

[coulw15.001. Tr: BJF. 2 September 90: Edited version] Transcription conventions can be found on the last 2-3 pages of each transcript.

Please Note: This is an edited transcript of an informal seminar meeting. Please do not quote without permission of the parties involved.

JEFF COULTER
Department of Sociology
Boston University

WITTGENSTEIN AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Meeting 15.: 17 September 87

[Tr: These meetings constitute the second semester during which a number of people associated with the Sociology Department at Boston University gathered with Jeff Coulter on an informal basis to study and discuss: the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the programme and achievements of Ethnomethodology, and their relationship to each other.

The first meeting of the seminar during this fall semester (Meeting 14) occurred on 10 September 87. It was an organizational meeting, and was not recorded.

The recording of this session (15) began a few minutes into the discussion.]

TOPIC: THE GRAMMATICAL/LOGICAL VERSION OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY.

Including discussion of: context,
relevant context, gestalt contexture,
indexicality of actions and expressions,
Harvey Sacks's work, the sequential organization of
utterances, utterance type-marking, adjacency pair
structures, preference ordering,

repair, and others.

- READING: (1) Garfinkel, H. (1967)
 STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY.
 Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
 (2) Coulter, J. (1983). Contingent and a priori
 structures in sequential analysis.
 HUMAN STUDIES, 6(4), 361-376.

Jeff Coulter: ... For Garfinkel, "documentary method of interpretation", which I take to be very, very similar to, if not simply a rephrasing of what is elsewhere known as the 'hermeneutical circle', what is meant by that is as follows: That in order to identify something of course one must see it in a relevant context, but in order to figure out what the relevant context might be, one has to use some notion of what that thing is, to delineate the possible relevances of a context. So, that as he puts it: The particular and the context are in a state of mutual elaboration. One can be used to elaborate the sense of the other.

So, that, for example, in order to know what relevant context might be in respect of how you can assign intelligibility, or find the intelligibility of what I'm now saying and doing, you'd have to work with some sense of what I COULD be saying and doing, in order to figure out what context you might invoke in justifying a claim about what it is that Coulter is now doing. If you say: "What Coulter's doing now is making a point, or giving an exposition", then in sort of justifying that, or elaborating upon how that could be a possible characterization of my context, you'll have to be invoking something like that this is a class, etc., and NOT that it is taking place in Boston. And how you would find that out has to do with what it COULD possibly be that I might be doing. So that although I would quibble with the notion of 'interpretation' here, because it seems to me that you are not interpreting what I'm doing. The concept of interpretation, I think, is incorrectly deployed as a generic term for what's involved in understanding. Understanding and interpreting are not the same thing. One can understand something without having to interpret it. So, if I would be allowed to strike out interpretation, and put understanding in - the documentary method of understanding - has got to do with the fact that what is a proper or relevant context for a bit of conduct, or an utterance, or an action, is sort of

a function of what the action could be, which in turn is now something which is provided for by invoking some possible contextual particulars. So, it's not that you could have the one without the other. And indeed in other places, I don't know whether Harold Garfinkel himself uses this expression, but commentators have, like Larry Wieder, Melvin Pollner, and various others, the relationship between an element and the relevant context of an indexical action, or indexical utterance, and that which is giving it its intelligibility with respect to context is to be construed as a "gestalt contexture" relationship. That is to say that specifying in a sort of 'figure - ground' kind of representation, what counts as the ground is inextricably provided for by what counts as the figure, and the other way around. In other words, there is no such thing as having an independent ground for a figure, or a figure that is somehow independent of its possible ground. The two are intrinsically interwoven together. So, you couldn't have an identification of the sense of an action or an utterance on the one hand, and then an independent specification of THE context on the other. The specification of what the conduct could be, and what the context could be, are interrelated in the way that a gestalt contexture intrinsically interrelates its features.

So, we have then the notion that utterances and activities have the property of being indexical, that is they are gestalt contexturally tied into their possible contexts for what they are, and what the analyst is conjoined to do in order to study the properties of activities and utterances in everyday affairs, in practical everyday affairs, is NOT to try to extricate activities from their gestalt contextures, or try to specify contextures for the activities that are not part of their gestalt contextures, but rather now to accept the fact of the indexically situated, and the indexically constituted character of activities as an integral and "irremedial", as he would say, an irremedial property of all conduct, and now therefore to try to work out what the properties are of such conduct under that constraint.

So, you can't, for example, you're not allowed to supply an informative context for some conduct that is not a part of that context which, in and over the course of the production of activities, the members would have to be seen to be orienting to, in order to find the intelligibility of that conduct in the first place. So it's not simply

trying to assert, in the manner of traditional ethnography, what THE context is as a sort of backdrop, e.g., "Well what we're going to talk about now is the organization of activities in hospitals settings, and here's a generic description of the context for these activities." And the ethnographer seeks now to describe the nature of the hospital, and then starts getting into an analysis of the activities. No! That is to supply an EXTRANEIOUS characterization of context, independent of the activities that are, in Garfinkel's sense, producing the relevancies of a context, in and through the courses of production of activities.

Ok, so, that's got to do with indexicality of actions and of expressions. Of course, expressions, the production of an indexical expression IS also the production of a kind of activity, although this is made somewhat clearer in Sacks' writings, drawing upon J. L. Austin and the notion of a "speech-act", an "illocutionary act". It still can be found, although not in those terms, in Garfinkel's discussions of the ways in which what we're saying, and what we're doing is a function of HOW we are doing and saying it.

Ok. So, what's it mean then to characterize, under those general constraints, the "rational properties" of indexical expressions and indexical actions? If we can't simply supply generic statements, or unilateral characterizations of context - we can't supply unilateral characterizations of context as sociological analysts - and we're barred from stipulating theoretical provisions for conduct independently of the actual, practical courses of conduct as they're co-produced in real time, and in real places, what on earth could it mean to study then the "rational properties"? By "rational properties", what is meant: they are properties of reproducibility, typicality, identifiability, efficacy, rationality in the ordinary sense - that they are rational, that they actually do sort of work in some way, that they have some reasonableness. In fact under "rational", Harold Garfinkel subsumes quite a lot of properties which should be teased out, so it's something of a gloss, but he does particularize the kinds of properties he's interested in. And, of course, a central feature here has got to do with the intelligibility, or the understandability of action in situ.

You can read STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY, the whole book though, without, I would say, being able to extract from studies that are presented there, any very clear methodological principles for inquiring into the rational properties of indexical expressions and indexical actions as a programme. And, in fact, if you look at the book, there's a variety of different methods used to try to explicate the endogenous properties of conduct and social settings. And it certainly was not the case that in STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY you find worked out a systematic methodology for the treatment of ongoing courses of practical action in the ways in which, for example, transcriptions of such phenomena are to be treated. And indeed there are, as you know, in that book several essays in which there is no attempt to reproduce the actual, over-the-course character of activities. There are conceptual arguments. There are very suggestive insights, some of them are of a logical nature, some of them of a more phenomenologically intuitive nature. But it's still unclear, at least it was for me, and still is, that one could extract from simply reading STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY, a way of proceeding to encash the study policies that preface the book. But if anyone wanted to take me up on that, we could discuss it a little later on. Because what I want to do is to get into the arguments of HARVEY SACKS.

