectivity, being sociologists as opposed to others, those they analyze. Just as you could say of Wittgenstein that he's critically analyzing a distinction between what philosophers do with language, so the "who" would refer to philosophers, vis-a-vis some ordinary sense of things, or some variety of ordinary senses of things. They aren't necessarily possessed by persons, but by settings which may be integrated with institutions, socialized bodies, and so forth.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah. Fair enough. I mean I don't want to pin a lot on it.

Mike Lynch: But I don't see that to be a sub-critique like that reference in "Formal Structures".

[Tr: The members of the seminar have reassembled]

Jeff Coulter: Let me just read this one, then we'll move on, because all I'm doing now is culling the very, very few explicit references to the later Wittgenstein in Garfinkel's published writings. The section in the "Formal Structures" paper is called "A Characterization of Indexical Expressions" [Tr: p. 348], and reads like this:

An awareness of indexical expressions occurs not only in the earliest writing but in the work of major authors over the entire history of logic. Every major philosopher has commented on them. Consider for example Peirce and Wittgenstein, Pierce because he is usually cited to mark the beginning of the interest of modern logicians and linguists in indexicals, and Wittgenstein because when his later studies are read to see that he is examining philosophers' talk as indexical phenomena, and is describing these phenomena without thought of remedy, his studies will be found to consist of a sustained, extensive, and penetrating corpus of observations of indexical phenomena.

Now, I think it's fair to say that you can certainly read the PI to consist in "a sustained, extensive and penetrating corpus of observations of indexical phenomena". As I hope should now be clear, after last semester, and after your readings. BUT, it's also clear, to me at least, that when Wittgenstein is treating philosophers' talk as indexical phenomena, he is doing so WITH thought of remedy, i.e., what he's saying is they haven't really been seen that way before. And when they're seen that way, we bring language back from the sky, down to earth, and we re-engage language with the rest of the machinery.

Mike Lynch: Yeah, but that's not the remedy, I don't think, that is being spoken of. The remedy would be - If, for instance, you take a usage like 'inner experience' - philosophers arguing about matters of 'inner experience'. Or what would be a specific thing? 'Certainty' from ON CERTAINTY, or the PI - It's a very specific item for philosophers' discourse; knowledge, something like that, the concept of knowledge. I'd think it would be fair to say that Wittgenstein is not setting out to rescue the concept. So there's no remedy for these concepts that he pulls out from long-standing philosophical debate. He's not saying that there's a solution at hand for rescuing these ideas. What you're taking about as a remedy is maybe a redirection of philosophical discourse, but not in the service of rescuing traditional philosophical concepts.

Jeff Coulter: Well, it depends how you read 'remedying what', I guess.

Steve Turner: This is very puzzling though. In a way it's not about Wittgenstein at all. It's really about- This is what G.E. Moore always did. He does a kind of ethnography of philosophical talk, and he says: Isn't it crazy that people talk like this. And his message is that the philosophers that he was criticizing were using language in some odd way. When Wittgenstein does it, he's explicitly NOT doing what Moore was doing by saying, in other words, that there is a kind of philosophical talk, and that's not a good kind of talk. The right kind of talk is this kind of talk. But the idea is, presumably, to show WHY it is that language naturally leads us to want to get into this other kind of talk - what the snares are in ordinary language itself that lead us to have philosophical ideas, and wants, and therefore into confusions. So either this is just a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein, or just a very light- But, I guess my reading of it was that wasn't what he was saying at all. It's not that he's an ethnographer of philosophy. But one way of reading the sentence would be that that is what he's being presented as.

Jeff Coulter: Yes, I like that.

Dave Bogen: There's also, though, the notion 'without remedy'. Remedy only gets off the ground as a concept where you presume illness.

Jeff Coulter: And Wittgenstein's later work is explicitly set-up as therapeutic.

Dave Bogen: It's set-up as therapeutic for philosophers-

Jeff Coulter: For metaphysicians.

Dave Bogen: -presuming no illness. And the point is: No illness in the ordinary language.

Mike Lynch: Yeah, ok.

Dave Bogen: So, it's not a matter of constructing perfect languages, in order to perfect something that is imperfect in the first place. You can't get the concept of 'remedy' off the ground then, in a certain sense. Only within the discipline of philosophy, which has been practicing that, is correction sort of...

Jeff Coulter: Well, here it bears upon whether or not - and this is an Ethnomethodologically interesting thing - it bears on whether or not there is such a thing as 'intelligible philosopher's discourse' in the old sense. Now, Wittgenstein is saying No. Garfinkel - I don't know whether he would want to say No, because, first of all, we have the policy of 'Ethnomethodological indifference', the bracketing of the epistemic status of the phenomenon inquired into - as a methodological policy. So that THIS I think is a consequential point. Let me work it through this way: The argument is that we are interested in the rational properties of activities, the RATIONAL action. As he puts it many times in STUDIES many times, philosophers have tended to be much more interested in deviance than in rational action. There are one or two exceptions, but that's been on the whole the case. Our interest is to elucidate how rational activities, and courses of activities are possible, how they are done, and understood to be done in situ. And he speaks of them as ongoing practical accomplishments, achievements. And so we generate the plethora of studies that we have of the different domains of social life in which people are going about doing what they do effectively, planfully, intelligibly, typically, intelligently, coherently, all of that list of adjectives that you find connected to the concepts of action in Garfinkel's writings. They are ALL normatively positive kinds of modifiers that he uses. Rationally, with efficacy, intelligibly, etc. Accomplishment is, after all, an achievement notion.

Now, if it comes to looking at performances that are in some sense intrinsically defective by some criterion, i.e., failures, what's to be done? Is it that there is an integrity to metaphysical discourse of some discoverable kind? The whole thrust of Wittgenstein's later writing is to provide ways of seeing, first of all, how it could be that there could be such, what he called, "grammatical monstrosities". As Steve was saying, like how language can be guileless, so to speak, to make grammatical mis-assimilations, and reifications, and all kinds of errors of category types, and all the rest of it. But then, the point is to do therapy, to get the fly out of the bottle, to let us see that traditional philosophical practice, discourse, now stands in need of this corrective. So it's NOT a domain of rational action from Wittgenstein's point of view. It's a disease of the intellect. Now, from the standpoint

of Ethnomethodology, we're to abstain systematically from the evaluation of our orders of subject matter. It's not up to us, unilaterally, as analysts, as Ethnomethodologists to go around saying things like: Here's...

[Tr: tape change]

Jeff Coulter(cont): ...mental illness, or there's something basically irrational about assigning motive to people. That judgment, whether it be generic or particular, is suspended methodologically in the interests of finding out how what's done is done. So, now, it seems to me that what we read here, in this paragraph, and what I've heard Garfinkel say on occasion, on the few occasions he addressed himself to the later Wittgenstein, is that Wittgenstein is doing ironies. We [Tr: ethnomethodologists] don't do ironies. So, our enterprise in regard to, say, philosophical practice and discourse, would be like any other, like the car salesman practice and discourse, or the physicians, or the conversationalists. It would be to look at it as having an integrity, and having.... without hope of remedy. We look at it without hope of remedy.

Now, that's a problem, I think, that is worth mentioning in respect of Ethno.

Mike Lynch: There's an ambiguity there.

Steve Turner: Yeah, he gives paragraph references here. It would be interesting to take a look at the INVESTIGATIONS, and see what he's actually talking about.

[Tr: omits]

Jeff Coulter: It's a generic reference to Wittgenstein.

Steve Turner: It should be, [Tr: given the syntax of the footnote reference], but Peirce is not in paragraphs. That wouldn't mean anything in Peirce.

Jeff Coulter: Oh I see what you mean. So it's juxtaposed. That's a good clue. I'll look those up.

Mike Lynch: I guess the thing about "irremediable" is one context in which he uses that expression irremediable is when he's talking about

indexical expressions, and the whole history of philosophical attempts to build determinate meanings for indexical expressions to try to repair the vagaries of their use. So that the term 'irremediable' then points out that they are essentially indexical, and we want to study the properties of what that is, how you understand through the use of indexicals. And I'd want to read that citation to Wittgenstein again, but my understanding of that I believe, is that he's talking about indexicals in the context of philosophers' uses as being irremediable. That Wittgenstein grasped the irremediability of philosophers' usages in their efforts to repair their indexicality. And he identified the indexicality of philosophers' usage as a phenomenon in itself. Now, that's a very vague formulation of what Wittgenstein's up to, because he's doing all this exquisite, intricate analysis of this and that concept. But it's different than what you said which was the irremediability of - in reference to the "indifference" posture - that you don't try to remedy the enterprise. You don't try to locate its failings and remedy that.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah... In saying what I was saying I was just trying to give more flesh to the idea that he's treating Wittgenstein as if he were doing dispassionate analysis of the indexical phenomena of philosophers' discourse. {ML: Ok} And that's clearly NOT what he was doing.