Now, it's not that you can find in Sacks' unpublished lectures [Tr: Sacks, H. (1964-1972). Unpublished transcribed lectures. The 1964-65 lectures have been published in HUMAN STUDIES, 1989, 12(3/4); edited by Gail Jefferson with an introduction by E. A. Schegloff. The remainder are expected to be published by Basil Blackwell in the near future] or in his writings, any direct clear reference to Harold Garfinkel's own writings in STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY where he explicitly says that: Now what I'm going to be doing in presenting my line of work is to implement these study policies. That's nowhere said. So, to some extent, we are kind of reconstructing this. And I'm not going to now try to get into the questions of the historical relationship between Garfinkel and Sacks as casting some light on this, though in some respects it can be seen to do so. And, of course, it's got also to be remembered that Garfinkel and Sacks collaborated, though in a rather loose way, on a paper that followed STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY, which is "On Formal Structures of Practical Actions". [Tr: see: Garfinkel, H., and Sacks, H. (1970). On formal structures of practical actions. In J. C. McKinney and E. A.

Tiryakian (Eds.) THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES AND DEVELOPMENTS (pp. 337-366). New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.] But, though, the exact nature of that collaboration is not altogether clear. Those kinds of historical and biographical, if you like, details are not interesting to me, at least for now. Though they may have to have some interest to me if somebody can make a compelling argument that they should be. What I want to do is simply to suggest that one can read Sacks' early claims about how to proceed to do naturalistic, sociological description and elucidation - one can read it AS IF it were designed to implement those study policies. And it seems to me that that is an interesting way to see what he's about. So, let's start out with some of the basic kinds of claims that arise out of Sacks' work, and also, of course, his collaborative work with Manny Schegloff, Gail Jefferson, and others.

So far what we've got then is some notion of utterances, and also non-linguistic activities, but now we're going to be concentrating on linguistic activities, communicative activities. We've got some notion that they have these gestalt contextural qualities.

One of the things that Sacks achieves in his early lectures, it seems to me, is a further technical unpacking of this notion of the gestalt contextural properties of naturally produced talk, naturally produced utterances, and expressions. And he does this by way of invoking the notion, the general notion, of the "sequential location" of an utterance vis-a-vis other utterances. This very powerful abstract idea of the sequential location of an utterance as a necessary part of its gestalt contexture. And one way to see this right off the bat is simply to do a 'gestalt switch', with respect to an utterance - which I will now proceed to do. For example, you could take something like this:

What time did you get back?

- as an utterance produced. Well there are certain characteristics that it has prosodically, i.e., it's a "wh" initial utterance, and that is a defeasible index of its being a possible question. If it starts with a "wh" - who, why, what, when - that's ONE kind of a prosodic feature of the production of a possible question. Let's also suppose that we allow to give an intonation contour: What time did you get back? [Tr: rising intonation on "back".]

Let's say then that, as it stands, it can be seen to be defeasibly a question. I say defeasibly because, of course, remember that what it is is a function of its contextualization. But what its possible context is is still a function of what IT might conceivably be, in terms of that to-and-froing of the documentary method of understanding notion derived from Mannheim and the documentary method of interpretation. By defeasibly, I mean that which can be defeated, but which is a first way of cutting the cake. So a defeasible characterization of that is that it's a 'question'. Granted?

Now, says Sacks: What kind of gestalt switch can be worked upon it to provide for sequential location as an integral part of any possible gestalt contexture? So what he does is this: - I don't think this is an exact example, but this is the kind of thing he does - he puts it in a sequence. Providing now for "What time did you get back?" - to gestalt transform from being a possible 'question' into now being a 'quotation in the form of an answer'.

A: What did she ask you?

B: "What time did you get back?"

A: Oh, hell!

Immediately now one can find that the sequential location of the utterance or expression gives it a necessary feature of its possible gestalt contexture. Now what you might say is: But sequential location is all very well for things that have relationships to other utterances or activities that precede and follow, but what about the initial thing? What about the first object? It doesn't have anything prior to it, at least not in the way that this is being set up. So we start with a FIRST turn: A: What did she ask you? B: "What time did you get back?" A: Oh, hell!

The argument here is that something's being a first turn - although here it starts out being a little bit counter-intuitive because it would be rarely the case, or it would be hard to imagine a scenario in which somebody just comes up to you and says: What did she ask you? So, there is something already a little bit sort of not quite real-worldly about this example - which is deliberately chosen for its slight lack of real worldliness to get you to see that SAYING that that

is a first in an encounter, a first turn in an encounter, provides for some way that it could be hearably a first thing said. So that it's a first thing done, in what sense is it a first thing done? Well the kind of circumstance in which you might have that kind of thing as a first thing done between two persons has got to do with something like its tacit invocation of a series of prior kinds of things. So that first of all, one of the things it does is it dispenses with a greeting. And it dispenses with a greeting which is a characteristic or conventional sort of thing that turns can get started with, or conversations, or interactions can get started with. And it also thereby provides for a certain sort of urgency. As if somebody were to be rushing up to you and saying: What did she ask you? And those are the sorts of considerations that they make available, but we don't have them documented. So these are the sorts of things that would be conjectures in respect of this. So, all I'm doing now is suggesting that something's being even a first turn, or a first activity does itself require some kind of sense of possible contexture, contextuality, that could enable one to make that specification for it.

Mike Lynch: [Tr: Please note that Mike Lynch was seated at some distance from the microphone, and was as a consequence quite difficult to hear on the tape recording. Unfortunately, this led to a somewhat choppy transcription of his contributions, which does not reflect their clarity at the time] Why wouldn't it work (independent of how Sacks would have done it) - But take the notion of gestalt contexture, and would you say that the identity of A as a first is contextually determined by its relation to a second? That's part of a pair.

Jeff Coulter: It's interesting, but actually Sacks never really explicitly makes that argument.

Mike Lynch: No, I know he doesn't, but that would be an argument Gurwitsch would make, perhaps, {JC: yeah} or Garfinkel.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, yeah. But you see I think if he were to make that argument there would be the following problem - and this actually comes up in a debate between Bruce and Wallis, and Sharrock and Watson in the BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY in a couple of papers on 'motives' - although these points have nothing to do with motives, they have to do with a certain way in

which one is characterizing relative position. Because it's a bit fuzzy, I'm just going to rush to the office and get it, because it's directly to this point. And we'll do that right now since it's a good issue to take up. [Tr: Bruce, S., and Wallis, R. (1983). Rescuing motives. THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 34(1), 61-71. Sharrock, W. W., and Watson, D. R. (1984). What's the point of 'rescuing motives'? THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 35(1), 435-451. Bruce, S., and Wallis, R. (1985). 'Rescuing motives' rescued: A reply to Sharrock and Watson. THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 36(3), 467-470. Sharrock, W. W., and Watson, D. R. (1986). Re-locating motives. THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 37(4), 581-583.]

[Tr: brief break]

Edith Rosenthal: Jeff, could you start by repeating Mike Lynch's point?; I missed it.