Now, Ok, fair enough. Perhaps that's a misreading. But it doesn't seem to me to be just a misreading. I mean Garfinkel doesn't just misread things. I think it's connected with something like the general posture of Ethnomethodology toward domains of phenomena. And one of the things that I've heard from him, and from others, is that there CANNOT be a consistent relationship between the later Wittgenstein and Garfinkel's approach to things. Primarily because Garfinkel cannot be interested in critique, if you like, or in remedying phenomena. And "remedying" as from here - "without thought of remedy" - not now speaking about just remedying indexical expressions into objective ones, but remedying the practices.

Now, I think that's an interesting thing to pick-up on, because as we noticed when we were looking at the sequential stuff, one of the things that Conversation Analysts never do is assign incompetence to speaker/hearers.

Mike Lynch: Right. They work very hard not to.

Jeff Coulter: That's right. And one of the things that Ethnomethodologists, in keeping with an aspect of the phenomenological tradition, from which some of this thinking emerges, is to avoid, as scrupulously as possible, to bracket, or to suspend judgments with respect to the adequacy by some standards of what's being looked at. BUT, my argument would be, that the very terms of analysis build in an orientation to the phenomena that provides for them AS achievements, as rational, as orderly, as intelligible. That that now becomes the sine qua non of getting analysis off the ground - that they are to be thought of as having that kind of integrity. So that, if we think now of Wittgenstein looking at an array of practices, and forms of discourse as intrinsically defective, i.e., he wants it to stop happening in the world. That's of course not a postulate an Ethnomethodologist could assume. But then it seems that the converse postulate is being assumed. In other words, maybe the converse postulate is to extend a generic sort of mantle of orderliness, and rationality, and accomplishment to anything whatsoever - including philosophers' discourse.

Mike Lynch: There's a problem there however. The whole characterization of intelligible, understandable, rational, etc., etc., is a very deliberate misleading use of established terms. In fact, in one of his lectures, Garfinkel in recent years started out talking about how he's going to seduce his audience by using their familiar vocabularies in order to take them a certain distance, in order to deny what they thought they understood at the beginning. And when he's talking about the rational properties of indexical expression, at least in 1967, he's talking about things like the "documentary method of interpretation" - which Sociologists look at aghast, at how irrational it is, at how it's like the Azande, which in traditional terms had been viewed as irrational. So that when he's talking about rational properties, he's talking about intelligible, he's talking about forms of activity - and at that time he was talking about interpretive practices that are usually dismissed as not worthy of examination because they can't stand up to skeptical scientific scrutiny. They're bad methods compared to the refined methods of the social sciences. So when he extends the mantle of rationality to them, all of a sudden what we mean by rationality is totally transformed.

Steve Turner: Transformed into what? Do you have a new concept of 'rationality'?

Mike Lynch: No, you don't have a concept of rationality as he explicates it. He talks about "discovering" what you could be talking about by using a term such as "rationality" in terms of some local practice that you examine. So that you're not extending the generic sense of it. In fact, you're denying a generic sense in reference to what you might discover next.

Jeff Coulter: And yet to know that any $n + 1$ th discovery is a discovery relevant to that issue presupposes that one is operating with a concept.

Steve Turner: () a concept of 'intelligibility' or 'rationality' that you then are discovering in all these places.

Mike Lynch: Well, yeah. Part of it is that you are thrown into a world in which these things are established as academic discourse. So you pick them up, you take them into a setting where they are not usually brought under analysis, and you try to find some basis for saying that you are talking about rationality with respect to air-traffic controllers, or whatever, and what you explicate as rationality is not a derivative of some a priori sense of the term as it's been used. It's more that the a priori sense becomes a bridge to some (unanticipated) version of it.

Jeff Coulter: Let's pick up on that.

Dave Bogen: Yeah. This gets back to a point we were raising last term that is sort of interesting - if I understand what you're saying correctly. We had talked in Wittgenstein about the notion of 'invisible light', and whether a concept, say, like 'rationality' - look at how it's used in the first chapter [Tr: of STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY]: accountable, intelligible, etc., i.e., the rational properties of practical actions. It looks like a nice global term there. If, on the other hand, we are being led down the garden path in order to neither articulate this global notion of rationality, nor even just EXTEND the notion of rationality, but to TRANSFORM it, then is "rationality" even usable anymore? In other words, it's become something else. It's become something quite other. Then it's not even a legitimate extension of the concept. It doesn't grow out of that, yet in practice it IS an extension of the concept because that's how we got

there.

Mike Lynch: Yeah.

Jeff Coulter: Now try it this way. Let me see what I think is going on. -- There's a little bit of intellectual history in this too, because it might clarify it a bit. And then see what you think of it.

In the early days, as a graduate student reading this stuff under the sway of the Symbolic Interactionists' general view of meaning, and the mentalistic reading of "Verstehen", it appeared that there were two kinds of meanings in the world. There were the "subjective" meanings of things that the ACTORS had, and then there were the meanings that the RESEARCHER had. Sometimes they were the same; sometimes they were different, but there was always a problem. There is the problem of the relationship.

Now, the way that this kind of thing got worked through, it seems to me, in some parts of Ethnomethodological discourse is in respect of the distinction between the sense of something to the analyst, and the sense of things to the members. So that, for example, one can say things like, as Garfinkel does: It is a leading study policy of Ethnomethodology NOT to import pre-established categories of analysis, nor RULES formulated INDEPENDENTLY of the orientations of settings' members. That's a rough paraphrase of one of the study policies.

Now that clearly, it seems to me, does NOT mean, as it has often been taken to mean, that now one hands over, so to speak, the sovereignty as to what things mean to the members' own native locutions vis-a-vis what things mean -- So that now one has to take whatever members say things mean -- that that's what they mean. So, there's all this stuff around the critical literature on Ethno. that says things like: Well, all Ethnomethodology does is it hands over the meanings of things to the subjectivity of the actors, the members. So that "deviance" is whatever the members say it is. Or ANYTHING is what the members say it is. Which, I think, is quite a crass misreading. But where is it?

Here now we're talking about rationality. We know that there are stipulations in the literature, say Parsons' "means-end" scheme, for example -- all of the other stipulated schemes as to what

rationality is, what it can mean, whether it be operationalized in some way, or be given a stipulative definition. And we know that in significant respects the conceptions of rationality that are around in the academic literature, many of them, if not all of them, have a moot relationship to the concept as it is ordinarily used in everyday discourse by persons in their various activities. But that does NOT mean that now when one is critical of the almost arbitrariness, if you like, of the analyst's stipulated sense of the thing, that one now goes to ask members what they could mean by whatever these words mean. Because asking the members what some words mean, or what something amounts to, or how to identify something, or what counts as 'deviant' - presupposes that, of course, you have some working sense of what will count as an INTELLIGIBLE response. So if some member tells you, or somebody is going about the world finding things to be other than they could possibly be, you don't count that into your canon of data. You know very well what these things mean. So, it seems to me that we need something like to de-empiricize the notion of sense. It's not that we have this division between the stipulated analyst's sense, of say rationality, or whatever, and some set of local members' senses that they could evince in some way. Rather we've got this: Sense in the language, which some members may or may not have access to, the same as some analysts.

Now you may say: This is a reification. What the hell could "sense in the language" be? Sense in the language OTHER THAN some sort of extrapolation from what people might actually come up with. But here is a key distinction that Wittgenstein draws our attention to. When he says: Don't ask for the meaning, look for the use - Or when he is speaking about the necessity to think of meaning in terms of rules of proper use of concepts and expressions - He's NOT saying that USE is the explanation of use that might come from some member's mouth. In other words, there are, if you like, grammars to concepts that members might not be able to reflect upon, or to generate for themselves, any more than analysts might. And it takes an explicatory labor to work out the logical grammar of concepts, and therefore to work out their sense in the language.