Jeff Coulter: Let me read the Bruce and Wallis way of setting up the issue, and then see if Mike thinks that that is the kind of thing that he was doing. If it's not, we'll talk from Mike's point, and if it is, we'll talk to this.

An answer is an answer because it follows a question. [JC - But] How does one identify a question? By the same method [JC - they say] - its placement - thus a question is what appears before an answer! ... [P]lacement cannot work [JC - in that it] ... depends on a special type of listener response; it rests on the hearer of the question GETTING IT RIGHT AND ANSWERING. [JC - But] If placement is the key to identification,

Or sequential location is what they mean by "placement" here.

If placement is the key to identification, then one cannot identify as a 'question' something to which the second speaker DOES NOT RESPOND WITH AN ANSWER. There is no possibility, then, of talking about the first speaker beginning [JC - with] what might be a question and answer ... pair, and the second speaker 'getting it wrong' and not responding. [Tr: Bruce and Wallis (1983), p. 67.]

Since one cannot identify something as a question, to which the second speaker does not respond with an answer, if one insists upon the notion of sequential location, as a generic constraint, that's the way they set it up.

In other words, what they are saying is that: if one generalizes the property of sequential location in this respect, then it would lead us to have to make an argument like this: that, UNLESS you have an answer to something that has just been done, and that thing is recognizably an answer, then you've no basis for saying that that prior thing was a question. And that they say is absurd.

Mike Lynch: That's Bruce and Wallis?

Jeff Coulter: Bruce and Wallis. Now let me give you the response from Sharrock and Watson, which I think is absolutely right, and as they say:

..we defy Bruce and Wallis to point to any claim in the Schegloff and Sacks ... [JC - output] that interlocutors can identify a given utterance as a question by reference (let alone sole reference) to the fact that it is followed by an answer. Nowhere in more than three hundred studies in conversational analysis will Bruce and Wallis find the claim that some first pair part is identified purely by reference to a second pair part. The most elementary considerations of real time would show the fallacy of any such claim. [Tr: Sharrock and Watson (1984) p. 437.]

Now, what they go on to say is this:

..ONE WAY in which one can SOMETIMES identify a question is through appeal to the normative requirement of sequential juxtaposition prior to an answer, that one can say 'it is a question because it comes where a question properly ought, immediately before something which could be an answer to it' they would be much more accurate but [JC - they are] still quite visibly a long way from telling the whole story [Tr: Sharrock and Watson (1984), p. 437]

[JC - Clearly] The identification of an answer by virtue of its succession upon a question is possible because the

question to which it stands as an answer is already available, but it is claimed that for the parties involved in the production of a question-answer pair the same simply can't apply to the identification of the question. It is not, ON PRODUCTION to be identified as a question through its precedence of an answer, since that answer is not yet available. [JC - Obviously.] Clearly the one who is to provide the answer to the question MUST have ways of knowing that a question has been asked, in order to see that giving an answer is the next appropriate action. Bruce and Wallis must suppose that conversational analysts are immensely short-sighted if they suppose that these observations are news...

There is a difference between questions and answers which Bruce and Wallis overlook. [Tr: Sharrock and Watson (1984), p. 437]

And now Sharrock and Watson basically get into the citations from, particularly from Sacks, but also from Schegloff. The first point which Sacks notes, and notes quite clearly, is that answers, unlike questions, are not type-marked as such. In other words, there is no clear prosodic, syntactic, lexical characteristics that can be used to define something as an answer. In other words, it is a PURE sequential object. And by that they simply mean that there are NO lexical, syntactic, prosodic or any other feature internal to the turn that can be appealed to to identify the turn AS an answer. So the illocutionary category 'answer' is a pure sequential illocutionary category. This is NOT the case for questions.

First of all, questions are type-marked, as we already noticed by "wh", and also by syntactical juxtapositions, for example: "The cat sat on the mat. Did the cat sit on the mat?" By syntactical formation, or by "wh" initiation. "Where did the cat sit?" There are no type marks of that kind, either "wh" initiation or syntactical arrangements that can be used to characterize something as an answer. That's point one.

Point two, there are no function indicating devices that can be used, or that are conventionally used to set something up as an answer, as something called an answer, in the way

that there are function indicating devices that can be used to set some things up as, say, 'promises'. "I promise you that..." where you actually invoke the concept in the production of that action. "I bet you that..." "I sentence you to ten years." All of that out of J. L. Austin, and John Searle. There is really nothing like "I answer you this way." It can be used, but it's not a conventional use. It's not something that is a conventional part of giving something that is identifiable as an answer.

Further, we have such a thing as interrogative intonation, of which we've already spoken. So one can recognize a question even before it has been fully produced, such that an utterance which begins "Where are you..." has got a very strong prospect of ending up completed as a question, and Sacks mentions this as "the projectable character of an utterance". Where some utterances have the character of projectability to completion, and they have that in virtue of the type-marked character of their utterance initial design, and others don't.

So, one can identify a question defeasibly - defeasibly, though - defeasibly, notice - because type-marked and intonation contours which are question CONVENTIONAL are NOT question SPECIFIC. And indeed it can turn out to be the case that by employing the prosodic features of question construction, one can turn out to be doing a lot of other, and rather different things than simply asking a question, as in this case where he's quoting somebody and giving an answer. In other cases there are kinds of questions that are really to be other things than questions like accusations where "Where were you last night?" can come off as an accusation, and not just a solicitation of information. One can have what Goffman calls "lamination" in respect of illocutionary force. The character of the act is not given PURELY by these things, but it is defeasibly so characterizable.

So, we have then the notion that questions can be defeasibly characterized by OTHER THAN sequential considerations. But sequential considerations do indeed enter into the ways in which a characterization might be settled upon in respect of the way in which hearers observably treat the thing. You see the point? It's a very, very important point to note here. It's not to deny that sequential placement is relevant to the characterization of something as a question. What it is though is to note that there are certain

things that can occur as FIRST turns, as 'firsts', and there are certain things that simply CANNOT in any conceivable world be 'firsts', and one of those is an 'answer'. You can't have an answer as a first.

So, there is then a generic restriction on what can be a 'first-turn-type'. And one can simply ramify into the logical properties of the concepts, and see that as an a priori truth. A return greeting cannot possibly be a first turn-type. An answer cannot possibly be a first turn-type. An acceptance of an invitation cannot possibly be a first turn-type. And not only and exclusively because of lacking the kind of type markings that we've just been talking about, though that's a part of it. It also has to do simply with the logic of these concepts. It simply makes no sense whatsoever to provide for any possible world in which an acceptance of an invitation precedes the production of an invitation.

Mike Lynch: () An utterance can be conditionally relevant to whatever follows. Whether it's an answer to a question, or the answer to a prior question can be a resource for an answer to the next question (and so on). You might not say it's a first in some initial sequence of talk, but it does have the character of a first with respect to whatever follows. So, what exactly do you mean by a first? Does it have to be a first utterance spoken after a gap? It seems like that has a very special status in the way you're using it - that it's not just something occurs before something else from which that something else draws its materials. It occurs out of the blue. It initiates from nothing.

Jeff Coulter: No. What I have in mind is the following, and really I have kind of assumed something that I should have put on the table before making that stronger claim, which is this: What we're talking about when we're talking about firsts and nexts in the context of THIS argument is: we're invoking the notion of an "adjacency pair". And that is something that I haven't laid out. So, if I lay that one out and then you get the argument in that, it should become clearer.

The notion of an "adjacency pair" is one of the first contributions that Sacks, and Sacks and Schegloff made to the idea of there being formal constraints - I would call them logical constraints, but in order not to beg the question - formal constraints ON the organization of

illocutionary conduct. And it's set up in a very specific way, and I shall quote now from the paper "Opening Up Closings" in Turner's *ETHNOMETHODOLOGY* reader - the paper is by Schegloff and Sacks - where they give the crispest formalization of "adjacency pair" that's available. And indeed I think that this is really the culmination of its technical identification. [Tr: Schegloff, E., and Sacks, H. (1974). Opening up closings. In R. Turner (Ed.) *ETHNOMETHODOLOGY* (pp. 233-264). Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. Slightly abridged version of a paper by the same title in: *SEMIOTICA*, 8, 1973, 289-327.] So I shall read their characterization of it:

... adjacency pairs consist of sequences which properly have the following features: (1) two utterance length, (2) adjacent positioning of component utterances, (3) different speakers producing each utterance. ... (4) [JC - a] relative ordering of parts (i.e. first pair parts precede second pair parts), and (5) discriminative relations (i.e. the pair type of which a first pair part is a member is relevant to the selection among second pair parts). [Tr: Schegloff and Sacks (1974), p. 238.]

Now adjacency pairs therefore could comprise illocutionary activities such as questions and answers, summons and answers, greetings and return greetings, and then there is a subset of adjacency pairs where you have alternate second pair part possibilities. So you have 'offers' that can get either 'accept' or 'reject'; 'invitations' that can get either 'accept' or 'reject'; 'requests' that can get either 'grant' or 'denial' - accept or reject - 'compliments' which can get 'agreed with' or 'disagreed with' - acceptance or rejections - 'formulations' that can get 'acceptance' or 'rejection', and so forth.

Now, when talking about 'firsts', what I'm really talking about is first-pair-parts of adjacency pairs. I'm talking about things that can be embedded in that technically described apparatus, in that combinatorial logic, if you will, of illocutionary conduct, of speech activity. Now, it happens to be the case that there are two highly conventionalized adjacently positioned, or adjacency pair, adjacently organized activities that do have as one of their major uses the

initiation of WHOLE spates of talk. Those are the 'summons-answer' sequence, and the 'greeting' sequence. Ok, so 'greeting' - 'return greeting'; 'summons' and 'answer' are characteristically NOT JUST adjacency pairs, but they are the kinds of adjacency pairs that tend to come in first position sequentially. So, it's a first sequence type, not just a first pair part, but a first sequence type - which are usable conventionally to open whole spates, whole sets of sequences. Ok. So, it's not that I'm just saying that they can't be employed to open whole sets of sequences, but it's embedded in this notion of adjacency position.

Now, it seems to me that the claim that answers MUST BE second pair parts, could NOT BE first, is not something that is defeatable empirically. It seems to me that if one finds some case where one believes that one has identified something as an answer as a first pair part of an adjacency pair, one is simply talking nonsense, and has not made, COULD NOT have made a discovery about a property, a hitherto unknown property of answers. It's simply part of the logical characterization. It is, in other words, a logical property of something which is an answer, that it be, and that it can only be, first of all, a pure sequential object - it's not identifiable independently of placement, which is not true for questions - they can be identifiable, defeasibly, independent of placement - It's not the case that something which is a question and doesn't get any answer thereby ceases to be a question. It's simply an unanswered question.

BUT, one wants to argue further, I think, and here's where I think one can elaborate on this technical specification of adjacency positioning by using the concept that I think was first developed by Schegloff elsewhere, that you mentioned a moment ago, which is the concept of "conditional relevance". Let me talk about it this way: The concept of conditional relevance is not mentioned in this specification of adjacency positioning, of the organizational structure of adjacency pairing. Instead they speak of "discriminative relations" - that is the pair type, of which a first pair part is a member, or token, is relevant to the selection - is RELEVANT to the selection among second pair parts.

The notion of something being "conditionally relevant" seems to me to be saying something like this: it seems to be saying something like IF you hear an utterance AS an 'x', then that will make

conditionally relevant the production of a 'y', subsequent to it. But more than that, if you hear something as an 'x', and then you hear something produced subsequent to it, IF 'x' and 'y' are in a relation of conditional relevant production, then you will try to hear, or you may well end up hearing the 'y' AS that which is conditionally relevant upon the production of the 'x'. So, it's not just a production issue, it's also got to do with the organization of our hearing and comprehension. That is to say, that it's not just that it might be relevant, for example, if I ask you a question, and you come up with something that's an answer, that it's a relevant thing to do. No. The notion of conditional relevance as Schegloff outlines it in his summons-answer paper is a far stronger one. He is saying there, as he elaborates upon it, that IF you hear something as an 'x', where the production of 'y' is conditionally relevant upon the production of an 'x', then whatever is produced next after 'x' has been articulated, not only is the production of 'y' something that you are constrained to do, but that whatever is produced in the SLOT, in that slot, is now HEARABLE as... In other words there is a pressure to try to hear that as if it were the 'y'. So, in other words, it sets up not just an organization of possible actions, but an organization of possible orientations, or hearings, or understandings. And that is missing from this characterization of adjacency positioning. But it's a helpful additional specification of these matters.

Ok. So we've got then...

[Tr: tape change]

Jeff Coulter(cont.): ... as a necessary part of any contexture. And, of course, that also holds for first parts, because what makes something into a first-part is that even if it doesn't get a second, there are certain kinds of things that are orientable to as firsts that are now making seconds conditionally relevant to them, whether or not they're produced. And, in fact, here Sacks speaks to the property of what he calls the "noticeable absence" of the conditionally relevant next. What he means by this is that something like 'a silence', that arises in a spate of talk, has certain properties assignable to it in virtue of the sequential placement of a silence. And if a silence arises between two speakers, directly after the production of a possibly hearable

first-pair-part of an adjacency pair, that it's not just that there is a silence. There is now made available the orientation to, first, that there is a noticeable thing. There is a NOTICEABLE silence, a noticeable absence, and not just something being absent. It is noticeably missing. There is something missing. It's not just that there is silence; there's something missing. Moreover, the silence is now attributable to a party. It's not just that there is silence that we're both now responsible for, but that it's, for example, your silence. In other words, the silence now has an owner, has an interlocutor. It can be assigned to someone. And that silences have these properties is further evidence for the strong conventionality of the adjacency positioning organization.

Let me now move on to the subset of adjacency pairs which comprise those with alternate second-pair-parts. Remember there's adjacency pairs, generically speaking, and we can conventionally characterize those things which we would routinely see to satisfy these five properties of adjacency pairs, like 'greetings' and 'return greetings', 'summons' and 'answers', 'questions' and 'answers', etc. And then we have the subset of those with alternate second-pair-parts. So that we have 'invitations' that can get 'accepted' or 'rejected', 'requests' that can get 'granted' or 'denied' - 'accepted' or 'rejected' - 'offers' that can get 'accepted' or 'rejected', and so on.