Now, if you delete the notion of logical grammar, or sense in a language, and dissolve sense to, on the one hand, the analyst's operationally purposeful, or stipulative definitions of things, or you go the other way and speak of sense in a

language as whatever the members would tell you, it seems to me that in both cases you are shorn of criteria for discriminating between intelligible elucidations. You don't find out what things mean by doing surveys, and you don't find out what things mean in a language by consulting members since you have to have some principle by which to consult members' practices - since members can and do mis-use the language. Analysts can and do, mis-use, misunderstand. So when it comes down to something like the question of rational action, or whatever else one is interested in elucidating about the ways in which comprehension and meaning are a part of the social world, it CANNOT be other than a matter of elucidating sense in a language. Now, of course, that elucidation is done by an analyst. And it is done by an analyst ON orders of sense.

Now the question is: How is it that you can generate criteria from inspecting USE such that you could then, having generated those criteria, rule out of court as meaningLESS whole orders of USE, i.e., philosophers' use. And this was the problem that I think Wittgenstein solves in the INVESTIGATIONS. He provides for the specific forms of de-contextualization that attend philosophers' uses when they are doing certain kinds of reasoning and speaking, and notes that the kinds of locutions that they come up with as a basis for their metaphysical claims DO have a home in practice, and ONLY in certain kinds of practices. So, for example: "I KNOW I'm in pain", cannot possibly be an epistemic, or cognitive claim. It's not a knowledge claim in the sense that it seems to be, rather it's a stressor of the sort that you might come up with when your pain avowal, or pain behavior is being discredited by someone. For example a physician who is probing you and you say "Owwl". And the guy says: "You can't be in pain there". So, "I KNOW I'm in pain" is really rather like saying: "I'm in pain, DAMN IT!". And, so, it's with these sorts of analyses that Wittgenstein is working. But it's a very tricky one, because the appeal to USE is not the appeal to any old use, and, it seems to me, that in Ethnomethodology we need to bear that in mind.

Dusan Bjelic: How I understood Mike is - even though he didn't say that, but it seems to me that that was the tune of thought - is that Garfinkel's criterial ground for the use of rationality is contingent upon a set of practices which we are applying when we look at certain phenomena in situ. Now those are the practices which are not

predictable because we don't know what kind of phenomena we are looking for. Therefore we cannot determine - there are all kinds of usages for that particular word "rationality". So it is that sort of practices that will give criteria FOR that concept 'rationality' when we come on the field and we DO, and we methodologically approach certain phenomena. So it is that whole set of practices that can EXPAND the circum-boundaries of the logical grammar of a certain concept. Now, how that is going to be used is not- There are no rules that we can term where are the boundaries. It is the same thing, like you can say: In history the square was known by the members as a figure that has four identical sides. That a square is a figure that is symmetrical, and so on. But in Picasso's work, square can be a human body in Cubistic paintings. Now that's a new logical grammar of it. Even though we know that the human body is not symmetrical at all, but in this set of practices the logical grammar is extended, AND it can be as a human body.

Jeff Coulter: Well, I don't want to get into concept extensions of grammar right now. But you did say something that triggers the following observation: Namely that, when one is railing, as Ethnomethodology historically has done, one is railing against the arbitrariness of analytic stipulation in respect of human conduct, the natural inclination then is to say: Right, I'm not going to lay down what rationality is, or what anything is. I'm not going to lay down what anything in the world is. I'm having no pre-conceptions. Instead, I'm going to let members instruct me as to what these things could amount to, as to what to subsume under them. But, of course, it's as if now one has removed faulty constraints, and replaced them with no constraints at all. But in fact there ARE constraints, because you know where to go to look for cases of marriage, and cases of diagnosis. And you know what kinds of things could count as 'rational' vis-a-vis 'irrational' conduct for certain kinds of domains. You can see it. If you can't see it, then you yourself LACK the concept, or lack a fully developed sense of the concept.

Let's say one goes to study doctor-patient interaction. You go to a hospital, but lo and behold you don't know all the doctors have been kidnapped, and there's a bunch of imposters taking their place. And they're all walking round, and they know that there's an Ethnomethodologist coming down there to study them, and they are going to go

around doing the craziest things, just to screw-up your study. - You'll know without a shadow of a doubt that this is crazy stuff that's going on. They are not doing diagnoses. They're using the stethoscope in radically deviant ways. We know how to use a stethoscope, etc., etc. So, of course we have conceptions. - The question is what constrains the search procedure, what constrains the inquiry is NOT operationalizations. What it is is the logical grammar of the concepts that we have. And the logical grammar of the concepts that we have are shared, more or less. So, what the pre-requisite of analysis is, the elucidation of the concepts relevant to a domain of conduct. We need to now place constraints on our theorizing, or our conceptualizing BY getting rid of stipulation, and putting in logico-grammatical constraints - But making them explicit - on our inquiries. And in that sense we are constraining both ourselves, and our subject matter, but in a principled fashion.

Dusan Bjelic: But Jeff words have meaning only in language-games. Now, there are also new language-games. We are inventing new language-games and the meaning is extended. We're going to get new ways of using our words. Now, how you are presenting it is that there are only certain sets of language-games, and we are to constrain ourselves on those language-games that are available.

Jeff Coulter: No, no. Grammar is historically evolving.

Dusan Bjelic: Well, so, (and) the course of methodological practice IS that history where you can invent new language-games. Now, I'm not saying that Garfinkel wouldn't accept the common understanding of rationality. He's just saying that for our Ethnomethodological purposes, we have to keep the meaning of that word open, because we don't know how we are going to use this word in our set of practices. Is like building a wall, and suddenly you don't have a brick, but you have a rock, which is a concept of rationality which doesn't absolutely fit to that phenomena, but somehow you can use that to finish your building. And in that moment it has that new use. But HOW that is going to be used is un-predictable, because we don't know how we will (live) to use that in order to accomplish our enterprise.

Jeff Coulter: Well, just two responses, then to throw it open. But the first would be that of course you can have concept extensions, but they

can't be extended in any old way, and still be extensions. So any extension IN USE has got to have clear relations to the established logical grammar of the concept. That's number one. Otherwise you don't know that it's an extension of THAT concept, rather than some other one. [Tr: JC lost the thread for a moment of the second point]

Dusan Bjelic: Could I respond to the first? {JC: Go ahead} Well, what you're saying is that solution to our problem is that we agree in the words that you just said. What I'm saying is that you and I cannot find a solution to that problem right here sitting at the table. It is that practice and our action of using words that are going to say IF we can do something or not.

Jeff Coulter: I know what I was going to say, and it connects directly with that. You have a view of Ethnomethodology as a discovering enterprise. It makes discoveries. I don't see it that way. I see it to make explications. And so we would have a different view of data. You would see an Ethno inquiry, and the data that is used as its basis, as empirical support for discoveries of new kinds of aspects of human practice, or whatever. I see data as "elaborate reminders" of what is pre-theoretically, or, if you like, tacitly known.

Dusan Bjelic: That's fine. But what is your guarantee that when you do explication you will be using the words as people always use them? How do you know that when you come to the point to explicate something you will be struggling with finding the right- or to use words on a new way in order to explicate phenomena that everybody knows, and everybody takes for granted? Because what I'm saying that explication is a form of ART. And if you talk about art, there are no certain rules, and no certain boundaries of the objects that you are going to use. It's simply you are the one who has to invent new language-games, and then give new meaning to the words. That's how I understood it.

Jeff Coulter: All right.

Steve Turner: Actually the idea of inventing language-games is nice, because I think that is a good way of dividing this up. Give me a story where you invent a language-game. - I will say I don't think you can invent a language-game.

Dave Bogen: That's the distinction in the notion of discovery. We use "discovery" in two senses - one where you discover something that's sort of at least putatively already there, and one in which you discover something through the process of invention. {JC: Yes} And so we're trading on the two senses of "discovery" here. You'd have to admit to the first {JC: Yes} in a certain sense, that it's a discovering science in the sense that, as we talked about it before, Adjacency Pairs are not something that when you present them to somebody they go: [Tr: produced lackadaisically] "Oh yeah. Right". [Tr: Rather], they're "Oh!!". {JC: Yes} It's got that aspect to it.

Mike Lynch: Some of them are likely to say "So what?!"

[Tr: general laughter]

Dave Bogen: If they understand.

Jeff Coulter: Ah, yes and no. But go on. Anyways because nothing much hangs on that. Yeah. Right. Fair enough.