Now, when we have adjacency pairs with alternate second-pair-parts, or second-pair-part alternates, the argument is made by Sacks that there is what is called a "preference ordering" with respect to the second-pair-parts. The argument goes as follows: that adjacency pairs with alternate second-pair-parts exist, and that for any adjacency pair with alternate second-pair-parts, there is a preference ordering defined over the second-pair-parts. What that means is this: as a first cut of the cake, what it's noticing is something like: 'invitations' have as their point conventionally their being 'accepted'. If 'invitations' have as their point their being 'rejected', we'd be in a Humpty Dumpty world. The point of the institution, the point of the illocutionary act of 'inviting' IS to get the 'invitation' 'accepted'. The same with 'offering'; the same with 'requesting'. And I'll just stick with these three for the time being: 'inviting', 'offering', and 'requesting'.

Now the way this is set up is that, for example, it is specified that, say, 'grants' are preferred over 'denials' post 'requests'. 'Acceptances' are preferred over 'rejections' post 'invitations'.

Now, it seems to me that you can argue this through in several different ways. And aspects of this argument cropped up in the Ethno conference [Tr: August, 1987; Boston, MA] with Jack Bilmes from Hawaii. And Jim Heap has a paper or two on it. It's kind of become a controversial issue as to how to specify this property of adjacency pairs with alternate second-pair-parts. Let me tell you what I think about it, and then we can either argue about it or go on to the next structure.

One way in which the case is made about preference ordering on second-pair-parts is to notice that IF somebody produces the DIS-preferred second-pair-part, that is to say if somebody is going to 'reject' an 'invitation', or 'deny' a 'request', then characteristically there are certain sorts of properties of the turn shape, the design of the turn, in which the dis-preferred thing is to be produced. So, for example - and this is a sort of matter of empirical skewing of a collection of cases - you get things like "the deferral" in the turn of the dis-preferred. You can get the production of the dis-preferred with an account for why it's being produced, but you don't tend to get that when the preferred is produced. So if I'm going to turn down your 'invitation', it's "No" plus a reason. Whereas if I'm going to 'accept' it, I'm not pressured to give a reason, and reasons are usually absent.

A: Like to come to the party tonight?

B: Oh, that'd be great, and I'd like to come because I really like you.

Things like that don't happen. But:

B: No, I can't. See the reason is I have no baby sitter.

That's the sort of thing you tend to get as a loose cut at it.

Or, you get phenomena like the weak initial agreement token followed by, later in the turn, the production of the dispreferred.

Or you get the "concessionary" rejection - what I've called in some articles the "concessionary" rejection, i.e., in the case I like:

A: Dr. K's asked us to call to take you to hospital

said by a psychiatric orderly who has the power to grab you and take you.

B: I'll come in me own time

Which provides at once a rejection, BUT it makes a concession. In the doing of the dis-preferred, it makes a concession to trying to satisfy the preferred.

So we have those sorts of features characterizing what would be generic for dispreferreds.

It seems to me that those are interesting arguments, but they are quite subsidiary to the primary argument in this domain, which I construe to be a logico-grammatical one - as you might expect, as a logicist - which is: that these are empirically contingent matters having to do with such things as the normative orders around things like doing something somebody really doesn't want you to do, RATHER THAN having any bearing on what I construe to be the logical status of the concept of 'preference'.

First note, the notion of preference does not operate as a matter of personal preference. It is not being said that it is SPEAKERS who prefer that hearers accept invitations. In other words, it's not a generic characterization of personal orientation on the part of speakers that's being argued about here. NOR, is it, I think, reasonable to thereby make a secondary related argument that it is a general characteristic of speakers that because they might prefer NOT to give, say, a rejection of an invitation, that therefore they will do those kinds of things that we've just been talking about. It seems to me that that way of setting it up is neither a part of the way that Sacks and Schegloff, and others, set it up, nor does it follow in any clear way that that is what we are talking about

Instead it seems to me that the notion of preference is really noting a LOGICAL feature of illocutionary forms like: inviting, requesting,

and offering. Namely, that they have as a part of their MEANING, as a part of the GRAMMAR of the concept - in other words, built into what could conceivably be something like an invitation that they are to be accepted. It seems to me, in other words, that the idea of having something that one could characterize as an invitation, but which does not have as a part of its point the securing of acceptance is to violate the concept of what an invitation could possibly be. Just as, by exact analogy, to say of something that it is a 'promise', but that it places the promiser under no obligation, is simply now to engage in a violation of the logical grammar of promising.

Mike Lynch: I don't buy that.

Jeff Coulter: No?

Mike Lynch: No. How do you get at that logical grammar independently of seeing how these things are used? Because I can imagine the logical grammar of 'request', that the grammar of 'requests' permits equivalently 'acceptance' or 'rejection'. And that that would be the logic, that there would be two legal alternatives, which would be equivalent. Just as for the answer of a yes-no question, there would be two legally permissible answers. But when you bring in the notion of preference you find in these various ways, that Sacks and Pomerantz, and so forth, elaborated, that although - and I thought this irony was actually a part of the way this was elaborated - although logically, or legally you have these alternatives, you don't find them being used in that imaginable way, or the imaginable equivalents take on a skewing. You have the non-equivalent production of disagreement as opposed to (an answer), that they are mirror images of each other. The disagreement would be prefaced, and (the disagreement) would be delayed, or it would be done with tokens that logically are associated with agreement, like weak "yeses", or weak statements, or assessments. So that when you're saying that it is part of the a prioristic logic of 'request' that there is preference for acceptance, wouldn't that be putting the cart before the horse? That would be something FOUND through the analysis of 'requests' in conversation, that they are preponderantly accepted, that acceptance and rejection are not equivalent, etc., etc.

Jeff Coulter: No, I don't think so. Which is not to deny what you've been pointing to about their USE. The argument I'm making is that in characterizing the nature of an utterance as a 'request', in the first instance, as distinct from something that might be using the request form - just in the way in which we spoke about 'accusations' as laminated over 'questions' - it seems to me that there are kinds of things that use the FORMS of activities without necessarily instantiating those activities. If somebody is inviting me to do something, and I'm characterizing what's being done as inviting me, then it follows logically, by virtue of the characterization of that as an invitation, as opposed to an insincere or pseudo-invitation, or something that SOUNDS like an invitation, but which is really a trap - it seems to me to follow logically that it is directed toward securing acceptance.

If, for example, let me put it this way, if I were to, say, "offer" you a bomb. And you say: "Thanks for the offer." It's an offer that OF COURSE, in a sense, you've got to reject. So you might say that: the preference for rejection is sensitive to the 'object' of the transfer in respect of requests and offers. In other words, you might say that for a whole class of objects of transfer, the preference is sensitive to the nature of the objects involved in transfer in respect of requests and offers. I say No. I say that you CANNOT offer somebody, except in an ironical way, a facetious way of talking about offering someone, you cannot offer them something that is not designed to get them to accept it. Though the amusement trades off of the form of offering. Just as you can't fall in love with a lump of mud, so you can't really request certain things, or offer certain things. You can only be seen to be borrowing on those forms. You see the way the argument works?

Edith Rosenthal: Did you say bomb? {JC: yeah} Well, there you're losing the decontextualization rule, because with an underground, revolutionary cell that would go. That would not be an ironic question.

Jeff Coulter: No, Ok. Satisfy the context for me, just fill it out so as to make my point for me. You know what I mean? {ER: I'm just saying-} I could pass you a bomb that's lit, about to blow you up. That's what I meant. {ER: Ok} You know what I'm saying? {ER: Yes} Fill out my example charitably.

Yeah, you're right, of course. But really you're making my point, actually, in a sense, because what you're saying is there are circumstances in which, of course, you can offer somebody a bomb, when it's not going to blow-up when they take it in their hands.

Now, I see it as () with exactly the following distinction between 'promising' and 'threatening'. "He promised to beat the shit out of it." is hearable as something that is glossing what is in fact a threat. It's not WRONG to say "He promised to beat the shit out of it". There's nothing wrong with that, but we know and we can speak to it as a threat. Because the difference between promising and threatening has got to do exactly with the kind of thing that the candidate recipient could be construed as either 'desiring', 'wanting', 'having a positive orientation to', and so forth, as distinct from 'threat'. That's WHAT makes THE DIFFERENCE between those things.

Mike Lynch: If - and I'm trying to remember how CA argues this, but - if I make a request by saying "You wouldn't be interested in taking in a movie tonight (would you)?" - I believe the characterization of that would be that that prefers rejection, that way of phrasing, rather than "How would like to go to the movies (with me tonight)?" That the prefacing of the request, it's not that all requests necessarily prefer acceptance, but they are produced so as to be heard to prefer ().

Jeff Coulter: Wouldn't you say, though, that in that case Mike we're in the business of the 'parasitic form argument'? That is to say, it borrows from the FORM of a request, but comes off as an irony, or comes off as-

Mike Lynch: (I'm not sure) that would be an irony.

Jeff Coulter: Well, that comes off as a something that is not functioning as-

Mike Lynch: Well, it is functioning as a request, and it can function very powerfully as a request.

Jeff Coulter: "You don't really want to do that again do you?" is really like a 'warning'. "You can't make the movies with me tonight, can you?" is NOT an invitation.

Mike Lynch: Oh it certainly is. I'm sorry, I'd characterize that as a 'request', but I would say that certainly acts as an invitation.

Edith Rosenthal: I agree. I think that it strengthens your argument, though, that the person—since the preference is for an answer "yes", the thing is presented in a way where the person is guarding against the possible up-set of the fact that the person is going to say "no".

Mike Lynch: Yeah, the PERSON prefers "yes", but in that case the utterance prefers "no".

Jeff Coulter: Run me the example again.

Mike Lynch: I mean that example could be used to distinguish the notion of person-preference from the form of the utterance which prefers rejection.

Jeff Coulter: And what was the example again?

Mike Lynch: The invitation: "You wouldn't want to take in a movie tonight, would you?"

Jeff Coulter: And you are saying about that?

Mike Lynch: That that prefers rejection. I believe that's how it's been characterized in Conversational Analysis.

Edith Rosenthal: Professor?, you've already changed what you said. When you first said it you said "You wouldn't be interested in going to a movie with me tonight, would you?" Which is blander than "You wouldn't want to go to a movie with me tonight, would you?"

Mike Lynch: Well, ()

Jeff Coulter: It sounds like a 'guarded' invitation.

Mike Lynch: Oh, it certainly would be an invitation that's guarded.

Jeff Coulter: Yes. And you're saying of it that it prefers "no".

Mike Lynch: The form does.

Jeff Coulter: Mmmh. It doesn't jog my intuitions that (way).

Ed Parsons: But the person prefers "yes", but the form of the utterance- ?

Mike Lynch: Well, I think that was the argument. I should probably not get into this, because I'm a bit foggy as to exactly how ().

Jeff Coulter: In any event, you're still objecting to the a prioristic analysis.

Mike Lynch: Oh yeah, that's (the wrong way around).

Jeff Coulter: You want to leave it on the table for the time being? {ML: yeah} We'll move on? {ML: yeah}

Eileen Crist: I can't see why the a prioristic analysis is making a logical point, rather than a normative point. Because you're still presupposing that sincerity is the primitive form. So that a person is sincere when they are making an invitation, and then all other forms are parasitic on it. So, why would that be a logical analysis, rather than a normative? Why would it be a logical feature, rather than a normative feature?

Jeff Coulter: Because sincerity is indeed a logical property. It's not that logic and normativity are different here. It's a necessary normativity for inviting that it get acceptance. Of course, empirically, as we know, many invitations get rejection. Rejection is dis-preferred as a matter of the LOGIC of what an invitation is. And part of the logic of what an invitation is is its POINT. It's part of specifying what counts as an invitation that it has a certain point. Like it's part of what counts as a question that it's transitive with respect to answers, i.e., what a question is cannot be elucidated independently of the concept of an answer. What an answer is cannot be elucidated....., conceptually speaking.

Now, of course, that's not wholly independent of looking at USE. But it's not that, you see, you're looking now at use, at cases, at instances in transcripts such that you could FIND a case in which, say, an answer was a first-pair-part, or that you come up with EVIDENCE out of transcripts that undermine the argument that invitations prefer acceptances. That is part of the logic of it. In other words, that is a priori, and INDEFEASIBLE, INCORRIGIBLE with respect to discoveries in transcripts. Indeed it's now part of the ways in

which you would LOOK at transcripts. You bring this to bear on the investigation and the inquiry into transcripts, INTO the analysis of talk.

For example - let me move on and try to elaborate on this point with respect to the matter of "repair", the organization of repair in conversation. This I take to be very interesting, because the way in which the repair apparatus was first noticed, as Sacks explains it, is by finding a peculiarity - the following peculiarity, namely: Three questions in a row. Which fundamentally violates the adjacency positioning constraint on questions. To find in interaction three questions in a row, where A produces a question, then B produces a question, then A produces a third question - is ostensibly to violate the whole logic of adjacency positioning with respect to questions. Questions are first-pair-parts in an adjacency pair. Questions make answers conditionally relevant nexts, not questions. So to find three questions in a row is, on the face of it, at a first cut, to find some violation of the adjacency positioning constraint, or rule, or convention, or the conditional relevance convention around questions.

Mike Lynch: Why wouldn't you say that for two questions in a row?

Jeff Coulter: Only because it's tailor-made to make my point, that's all.

Mike Lynch: The same point could be made with two.

Jeff Coulter: Certainly. But I'm speaking about three questions because it was noticing THIS, rather than noticing two questions that alerted people to the existence of different sequential structure.

So, we have:

A: What made you do it?

B: Huh?

A: Why did you take it?

What looks ostensibly like three questions, but it works intelligibly. There's nothing counter-intuitive about that. In fact, it's a real case. Whether or not it's a real case, by the way, doesn't matter for this argument. That, of course, is to open a whole can of worms that we'll talk about much, much later on. But that it's a real

case, at least for now, let's us satisfy the empiricist program, before I try to argue for the logic program, a logico-grammatical program.