Dave Bogen: Yeah I mean just that point. Ok, so the issue of invention, if that's what you're taking up would maybe to-

Dusan Bjelic: For example, just an example: Sacks uses Socrates' "why", or Socrates' way of asking the questions in the course of conversation. And Nietzsche and Heidegger and all De-constructivists are pointing to exactly that phenomena (and) part of logocentrism, which came out by a man who in mundane activities was using the words in the way that nobody used them before.

Steve Turner: Yeah, but you see that's very tricky though. Obviously these people had to understand him or they couldn't have answered these questions. It has to be- So you're giving a story of, it seems to me, an EXTENSION of "why-talk" in a way that is, at least, intelligible to the people who are listening to the-

Dusan Bjelic: But what Socrates was doing is that he was putting them in puzzlement and bewilderment in a situation where they had never been before. And he was comparing their statements that were being said in different contexts, and saying: "Look, your statements are contradictory. What are you going to do about that?" Now, what they have to do is to invent the rules to make

those statements coherent. And that's how we have invention of their logical rules, that Plato describes, and Aristotle formalizes. Then we have logic. But it was-

Jeff Coulter: Ah, but the rules didn't make them coherent. The syllogism, for example, didn't suddenly make the argumentation coherent. It ELUCIDATED its coherence.

Dusan Bjelic: Yeah, I know, but I'm just answering his question: Where is that point when new language-game originates?

Jeff Coulter: That's not his question. His question to you was: Give me a scenario in which someone is inventing a new language-game. - Of course new language-games are originated in society. Really I think the challenge is: Does it makes sense to say that A GIVEN SPEAKER can INVENT a new language-game?

Mike Lynch: I think that that's not a relevant question, in a way. I mean, if we get back to what we were arguing about in Garfinkel's formulation. Because there's nothing in there that would ask of the analyst to invent a language-game anyway.

Steve Turner: Well now, I think there is a relevance, and it's this: Let's go back to this business of extending the concept of 'rationality', or finding the rationality in some situation. It seems to me that we all have to know an awful lot about 'rationality' in order to find it in this situation. We carry it all into it. And it's not that a new form has been invented there; it's intelligible to the people, and it's intelligible to us by virtue of the things we (share) with them.

Mike Lynch: No, I don't think anybody would deny that. The issue is, I think, and getting to this notion of 'discovery', is to first of all DENY that the claims to community between the analyst and the member - whoever that might be. Someone other than the analyst's favored interlocutors. And then to, given that we start out as analysts, as Sociologists, or so forth, we have an heir to things like "rationality", "action", and so forth, as stock in trade. We might as well start with that stuff. We have to, really. We can't erase the slate completely. But we'll start with that, and we'll start with an explicit policy that we don't yet know what we're talking about. That to use these terms, we don't know-

Steven Turner: Does that make sense though?

Mike Lynch: No. Well, in a sense it does. Ok. Then we place ourselves and our usages in a context where in effect we're rendered speechless. That what we'd previously understood as 'rationality', as the orderliness to action, doesn't work in those circumstances; that we are at a loss. That we don't know how to talk in a way that people can take seriously, at least if we talk in the () academic fashion. And then to re-discover in such a circumstance what it is to talk sensibly, what it is to be rational in some sense - if the word is used locally - I don't think it had to count that that mattered a whole lot, or that the word itself is used. But the notion of: Ok, evidently things are done routinely, effectively, to the apparent satisfaction of people going on. So HOW is that?, given that you start out as an analyst, schooled in Sociology for however many years, but yet are practically and intellectually at a loss as to what might be going on here. Where the concepts as they are previously established and as you could explicate them ad infinitum, in terms of your own understanding of them, they just don't work. There's something missing.

Jeff Coulter: You mean the Sociological terms of art?

Mike Lynch: Yeah, or even a term like "rationality".

Jeff Coulter: Which has a peculiar genealogy as a concept insofar as it has a vernacular home ab initio, unlike, say, Adjacency Pair, that has an analytic home as initio.

Mike Lynch: Yeah, but I think one of the things that Garfinkel is getting at, and it was certainly a claim that could be attacked, is that there was discontinuity between the "form of life", if you like, of analytic Sociology, and the way terms are brought-up, discussed, defended, criticized, etc., there, and the specifiable or unspecifiable everyday life worlds where maybe English may be spoken, but it's not spoken as we're accustomed to it, or we don't do the highly practiced work of social theorizing when we're lining up in a queue.

Steve Turner: Ok, well let me give a sort of quicky answer to that - which is really what puzzles me about the whole enterprise. It seems to

me that there is a kind of artificial trick you can play on yourself - like the famous thing in Dostoevsky where the situation is described from the view-point of a horse. Ok, you can externalize yourself in some artificial way from the situation, and then do this re-description trick, {ML: Oh yeah} and Ok I see that - that's what Symbolic Interactionists do all the time. And then they've got categories they stuff this stuff into, and you can feel like you've discovered something, orderliness in the situation. Then there's a different kind of situation where you actually DO go into the situation and - say you're talking about delinquent kids - and you can't figure out in certain specifiable situations that arise why they think that way, or what they could mean by that, or what kind of intentions they could have.

Mike Lynch: Or what you would have to do to make it intelligible.

Steve Turner: Right. - So one job you might have as a Sociologist - and maybe the primary job - is to patch it up so that you've got a way of making that intelligible. You've got a story you can tell, or you've got an assumption you can attribute to them that makes their conduct intelligible. Now that's kind of a NATURAL origin of a Sociological problem as distinct from these externalizing devices. But it gives you a different domain of problems. But it seems to me that you've also got a whole range of externalizing devices ().

Mike Lynch: Well, first of all, I don't see the applicability of the issue that it's an "externalizing" device that Garfinkel is getting at. If that's the case. I think the second alternative you laid out is closer to what he's getting at than this issue of an externalizing device - which he would criticize just as much as you would.

Steve Turner: Well, I don't know. It seems to me that when you say: Ok, we're going to make a policy of saying we don't understand anything here - that sounds to me like a kind of head-trick, and not even an intelligible one.

Mike Lynch: Well, actually the way it's presented is NOT as a head-trick, but in fact when Garfinkel talks about mis-reading the philosophers, and he would include Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, etc., he's talking about it in reference to work already in hand in Ethnomethodology that

having come upon conversation, as an analyzable, specifiable activity, we can then use what we've been finding in conversation as its orderliness to re-read the philosophers, and have it as though they were talking about this. And then you can proceed further to discover new ways of misreading them in reference to what you might bring to hand. So it's not a head-trick in that the charge is to put yourself, or place yourself, in a situation where as a practical matter you in a very bodily way have to contend with the insufficiency of your prior understandings of how the world works too. Then re-examine the academic landscape that may have initially brought you there.

Steve Turner: You keep going back between these two senses, or else another way of putting this would be: What is the status of the particular. Suppose you're Derrida, and you say: Ok, now what I'm going to do is to deconstruct this particular kind of talk, and by that I mean I'm going to show what kind of stuff has to go on backstage in order for people to be persuaded by this. - And we can say: Ok, now we can look at all kinds of texts, like letters to the editor, and Ford ads, and philosophical arguments in this way, and re-describe it in that way and come up with very interesting results. Or you can say: Gee, I'm Levi-Strauss, and I'm going to do this all in terms of binary oppositions. We're going to analyze this letter, we're going to do this...we're going to break it down. Ok, these are all- You externalize yourself from it in some way, and then you re-describe it. Then what's the status of those re-descriptions? Why is this re-description any more interesting, or valuable than some of this other wide range of possible re-descriptions that you can construct?

Mike Lynch: Well, um, I don't quite track how you're linking together what Garfinkel would be recommending with, say, a Structuralist interpretation of the text, or a Derridian deconstruction.

Steve Turner: Well, they all think they're discovering something in those texts - in the same way. And they've got this vocabulary for it, and they've managed to break away from the ordinary reading of those things, and now they've got what they think is THE reading, or maybe not THE reading, but it seems to me you've got the same "status" question with this stuff.

Mike Lynch: Being what?

Steve Turner: What is the status of these re-descriptions?

Mike Lynch: Ok. Well, we, first of all, have to have a re-description at hand. We would talk about a programme to get people started. {JC: Yes} You want to investigate 'rationality' - Well, find a place where 'rationality' might be an issue. Subject yourself to its local constraints - as an analyst - and come back with something. But so far we haven't talked about an analytic programme in the sense of a set of interpretive devices for coming upon conversational data - trying to get into Adjacency Pairs, or whatever - or looking at Shop Talk, or practices in some work setting - and coming back with findings. In a way if you want to compare at least the initiatives that are formulated as a programme in Ethnomethodology to something like - or especially something like - Levi-Straussian or Grimace's story-grammar sort of a thing - you're going to find it's very UN-determined. There isn't this lovely latticework of oppositions, themes, and so forth, (that) are ready to hand when you encounter the next bit of material, whether it's newspaper articles, scientist's discourse, or air-traffic control communications with pilots, or any of that. There isn't a ().

Steve Turner: Well, it seems to me that from outside it does look like there is a whole jargon, and a whole set at hand. It's almost exactly the same. If anything it's less determined than these other-

Mike Lynch: Well, I'd tell you it is LESS DETERMINATE in the sense that there isn't a specification that these are the things that we will reduce the work to, or the texts to, once we get them in hand. In fact, it's a deliberate eschewal of having that sort of a thing.

Eileen Crist: That's a very simplified way of seeing it though. It's not ALL methodologies are reductive simply because you're bringing certain tools of analysis.

Mike Lynch: No, but I think that programmatically these other methodologies have no trouble with specifying the various (senses of the) rubrics that we the analysts are schooled or cultivated to be used in reference to catching the material side: narratives ().

Jeff Coulter: I think I detect a bit of a difference between you two here, and perhaps between the three of us...

[Tr: Tape change]

Jeff Coulter(cont): ... if you're doing Ethnomethodology, you have certain analytical problems that you're going to address which are not shared by other enterprises. But having a set of analytical problems is not the same thing as having a whole bunch of PRE-conceptions. That's clear, right? I mean you have an analytical interest. That doesn't mean to say that you come armed with a whole bunch of elaborate theoretical schemata that you're now going to impose upon the materials. No - you have an interest, i.e., How is it that these things have the intelligibility they seem to have? That's a kind of Ethno type question. Or, How is it that these activities are coordinated together in these ways? So that's the sort of rubric under which Ethno approaches its subject matter.

Now, the question is: What more is brought in? It seems to me that the arguments that Garfinkel, and many others, have made over the years against what they have characterized as "constructive analytic theorizing" is that constructive analytic theorists, if you like, or constructive analysts, are in the business of importing terms of art for which they now seek exemplars - as distinct from going in with these established terms of Sociology and of theoretical thinking in the discipline suspended. But that, of course, doesn't mean they go in "tabula rasa". They go in as MASTERS of the natural language. They go in as MEMBERS, and we mustn't forget that Garfinkel and Sacks define "member" as mastery of natural language. So you go in as a master of a natural language, and that's what you CAN'T BUT go in with anywhere you go. And it seems to me that what you end up with is, in significant measure, to be constrained by an elucidation of whatever natural language concepts you are going to employ in characterizing what's going on. It seems to me that it's that that puts the constraint on analysis.

Mike Lynch: I think there's two things that are being run together here, and I think it's partly running together different phases of Garfinkel's research. I think in the latter work he's emphasizing the discontinuities between natural language understandings in various local

settings, and treating Sociology - or the local setting from which Sociologists start out is one of a landscape of discontinuous, partly over-lapping, or whatever - he doesn't elaborate on THIS - But is insufficient as an explicative resource for encountering endless varieties of ordinary, practical actions in work settings, and various other environments.

Now, the earlier programme - I think what you've said is more appropriate to the programme in STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY, and in "The Formal Structures of Practical Action" where there is this positing of natural language as would be exhibited in conversation, and the analyst is already competent by virtue of being a speaker of the language - to treat that competence as a resource for explication. But, it's a different kind of explication that's being demanded than a search for how we as single users of a language mean things by what we say, a grammar of our own utterances. Instead it's a search for a collaborative speaking situation, the essentially collaborative character of which generates properties that can be discoverably orderly, rational, etc. But which are not to be unpacked through a single speaker's explication of their understanding of things, whether that single speaker is a member who you interview and ask them to reflect upon how they do things, or whether it's an analyst's reflective explication, with or without the use of materials of some understanding.

Steve Turner: But who does he attribute that activity to?

Mike Lynch: It's not a "who" that it's attributed to. I remember once there was - George Gertin made () to be a slip of the tongue when he was talking about kids claiming-practices. He had videotapes of kids claiming things. He used the expression: "When claiming grows older". And Garfinkel turned to me - we were on a panel - and he turns to me and he's smiling and he said "when claiming grows older". There's a sense in which the activities are sui generis, and that the attributions are to the discoverable order of activities, NOT to the intentions of speakers, not to the explicatable understanding of the speakers, although obviously you have to have speakers with experience, understanding, and so forth to put these things together. But it's the conjoint production that is the resource, that is the attributed presence of what understanding might be.

Jeff Coulter: I absolutely agree that what we have is a sense of an order of practical action *sui generis*, and that will include conversational objects, that will include any kind of domain of work practices. They are cohort independent - we could run through the list. They have all of these Durkheimian properties - cohort independence, etc. Now, why is it not also accepted that the conceptual apparatus has that property as well?

Mike Lynch: The conceptual apparatus of what sort?

Jeff Coulter: Of the natural language.

And that the conceptual apparatus, or concepts, also have that *sui generis* property that, so to speak, is independent of members and analysts alike, in which we participate and whose elucidation should now operate as constraints upon our conceptualization, and will thereby constrain stipulative, arbitrary analytic glosses, and all of the vocabulary of denigration that critics of the positivistic canon have made for many years. Without that, it seems to me, that it's not clear what the constraints are going to look like. But of course they're there implicitly. What we have to do is to make them explicit.

For example, we can suspend the relevance of the technical languages of, so to speak, received Sociology if we want to, or received Psychology. But we can't suspend the vernacular. And that's not just when doing Conversation Analysis either. It's in our seeing, hearing, smelling, doing everything we do in the world we can't suspend it. - One of the arguments has been that well after all the ordinary language, or the conceptual apparatus, so to speak, which embodies a logical grammar, ALSO embodies a whole series of theoretical commitments and stipulations, etc. That I think is something I would like to address at some point, i.e., that ordinary language itself embodies or houses an ontology, or a set of metaphysical commitments. That I think is NOT the case.

Mike Lynch: I guess the thing that stops me in what you say there is: What are we talking about when we're talking about the conceptual apparatus? What is it? Where is it? Is it an 'it'? Are we talking about the meanings of words? Are we talking about the history of ideas? Or what?

Steve Turner: Let me NOT answer that question, but answer in a somewhat different way. It looks to me like - this is the first time I've really gotten a clue that that's what was going on here - but it looks to me like there are sort of two stories you can tell about getting people's meanings wrong, and getting people's intentions wrong, and then getting them right, so that you understand them, or you understand something, and so forth. And there's an activity that goes along with this which we do all the time. Ok, now we can do it on a kind of grand scale in Sociology. Now, I take it that is not the focus of Garfinkel's interest. His interest is in the orderliness of activities. But what I don't get is that there is a story of getting that wrong, and getting that right - turning that into a topic. So that it seems to me when the whole thing comes together, when you understand what people intend, mean, and so on, you've understood the orderliness of the phenomena. How you abstract out from all of these other things the-

Mike Lynch: All of these other things like what?

Steve Turner: People's intentions, what people mean by the terms that they use when they talk about what they're doing, and so on. So what I understand is that stuff. I understand how you handle that. What I don't understand is how you make orderliness into a topic. {ML: A topic?} Well, or as a subject for analysis.

Mike Lynch: You mean as a methodological procedure?

Steve Turner: No, as something to study.

Jeff Coulter: It is in implicit contrast to dis-orderliness, but it's never so specified.

Steve Turner: But you're artificially saying: Ok, let's ASSUME we don't understand this, and then see what it is, see what the order is in this.

[Tr: Behind Steve Turner's remark Jeff Coulter is saying to Dave Bogen: "I think this was your point", and Bogen seems to agree]

Mike Lynch: Well I don't think we need to "assume" we don't understand it.

Steve Turner: Well, how do you make it problematic? How do you make orderliness problematic? As a separate and distinguishable thing from all these other things that...

Mike Lynch: As a separable thing from what? Understanding?

Eileen Crist: Do you mean: On what grounds do you give it priority? Is that what you're asking?

Steve Turner: It's not a matter of priority. I mean how do you make it into, constitute it as a problematic object to study. I mean give me a de-constructionist analysis of how Garfinkel makes something into a problem, makes this into a problem in the first place.

Mike Lynch: Well, I think that the genealogy of that is the interest in the production of order, of social order. As in Heritage's book, the - it's a long-winded sort of a topic - but developing out of the Parsonian....