"What made you do it?" "Huh?" "Why did you take it?" Q, Q, Q all in a row, next to one another. Well, now, clearly, you can do one of two things. You could say sequences like that violate the adjacency convention with respect to questions as first-pair-parts of adjacency pairs. OR you could do what, of course, you should do, and what Sacks and Schegloff did, being highly intelligent and rational analysts, is to see that it doesn't really make sense analytically to characterize this as three questions, in a row. It is far better to think more carefully about the nature of the interactional work being achieved in and through the use of question FORM, rather than to take question form, fetishize it, and characterize it as three questions, and therefore now argue that adjacency positioning in respect of questions has a limit, and that there's a whole range of unknown phenomena out there that violate it systematically. Where does that leave your adjacency positioning rule in respect of these illocutionary acts, like questions, and others?

The first thing to note, as they set it up, is that THIS turn, A, receives in its immediate subsequent turn, something that Schegloff very nicely characterizes as "a repair-initiator". This [Tr: "Huh?"] is to be seen as a repair initiator that retrospectively operates on the prior turn. In fact, he calls it a "next-turn-repair-initiator", or NTRI for short. Objects like that [Tr: "Huh?"] with a questioning tone, are next-turn-repair-initiators in these sequences. BUT, notice that it has additional properties. This kind of object: "Huh?", "What?", "Mmmh?", and their cognates post ANY prior are NON-targeting repair-initiators, which operate generically on the WHOLE of the prior turn. That is, they are 'whole turn' operators, as distinct from targeting next-turn-repair-initiators, or targeting repair-initiators, such as: "What made her do what?". Or "What did you say about my doing it?" which targets that [Tr:in "What made you do it?" above]. Or "What made I do what?" which targets that [Tr:in "What made you do it?"]], and so forth. Or:

A: You took away the car late last night.

B: I took away the what late last night?

which targets a specific thing in prior turn.

So then there is a generic sort of distinction to be drawn between TARGETING repair-initiators, and NON-targeting, or generic prior turn operators.

Now we're into interesting business. Because it can now be argued that the production of any next-turn-repair-initiator, whether it be targeting or non-targeting, provides for either the whole of the prior turn or some selective part of the prior turn as a "repairable". And the "repairable", like an answer, is a pure sequential object. There is no way of telling what bit of conduct, or utterance is a repairable independently of its sequential location. Nothing whatsoever. It's a pure sequential object. Like 'answer' is a pure sequential object. That means that the only aspect of gestalt contexture that can be brought to bear to figure what its illocutionary force is, or what the action is that its accomplishing, is its sequential position. The ONLY thing, absolutely the ONLY thing, apart from, of course, the fact that something has been said. In addition to that something has been said, WHEN it's said is the thing that makes it what it is, and WHERE it is, prior to NTRI, makes it now repairable, either in whole, or in part if one is using a targeting form.

And this third turn, "Why did you take it?", is itself clearly not a question in the sense of that's the only thing it is. What it is is a "re-formulation" of the repairable item post the repair-initiator. Now we can come up with a number of rules for what's referred to as the "repair sequence", the "repair structure". Note that turn three, in these canonical repair sequences, turn three is where the candidate repair is produced, post the repair-initiator. So that here is the candidate repair: "Why did you take it?". And it's a "candidate repair" as distinct from being able to say that it's just 'the repair' in virtue of the fact that at that point it's still not known that that has done the job of repairing. Because it might still get something like, in a fourth turn: "What?". It still needs work. So, post the next-turn-repair-initiator is the opportunity space, the sequential position in which whatever is produced can be heard now for its possibly repairing the repairable.

Moreover, notice the following properties: there are THREE and ONLY THREE types of candidate repairs that are producible. And this again is not an empirical but a logical 'allowed', an a

prioristic argument. Those three are, and it has to do with the meaning of the word repair in this context: (1) the re-formulation of the repairable, as in this case.

A: What made you do it?

B: Huh?

A: Why did you take it?

(2) repetition or full repeat. e.g.:

A: What made you do it?

B: Huh?

A: What made you do it?

(3) partial repeat.

A: What made you do it?

B: Huh?

A: What made you take it? - or - What made you? [Tr: see discussion on page 29 of this transcript]

There are three and only three kinds of candidate repair: re-formulation, full repeat, and partial repeat. Now, of course, it's possible to go on AFTER, or even prior to the production of the candidate repair, but the thing that operates as a candidate repair can instantiate only one of these three options.

Now, notice: that the production of partial or total repeats, as distinct from re-formulations, tends to exhibit the orientation on the part of the producer of the repair, or the candidate repair, exhibits an orientation to the nature of the repairable as a hearing problem rather than a comprehension problem. Defeasibly. It doesn't settle it, but the very production of a repeat rather than a re-formulation can provide the one producing the next-turn-repair-initiator with the notion that what has been the problem with that, for him, according to him, is a hearing problem. [Tr: JC pointing to utterances on the board] Whereas a re-formulation provides for that it might have been a hearing problem, but it could have been a comprehension problem. Now, if you think it's a comprehension problem, but NOT a hearing problem,

then it doesn't make any sense to produce a full repeat. Because a full repeat is not the thing to produce if you analysis of the source of the trouble is a comprehension problem. Since simply repeating something that hasn't been understood, isn't the kind of things that is going to get it understood, but it is the kind of thing that might get it heard. So, one of the things that one can find from the FORM that the repair turn takes is that it can exhibit an analysis, or an orientation on the part of the producer as to the nature of the trouble that the interlocutor has had with the turn that's under repair.

Mike Lynch: Well, why do you say that there are only three logical possibilities? What's the ()? What's the (basis)? Why would we come up with that independent of inspecting these things and finding that....?

Jeff Coulter: Could there be another?

Mike Lynch: How do you derive three? I'm just puzzled by your saying there are only three logical possibilities. I'm wondering what the logic is that allows us to specify three possibilities, if indeed we agree there are three.

Jeff Coulter: Well, I think the onus is upon you to give me a fourth.

Mike Lynch: But say there is only two?

Jeff Coulter: Oh, well then you'll have to strike one down in a principled way. I'm not trying to play with this, what I'm saying by saying there are logically only three is it's INCONCEIVABLE that there are others that could constitute repair. The "conceivable" - it's not that we've exhausted the universe, but we wouldn't know how to recognize a fourth if we found one AS a repair. Would we?

There is no proof procedure for it. Somebody could (cut out the floor from under me). That will destroy the claims. I don't have a proof procedure for it. It just seems to me that I can't feel what could possibly be a repair if it's not one of those three. Nobody has ever come up with a fourth. And it seems to me that it defines what repair is in conversation and communication.

Gary Reed: I'm just having trouble with seeing what (is going on with) the third or the partial repeat, as opposed to it being a

re-formulation. Is it a partial repeat just because some of the words were the same?

Jeff Coulter: Yes.

Ed Parsons: Well that can be true of the re-formulation too.

[Tr:omits]

George Psathas: [Tr: With respect to the partial repeat:] The initial is: "What made you do it?", right? {JC: yes} And, if it's a partial repeat, it would be: "What made you?", or some such.

Jeff Coulter: All right. Yes.