Steve Turner: Oh yes, I know that story. That's not my problem. My problem is in a specific context, how do you make "order" into the kind of object you can study, or into a problematic thing?

Mike Lynch: I guess I don't really quite understand the question. It's puzzling to me.

Jeff Coulter: Well, I think it's the working assumption that ANYTHING, as Garfinkel himself puts it in STUDIES, any occasion whatsoever from divination to theoretical physics can be examined for its properties of orderliness, intelligibility. So, it's intrinsic to the enterprise. I've never heard an Ethnomethodologist, myself included, ever saying of any orderly stuff I've got in front of me: It's disorderly. There's orderliness that's going to be found one way or the other, by hook or by crook, we're going to find some orderliness. Which is not to say that in doing that we're now arbitrarily imputing orderliness. But the claim NOT to be arbitrarily imputing orderliness rests upon, I think, showing, exhibiting connections that follow - if I may say yet again - logically one to other.

Dave Bogen: Aren't you here equivocating on the notion of 'orderliness', especially in your contrast to dis-orderliness? Because IF you had a piece of something before you, there would be many

things that you could show were dis-orderly. Drunken and dis-orderly, or something like that - was going on - in this ordinary sense of orderly, or dis-orderly. I think the point is that on the one hand you don't want to talk about orderliness as what is being studied, because that's an insufficient gloss, or orderly, intelligible, etc. But on the other hand, the presumption is of another order of orderliness -

Jeff Coulter: Primordial orderliness.

Dave Bogen: Yeah, primordial orderliness, or something like that, where the initial "experiments" can be taken as little empirical tests of that. So how do you raise orderliness? Well hit it at its flash points, and then it will be taken care of. And that it's taken care of just that way provides your topic of analysis, in a certain sense. - You know what I'm referring to? {ST: No} I'm sorry, the ways of "breaching", or what would count as a "breach", produce "dis-orderliness", but it is never produced as disorderly at this second level of orderliness. - So the objections come in when it looks like what you've done is sort of equivocated on the notion of orderliness- It's not been used anywhere since - or has it?

Jeff Coulter: Well, as Garfinkel says vis-a-vis the Durkheimian and other sorts of approaches to the problem of order, he says: The key thing is not so much the production of anomie, but the production of confusion. So there's a close relationship between his concept of 'orderliness', and the concept of 'intelligibility'.

Dave Bogen: And elsewhere the concept of 'coherence', and elsewhere the concept of 'relevance', right? These are the sorts of concepts that are floating around (in this attitude) towards ordinary language.

Jeff Coulter: But, you see, Wittgenstein is arguing that there is DISORDERLINESS, UNintelligibility in philosophers' discourse. Now, I know he's doing that -- I would argue, by the way, that that - and I've had this argument often; I'll argue it again -- Wittgenstein is not HERE by making THAT claim doing philosophers' talk. It's not more of the same. It's seems to me that it's something ELSE that he's doing. If you like, he's the first DE-constructivist, not a philosopher. He's an ANTI-philosopher. So it's not when

Wittgenstein's talking in the PI he's doing Philosophy. NO, he's doing ANTI-philosophy.

But, now, the thing about Ethnomethodology is, though it's interested in elucidating intelligibility, and orderliness, it will not rule out of court any domain of practice, in principle. And I don't know what that policy could be. For example, I remember asking an undergrad student one time to go out and have a look at how it was that - He was working in New York City - how it was that prostitutes can pick up their clients without attracting the attention of the police. So he went and he had a look at this, and he found that they never did. That it was a failure. That they were continuously getting the attention of the police. And it turned out that, of course, the police, and the john's, and the call girls, and the prostitutes all had their relations. So he eventually got into studying that. But he comes back and reports that it's a failure - they can't do that. And so there's a different system in action. So there's like a failure. It's not an "achieved" thing. The ACHIEVED thing involves something else, i.e., the relationship between the prostitutes, and the john's, and the police.

So here we have a system of activities as an achieved order of things. But there are things that go wrong. Like, for example, philosophers' thinking they make sense. It seems to make sense, but it's not making sense. Or things apparently getting achieved, but not getting done. All of these concepts have contrasts like 'order' contrasts with 'disorder', 'achievement' contrasts with 'failure', 'intelligibility' contrasts with 'UNintelligibility'. So when we're gathering our materials we are making assumptions about the inapplicability of the alternate contrast-class member. This is never an issue - as I've seen it - in any of the work of our field. And it seems to me to be an interesting topic in itself. It raises itself as a methodological question.

Mike Lynch: Well I'd follow up on something David Bogen mentioned. I think that a perfectly legitimate topic within Ethnomethodology, if you're interested in dis-order - follow the police around, and when they are making the arrests for DIS-orderly conduct, you'll find some local specification of whatever might be meant by dis-orderly.

Jeff Coulter: Let me just come in there, because that's taking the argument off at a tangent.

Mike Lynch: Well, I think that it CAN deliberately.

Jeff Coulter: No, no. Because what I'm trying to propose is that there is a normative appraisal of the order of data in the first instance. To say of some praxis that it exhibits orderliness is a normative appraisal of it. And, of course, what you are going to be doing when you're looking at the, so called, DISorderliness of police practice, you're going to be finding it's orderliness. What I'm saying though is that...

Mike Lynch: Well, no, no, not necessarily. You would find what is it for the police, working as they do, employing whatever resources they employ, to establish, to come upon, to establish instances of disorderliness. And to find...

Steve Turner: I think that the reason we're having trouble with this is that (a pair/repair) and in contrast very much to un-intelligibility - there's something unintelligible that may or may not be made intelligible - we know what that kind of transition is - but it's not clear that we know what kind of contrast is involved, say, when Garfinkel talks about orderliness. It's an attribution that, it seems to me, without the kind of contrast that would make it an intelligible kind of concept.

Mike Lynch: Well, I think it's to - rather than treat the contrast between what he means by dis-ORDER, and what he might then mean by DIS-order, we could focus on this preoccupation with the order of ordinary activities - Back up a step, and look at what he's reacting against in analytic Sociology. Why would anyone be fascinated with the order of the phenomenon: a queue. There's a place for having a turn, one after another. If you have disorder you don't have a queue. It's something else. But why would anybody be interested in that? Well, part of the reason would be you look at what counts as order for the analytic social sciences, it's things like Markov chains. It's methodologically specified, conceptually elaborated discourse in the social sciences - of something that's reserved for academically trained, highly intelligent university educated people to establish on behalf of all those other places in the world, or as a set of rubrics

to find when there is order, when there is dis-order. He's trying to break frame with that whole approach by talking about order at all points, order everywhere.

Steve Turner: Yeah, but that's what I see as problematic. You've got this category that doesn't have the kinds of contrast. At least with these guys with their Markov chains - They know what the difference is between order and disorder, or whatever the pair is. With this other thing, discovering it everywhere, it sooner or later disappears as a concept of describing anything.

Mike Lynch: Well, it does! It probably does. And you would find that in Ethnomethodology there isn't a whole lot of talk about "order of conversation". Even that kind of talk is elaborated into the analysis of laughter, the analysis of greetings, the analysis of these's or that's. Where they are highly detailed, localized specifications of what order in conversation might be, but the direct topic of 'order' versus 'disorder' has fallen out.

Steve Turner: All I read those is just different ways of making this a problematic. You get this different descriptive frame, and you see something going on there. It's like Larry Wieder having a camera and following these people in this drug center around the building, and speeding it up, and seeing that: Yes, in fact, when these people sit down, the other people get up - But you wouldn't notice that if you were sitting there. Well, yeah. You can come up with all kinds of things, and then you can make a problem out of it by doing that, and then you can DISCOVER the solution to it, and find the order to it, but that seems trivially artificial to me.

Dusan Bjelic: Yeah, of course it is.

Mike Lynch: It is?

Dusan Bjelic: But of course it is. It is trivial, but isn't all of our life trivial? We are not Weberian in the sense to find some higher meaning, or explicate some higher meaning in the history or whatever. It's simply to explicate the triviality of... - (that makes our diet other wine).

[Tr: general laughter]

Lena Jayyusi: I was going to say that all the contrasts, not just for disorder, but randomness - and in a sense, I think, that's the kind of contrast that's being worked against when in Ethnomethodology they are looking for order. In a sense you're going back to the idea of the LOGIC of activities and their INTERlogic.

Mike Lynch: Yeah. Well I think the same problem would apply - that you can't find disorder, and you'd have a hard time finding randomness too.

Jeff Coulter: Right! But, now, invoking the concept of 'logic', you have your contrast class of il-logic. And Wittgenstein in elucidating the logic of language, the logic of conceptual apparatuses, is perfectly prepared to rule out of court all orders of MISuse of IL-logic. And it seems to me that as SOCIO-logicians, if I may - which is what I take Ethno to be at its apex - that what we're doing is we're simply extending the domain of logic, which does have this contrast class. So, of course, WE as Socio-logicians can go around saying those practices haven't a bit of logic.

Mike Lynch: How could we do that? Where would we begin to specify il-logic?

Jeff Coulter: Well, we do it anyways. Now this is where, let's say, this is where the methodological naivete won't wash, because we do it anyway. And the thing is to elucidate what we do anyway. So, it's NOT that you could be satisfied with proposing for some, say- Sacks used to say: Never try to do Ethno on very small children, and mental patients. And so here we have areas in which you can get people engaged in the most incoherent, bizarre kinds of-

Mike Lynch: No, but when that is studied it turns out to be orderly. Judy Davidson tried to find conversational analytically the organization or dis-organization of schizophrenic talk - and keeps finding orderly conversation.

Eileen Crist: It doesn't have to turn out to be orderly. I mean I think though that what Professor Turner was saying is that if you have such a broad concept of..., and you're sort of prejudiced with that concept, and you're going to go out and you're going to be finding that orderliness. Now if you were to start say with a conception of DIS-orderliness, as something like Foucault does that, where you're looking at

IN-coherences, or you're looking at- you're postulating turbulence from the beginning-

Mike Lynch: How does Foucault postulate disorderliness? Discontinuity?

Eileen Crist: Well this is his conception- this is his conception of how history rules. So that if he's looking at, for example- Well, that's a question about what Foucault was doing. But that what he's doing is he's looking at different clashing, and how clashing gets things going, and gets things in your way, and not ORDER.

Mike Lynch: Well, that's not what () was doing. That's about Foucault.

Eileen Crist: I guess you can't really compare them, I guess, because it's a different level of analysis. But if you were to postulate DISorderliness, you might very well be shedding light on THOSE aspects of the phenomenon.

Jeff Coulter: But you're not saying that one now sort of abandons the primordial generic assumption of orderliness and now substitutes DISorderliness, generically. BOTH are wrong. Right?

Eileen Crist: Well, both are wrong because both are too all inclusive.

Jeff Coulter: Because as we go about the world, we very well know and can tell, by and large, as members, which is the whole issue, what kinds of things are disorderly, what makes sense, what doesn't make sense. I mean this principle of naivete, or making everything Anthropologically strange, is taken too far here. We are, after all, supposed to be elucidating our commonsense practical reason, our commonsense acquaintance with the world. And that means that that includes the normative areas of our conceptual apparatus. For example, our judgments, like where we find things indeed to be bizarre. Now the question is HOW we find them to be bizarre, and how we find these things to be illogical, or logical. It's not that those things should be-

Dusan Bjelic: How do you know that in doing that you won't come to the point of a break with those notions for how to use the concepts? How come you don't know that when you come to a point to elucidate something you have to put the words up-side-down in order to elucidate something? And

if you're not sure, what are the criteria and rules that you can determine when you're going to use what is up-side-down, and on which occasions?

Jeff Coulter: Well, we would need an example.

Dusan Bjelic: Well, I can not give you an example because I don't know those cases. But I know that in history people came to the point - they have to use words or things in the way that nobody used before, and they put them up-side-down, and they went on creating a whole new set of practices.

Dave Bogen: I want to pick up on that point. I mean I think it moves away from what we were talking about before, but I think that in that- or possibly what you're doing is fetishizing individual practices. That is to say, you spoke earlier about the kind of INVENTION of a language-game as if somebody could sit down and -- the ART of the invention of a language-game, as if the ART was sort of 'creative ACTS' or something like that, that you just spin with NO sense what so ever. But the art is always embedded within a craft, of some sort or another, or some sort of tools for doing a work of art. Right? And in that sense, within a much broader history. Right? So you can't look back on the evolution of grammars in terms of individual creative acts - in that sense of invention. There has to be a sort of SURROUND of tradition, a surround of convention, in order that there would be any intelligibility there at all. But I think ONE way you can put this back to, say, the Ordinary Language Philosophers, is that, ON the other hand, they go around analyzing unitary meanings, that is, tracing a concept.

Jeff Coulter: OH! Absolutely. But-

Dave Bogen: Wait! Wait! Let me finish the point.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, yeah! Go ahead. I'm sorry.

Dave Bogen: And that what you COULD find over a period of time, let's say, would be where there WOULD be constraints, say, placed on what are now being called stipulated concepts - You could find over time a conventional transition across an ARRAY of concepts that would make now intelligible what previously would have been an UNintelligible usage.

Jeff Coulter: We had the case of "invisible light" - last semester.

Dave Bogen: Well, what I was looking at too would be the way in which you want to place constraints upon, say, the terminologies being used in "artificial intelligence". What was originally intended as metaphor now becomes a stipulated usage and taken as identity, or something like that. BUT we see at the same time, across a whole domain of practices within academic- within sort of technical jargon, the translations that make that an intelligible usage. SO, the computers are smart!, and etc. Perfectly legitimate usages. We have objections to them because they SEEM like they ought to be metaphors. They SEEM to do an injustice to the concepts that they're putatively extending. How do you get the () is the question then. How can you come up with an argument that would place constraints on that sort of theorizing?

Steve Turner: What logic?

Dave Bogen: Yeah!

Jeff Coulter: Well, I think there can be some with respect- Like not any old innovation is properly grounded, and some are. But, for example, I'll show you a paper by Sharrock and Anderson on "Can Computers Think?", for instance, which is YET AGAIN Turing re-visited, only in a wholly new way.

But let's put that aside for the moment.

What I want to pick up on out of this was: INDEED Ordinary Language Philosophy comes to a dead end. Indeed it does! But NOT methodologically. It comes to a dead end precisely because, as you say, it restricted its scope - the scope of probably the most powerful methodology of elucidation that we've had. And from which differentiate, I would say, the degenerate versions, like Derrida, and other things, from what I've read of them - which is perhaps not enough to make the claim, but... Certainly the Searle-Derrida debate, which we must get onto at some point. Where it comes to an end is because it restricted its scope. As we've seen, we have the traditions of formal logic that fetishize "THE" proposition. Austin comes along with the "constative-performance distinction", and then smashes that. It's the tripartite: illocution, locution, perlocution. And then the whole apparatus of speech acts is opened up for logical elucidation with the SAME methodology, and I'm

arguing that the sequential stuff, and the stuff on the logic of practical action is THE SAME METHODOLOGY extended now away from just concepts, or particular expressions or categories, as in Ryle and Austin, and parts of Wittgenstein, to now the whole domain. But the methodology is identical, as such.

Dave Bogen: In answer to these earlier questions then, what is the methodology? Doesn't it, at least most of the time, come down to something like: "The baby cried. The Mommy picked it up." I take it that you all HEAR that as...

Jeff Coulter: But the power of it is that we do. But we're not going to say that we do because of the empirical generalizing MIS-hearability of it.

Dave Bogen: So you get these cases where people in a class will come up with contexts, perverse contexts, that they can dream up where that isn't hearable that way. So now we're not talking - and I think things got awry earlier when we were talking about the contrast 'order' and 'disorder', and having to, because of other understandings of this other sense of order and disorder and the contrast we're USED to working with sort of leads things astray. If you talk about 'sense' and 'nonsense', one of the ways in which you bring off your examples is to show how something just like this, that worked here, in just this way - placed over here goes Pumpf! And it's bizarre, and everybody hears it as bizarre. It's OBVIOUSLY bizarre. And it doesn't matter what you're class background is, what your gender is. Nothing. It's just bizarre. And that would be the construction of an argument in the way that Lena was putting it. It's not random at all. You can present it as non-random. And over and over again you can teach it that way. But your examples then come from the purposes at hand for making the argument you need to make.

Jeff Coulter: Well, purpose dependence is not woolly relativism.

Dave Bogen: No. There's no problem with that. I'm not saying that you can be called for examples, and you can give them. And they're of THIS sort.