[Tr: omits]

Jeff Coulter: But the difference between a partial repeat and a re-formulation is that a re-formulation is something which RE-CASTS the WHOLE turn, re-casts the issue, whereas a partial-repeat simply says a little bit of what was previously said. That's the only claim that's being made.

[Tr: omits]

It's a particularization off of the thing that he did. Clearly, "What made you do it?" is now construed to be an inquiry into something like a 'theft', or a 'taking', which is hearably something untoward.

Mike Lynch: (I wonder if we could) treat this as a Garfinkel exercise () based on the concept of repair and we'll generate these categories of candidate repairs. And then you go look at transcripts and see how well we can make this work. Start collecting the troubles and the ambiguities about whether 'a this one' is a 'repetition'. You notice some slight differences, like whether it's a partial repeat. Or whether this one is a partial repeat or a re-formulation informed by our categories (). And then, within any one of them there's two very significant variations that may over-ride the categorical markers between them. (It's a messy) logically derived analysis.

Jeff Coulter: Borderline cases, it doesn't seem to me, affect the..

Mike Lynch: Well they could turn out to be worse than borderline cases, (that you find a preponderance of cases). It's an imaginable activity. You could find a predominance of cases that would not- you'd have to really strain to get these to work as explicit categories (or as...) collecting repairs.

Jeff Coulter: If it's not a borderline argument, what sort of argument is it?

Mike Lynch: What I'm trying to get at is: Conversational Analysis is, as far as I can see, it usually works from, or at least it presents itself as working from materials and the characterizations are based on those, whereas you're recommending that we (...the other way around). I'm wondering where those two ways of working might come into conflict.

Jeff Coulter: Oh, no. It's not that one is recommending abstaining from looking at materials. Rather it's claiming that there is absolutely no truth to the programmatic argument that the characterization of the organization of interaction derives from materials particular to the data, so to speak, construed as the stuff on the transcript, or even on the tape. I'm not making a transcript fetish argument; I'm making also a tape argument. In fact, I'm making an in situ hearing and looking argument too. That, in other words, there are two strains in CA, as I see it. And they intertwine in odd ways. For example, the concept of preference seems to me to work as a logical issue. There is a way in which, however, the concept has been extended in purely an empiricist way as, for example, the argument that there's a generic preference for self-correction over other-correction. Now, it seems to me that that claim is, as Schegloff might say in a different context, a quasi-statistical argument. That there is a preference for self-correction over other-correction seems to me as an argument to be purely a empiricist argument: where, by whom, in what circumstances? Clearly there's a preference for other-correction operating in classroom pedagogy, because the teacher doesn't expect the child to correct himself in certain circumstances where there is interrogation going on. The teacher is the one who has the right to make the correction, and the child is not expected to be able to correct himself on all counts. And indeed, it's not a violation if the child fails to correct, and the teacher comes in and does it for him. That's what pedagogy is about.

[Tr: tape change]

Jeff Coulter(cont.): ... is, at best, a matter of a quasi-distribution kind of argument for (Ethno. ...).

Mike Lynch: Sort of a normative understanding (that would make that sensible). Or a moral understanding. Sacks used to tell the story of the guy who ().

Jeff Coulter: Yes, yes. The relativization I was speaking about then really isn't a question about the distribution of occurrence, but a question of the relativizable to an unknown domain of what transfers are - is what I should be saying. You're right.

Jeff Coulter: We're a bit way over time I think.

So, will you bear with me? I'd like to work through the basic abstract sequence structures of Conversation Analysis for the next couple of weeks, and try to continue and try to make more rigorous sorts of arguments in favor of the logico-grammatical conception of this stuff, and to SHOW, very seriously, that that does not mean that one is excused from empirical work, at the same time. Because, of course, the argument will be that doing proper logico-grammatical elucidations OF the properties of indexical expressions and indexical actions, etc., is a matter of, if you like, deriving a priori's in a way that can't possibly be done without data. The argument that I will be making is that it is exactly like certain forms of theorem derivation in mathematics, which require of the mathematician that he actually look at numbers, and look on a page at stuff. And then when he finds a certain theorem- what I'll be sort of arguing is that the CLAIMS, the principles that emerge from doing Conversation Analysis are theoremic or quasi-theoremic. They are quasi-theoremic insofar as they don't have exact proofs, in the way that mathematical theorems do. But they are theoremic RATHER THAN matters of empirical distribution, or of mere regularities of occurrence. That they are quasi-theoremic is the claim that I would want to be making. And I would say that trying to establish claims speaks to a certain way in which we will engage in the enterprise, if you want to do CA type work, but

it's going to take a lot more work to try to be persuasive about that.

We'll carry on next time.

TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

These transcriptions were prepared from an audio recording, the auditory quality of which was not always optimal. Participating members, especially Jeff Coulter, have reviewed initial drafts of the transcripts and have attempted to clarify portions that were particularly difficult to hear, and also provided assistance in correcting errors in transcription that were made during the production of the first draft of each session. The generous assistance of all those involved is gratefully acknowledged. Particular appreciation goes out to Jeff Stetson who took on the laborious task of copy-editing. Unfortunately, not all errors in transcription, and not all inaudible portions could be corrected given the time lag in producing the transcriptions. The transcriber apologizes for any remaining typographical errors.

The following are conventions employed in producing the transcriptions of these meetings:

[x] square brackets: Text in square brackets is for the most part that of the transcriber. Such text is indicated by "Tr:" at the beginning of the brackets. It includes: 1. paraphrases of talk, 2. clarification of indefinite references, for example pointing, drawing or writing on the chalk-board, producing a behavioral display etc., 3. information about references to texts referred to in the talk, 4. other general remarks and clarifications and 5. indications of omissions and tape changes. PLEASE NOTE that there is almost always some bit of talk missing at the points of tape change. On occasion, comments in square brackets are insertions offered by those who have edited the text and are indicated as such by the initials of the person in question, e.g., [JC: xxxxxxxx]. Also, if additions or deletions are made in text quoted during the class, then these changes are noted in square brackets, with the speakers initials included within the brackets.

- { x } braces: Text in braces is the talk of persons who are commenting on or responding to the talk of another person who currently has the floor. This talk is introduced by the initials of the person making the remark and/or comment, e.g., {JC: xxxx}.
- (x) parentheses surrounding text: Text in parentheses is the transcriber's best guess as to what was being said when there is some doubt about exactly what was said due to the poor auditory quality of the tape.
- () empty parentheses: Parentheses containing no text indicate a portion of the talk which is not transcribable due to the poor auditory quality of the tape, although it is possible to tell that something was being said.

CAPITALIZATION: Capitalization is used to indicate titles (or partial titles, e.g.: INVESTIGATIONS for the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS) for books. It is also used to indicate vocal emphasis by the speaker in question, i.e., something which is spoken noticeably louder, or with more emphasis than the surrounding talk. It was not possible to underline text in the editing/text-formating system employed, which is why capitalization rather than underlining was used in the above cases. This also influenced the forming of terms in languages other than English, e.g.: Ubersicht, vis-a vis, etc, which are neither capitalized, nor underlined, although occasionally are explicated in square brackets following the text in question.