Jeff Coulter: Anyway - It seems to me that the substitution of 'logic' and 'illogic' for 'order/disorder' is not just a pure terminological

quibble. It seems to me to carry with itself a whole order of traditions, a whole sense of different methodologies, and it enables us to place constraints on how we are characterizing what's been achieved so far. This is NOT - as everybody here knows, coming from me - an attempt to criticize the enterprise of Ethnomethodology. On the contrary, it's trying understand what it can be seen to be in as clear a way as I can pull off. But ALSO, if these kinds of reconceptualizations of the CLAIMS of Ethnomethodology FOR its analytical achievements are accepted, it constitutes now a set of criteria of assessment, a set of criteria of adjudication of the kind of work that's done. So, for example, it seems to me that there is a good case to be made for PREFERRING the postulation of a priori sequential structures OVER merely contingent ones in Conversation Analysis. It seems to me that ramifying the endless induction of relations between bits and pieces of talk for the possibility of an empirical regularity whose domain can never be specified is degenerate compared to the postulation of the abstract structures - that I've argued have this a priori incorrigibility. That THIS is what the work amounts to when it's done in the proper fashion. Just as I think a mathematician would see a clear difference between 'having a theorem' and 'having a conjecture'. So we have in Conversation Analytic work - just because that's all we've been looking at so far, we must move on to other things - there's a clear difference between 'having the a priori structures' and 'having the mere inductive, rather weak, regularity claims'. Like for example - not to be invidious, but just to take one of Jefferson's - laughter is speech onset sensitive. Yeah, for that domain of data, it was, apparently. I've no idea whether laughter is speech onset sensitive for the whole domain of speech and laughter, and neither does she.

Mike Lynch: You would say that that's a mere empirical...?

Jeff Coulter: Yeah.

Mike Lynch: That laughter is speech onset sensitive?

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, which is a way of characterizing the occurrences in her materials of the cessation of laughter post a laughable once someone resumes speaking. I've no idea what the scope of that generalization might be.

Mike Lynch: I think it does it a disservice to characterize it as a {JC: a contingent claim} mere empirical regularity in that it's a local run at an explication of the accomplishment of order in conversation. It's a demonstration of a certain, if you like, principle of conversational organization and of recipient design - of a sort of recipient design. It is one of many ways in which speakers, or utterances, or actions in conversation display a sensitivity that - I'm sure in her article she describes the contextual production of laughter in very detailed terms.

Jeff Coulter: Yes. It's a bit unfair to pull that out. But still...

Mike Lynch: But there are ways in which even that explication is dealing with some rather resonant issues of the production of order in concerted activities. Laughter isn't done just anywhere. It's done in just these ways. It's not just something pulled out of conversation.

Jeff Coulter: It's the result of looking at a collection.

Mike Lynch: Oh, it's certainly that, but nonetheless you can see it as an explication of some very deep issues in...

Jeff Coulter: Yes. And I don't mean to be demeaning the article AT ALL, because I think that the power of that article, and the power of a lot of Gail's work is in the detailed observational study of those particular interactional fragments. I mean she has a kind of eye for interactional relationships, but-

Mike Lynch: But there's also a systemic-

Jeff Coulter: Hold on a minute Mike. But that is now postulated as an analytical upshot. From all of the finely articulated insightful discussion of JUST those fragments, the result is, putatively anyway, the production of a general argument. There are two or three other like claims to be derived from that article. Now you could say: No, no. Don't pluck those out as like the things that the paper is to be read for. And I buy that. {ML: Oh.} Oh, definitely. Because I think you will learn a great deal about how the world works by the sheer artfulness of her observations. BUT, is that the game? Now if the game is to eventuate in the production of general abstract claims, I'd now like to know what I've got - even

just to read it, or to teach it, or to try to do it myself. And the only characteristic I can assign to THAT kind of argument is that it is an empirical regularity sort of argument across an unknown domain. I do not know what its scope could be. I don't know what it is.

Dave Bogen: Well, only if you presume- I mean the way it seems you're taking...

[Tr: tape change]

Dave Bogen(cont): ... after his speech onset sensitive, and laughter can be speech onset sensitive, and laughter in these instances is speech... in this way, and etc. So, what the particular claim was now makes a big difference. And also for the weight with which that claim will be heard - whether it 'is' or 'can' in these instances. But then the point becomes: Is the point of a general claim there to say something about a category, i.e., laughter? And if that's not the point, then I don't think the criticism you made would hold. If that's not what she's up to at all, then the criticism just seems to wash. She's doing something else. It's only WHEN you want to make that sort of claim in the first place that it would hold, and then all of your arguments about conventionality would fly.

Dusan Bjelic: You used, Jeff, 'logical' and 'illogical' distinction. But you used to use before 'informal logical'.

Jeff Coulter: Well, that's what I ONLY mean. {DB: Where would that fit?} I only ever mean that. I don't mean formal logic a la Frege, Russell, or Whitehead, or the TRACTATUS either.

Dusan Bjelic: So, using 'informal logical' would be logical?

Jeff Coulter: Yes. In the sense of Ryle's paper on formal and informal logic.

Dusan Bjelic: Now what then would be illogical?

Jeff Coulter: That which is informally illogical. Informal simply means that which is prior to any formalism derived from, say, the propositional calculus, or whatever. That which is discernably devoid of sense, or in violation of the-

Dusan Bjelic: Well, if that is the case, that there are no prior rules that you can determine in a context, how could you then speak of "a priori"?

Jeff Coulter: I didn't follow that.

Dusan Bjelic: Well, you're talking about how we can talk about "a priori" structure in informal logic. Now, that seems to me contradictory ab initio. If there are no rules given,-

Jeff Coulter: Were you here last week?

Dusan Bjelic: Yes.

Jeff Coulter: Because we went through the meaning of "a priori"

Dusan Bjelic: Yes, we didn't seem to come to agreement as to what does that mean, and how we can use it. {JC: I see} That's what I'm asking again, because that's what, it seems to me, doesn't mesh together.

Jeff Coulter: Ok, let's make that a topic for next time. Let's bring that up again.

TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

These transcriptions were prepared from an audio recording, the auditory quality of which was not always optimal. Participating members, especially Jeff Coulter, have reviewed initial drafts of the transcripts and have attempted to clarify portions that were particularly difficult to hear, and also provided assistance in correcting errors in transcription that were made during the production of the first draft of each session. The generous assistance of all those involved is gratefully acknowledged. Particular appreciation goes out to Jeff Stetson who took on the laborious task of copy-editing. Unfortunately, not all errors in transcription, and not all inaudible portions could be corrected given the time lag in producing the transcriptions. The transcriber apologizes for any remaining typographical errors.

The following are conventions employed in producing the transcriptions of these meetings:

- [x] square brackets: Text in square brackets is for the most part that of the transcriber. Such text is indicated by "Tr:" at the beginning of the brackets. It includes: 1. paraphrases of talk, 2. clarification of indefinite references, for example pointing, drawing or writing on the chalk-board, producing a behavioral display etc., 3. information about references to texts referred to in the talk, 4. other general remarks and clarifications and 5. indications of omissions and tape changes. PLEASE NOTE that there is almost always some bit of talk missing at the points of tape change. On occasion, comments in square brackets are insertions offered by those who have edited the text and are indicated as such by the initials of the person in question, e.g., [JC: xxxxxxxxx]. Also, if additions or deletions are made in text quoted during the class, then these changes are noted in square brackets, with the speakers initials included within the brackets.
- { x } braces: Text in braces is the talk of persons who are commenting on or responding to the talk of another person who currently has the floor. This talk is introduced by the initials of the person making the remark and/or comment, e.g., {JC: xxxx}.
- (x) parentheses surrounding text: Text in parentheses is the transcriber's best guess as to what was being said when there is some doubt about exactly what was said due to the poor auditory quality of the tape.
- () empty parentheses: Parentheses containing no text indicate a portion of the talk which is not transcribable due to the poor auditory quality of the tape, although it is possible to tell that something was being said.

CAPITALIZATION: Capitalization is used to indicate titles (or partial titles, e.g.: INVESTIGATIONS for the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS) for books. It is also used to indicate vocal emphasis by the speaker in question, i.e., something which is spoken noticeably louder, or with more emphasis than the surrounding talk. It was not possible to underline text in the editing/text-formating system employed, which is why capitalization rather than underlining was used in the above cases. This also influenced the forming of terms in languages other than English, e.g.: Ubersicht, vis-a vis, etc, which are neither capitalized, nor underlined, although occasionally are explicated in square brackets following the text in question.