

[coulw12.001. Tr: BJB. 2 September 90: Edited version] Transcription conventions can be found on the last 2-3 pages of each transcript.

Please Note: This is an edited transcript of an informal seminar meeting. Please do not quote without permission of the parties involved.

JEFF COULTER
Department of Sociology
Boston University

WITTGENSTEIN AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Meeting 12: 23 April 87

TOPIC: CRITERIA (cont.),
including as subtopics: symptoms,
evidence, defeasibility, ON CERTAINTY,
and skepticism.

READING: (1) Cavell, S. (1979). THE CLAIM OF
REASON. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. p. 45. (2) Hacker, P. M. S. (1972).
INSIGHT AND ILLUSION: WITTGENSTEIN
ON PHILOSOPHY AND THE METAPHYSICS OF
EXPERIENCE. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press,
Chapter 10: The Problem of Criteria.
(3) Hacker, P. M. S. (1986). INSIGHT
AND ILLUSION: THEMES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN (revised edition).
Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, Chapter 11:
Criteria, Realism, and Anti-Realism.

Jeff Coulter: I think the best thing to do is
if you just read this handout, which comes from
Stanley Cavell, THE CLAIM OF REASON, Harvard
University Press, 1979, page 45. -- Oh, before you
read it, just a quick word about this book, which
many of us found a bit disappointing, especially
given Cavell's MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY?. That
collection was very interesting. THE CLAIM OF
REASON is a sort of re-write, and up-dating of his

doctoral dissertation, which was called "The Claim to Rationality", on which Hanna Pitkin bases a substantial amount of her WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE. And Cavell has been around for many years, and had never published that dissertation himself. And since Hanna Pitkin published WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE, felt that it would be really a duplication of that effort in significant measure. So he never did it. But obviously he wanted to still use some of that material, and use it in a way that was somewhat different from Pitkin's treatment. So what he did, as far as one can tell, he sort of up-dated certain sections of that, and then added a lot more material. So there's some material here which is not in the dissertation, as far as I know. The style, for the most part, is very, very rambling. I'll give you an example.

If not at the beginning of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, since what starts philosophy is no more to be known at the outset than how to make an end of it, and if not at the opening of PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, since its opening is not to be confused with the starting of the philosophy it expresses, and since the terms in which that opening might be understood can hardly be given, along with the opening itself, and if we acknowledge from the commensurate... [Tr: Cavell (1979)]

And it goes on and on like that. It's very hard to read.

But having said all that about it, he has a very succinct couple of chapters on criteria, which are worth considering. And I think the guts of his argument about criteria are on this page [Tr: page 45].

There are some very good chapters in there. There's a very nice treatment of Othello, etc. But it's very hard to read.

Ok. We were talking about criteria last time, and I thought we got a bit side-tracked toward the end. One of the things we have to bear in mind about criteria, as Wittgenstein discusses them, is that they don't relate, generally speaking, in his thinking to material objects. So, it's not as if books and tables and chairs have criteria. And the kinds of things that he addresses in terms of the concept of criteria, as you can glean from the

index at back of the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS [Tr: Abbreviated PI], are things like 'activities', 'states', 'processes', abstract kinds of phenomena - I'm being very rough and ready here. But I want to make a clear distinction between a concern for, let's say, the identifying characteristics of material objects, physical objects, and the more interesting and deeper issues of the identifying characteristics of experiences, the mental phenomena, and all of those matters, which are really at the hub of his concern, and which really motivate his discussion of criteria, for the most part.

Now we were talking about the contrast between early and later Hacker last time, and juxtaposing the 1972 treatment of criteria to the 1986 revision. That revision being, in significant measure, occasioned by Hacker's joint work with Gordon Baker on the exegetical commentary on the PI that they have been working on for some years, and of which we now have two volumes, and a third volume is expected, imminently.

One major difference is in the role of the concept of 'evidence' as between the first treatment and the second treatment. And a second difference seems to have to do with the role of "defeasibility".

Let us just refresh our memory about this before going on to the Cavell, which I want to discuss briefly, and then we'll pass it over to discussion.

[Tr: brief interruption to pass out materials to the group]

Jeff Coulter: I'm trying to find where Hacker talks about defeasibility. Pp. 307, 316.

Since any set of symptoms falls short of entailing the hypothesis, the evidential support it gives is defeasible. [Tr: Hacker (1986), p. 307]

So symptomatic support is defeasible. And that's consistent with Wittgenstein's entire treatment of symptoms. The notion of symptoms is the notion of inductively related evidence. That was page 307 of Hacker's 1986. Then on page 316:

Understanding and abilities are not inner processes at all, although they are not behaviour either. We should

remind the person 'of the CRITERIA which would prove his capacity to us' (RPP I, Paragraph 302). [Tr: Hacker (1986), p 316. "Criteria" italicized in original]

That taken from REMARKS ON PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY, volume 1., paragraph 302.

This might suggest that if 'p' is a criterion for 'q', then 'p' entails 'q'. But that would be wrong, at least if made as a GENERAL claim. [Tr: Hacker (1986), p. 316. "P", "q", and "general" italicized in original.]

Then the footnote at the bottom of the page:

Footnote 10. In some of Wittgenstein's mathematical examples it is at any rate not OBVIOUS that what he calls a criterion falls short of entailment or at least, of necessary conditions. Similar considerations apply to the angina example. [Tr: Hacker (1986), p. 316]

From the BLUE BOOK, remember? The criteria and the symptoms of angina. The criterion is the presence of the bacillus, and the symptoms are things like having a sore throat. [Tr: See BLUE BOOK, pp.24-25]

So, depending on the case, sometimes a criterion, in this treatment, entails the phenomenon.

Someone may manifest pain-behaviour, yet be pretending. A lucky beginner might successfully ϕ , yet lack the ability to ϕ . Criteria are here CIRCUMSTANCE-DEPENDENT, and it is this which gives a point to the claim that such criteria are DEFEASIBLE. If 'p' entails 'q', then if 'p' is the case, 'q' is the case come what may, independently of circumstances. But if 'p' is a criterion for 'q', it is so only in certain circumstances. Weeping and wailing, in certain circumstances are criteria for being in pain, in other circumstances they are criteria for grief; change the circumstances again and they are criteria for acting pain or grief. [Tr: Hacker (1986), p. 316. ϕ

is theta. Terms in caps, or surrounded by inverted commas are italicized in the original]

Now, what does Cavell have to say about this matter? Because it's quite clear that if criteria are circumstance-dependent, then they are defeasible, according to Hacker. And this is more or less the sort of analysis that was originated by Norman Malcolm in his exegesis of the PI that you have already read.

Circumstances, namely - as Malcolm rightly suggests, but for the wrong purposes - in which we will say (he will be) feigning, rehearsing, hoaxing, etc. Why such circumstances? What differentiates such circumstances from those in which he is (said to be) clearing his throat, responding to a joke, etc.? Just that for "He's rehearsing", or "feigning", or "It's a hoax", etc. to satisfy us as explanations for his NOT being in pain (for it to "turn out" that he is not in pain) WHAT he is feigning must be precisely PAIN, what he is rehearsing must be the part of a man IN PAIN, the hoax depends on his simulating PAIN, etc. These circumstances are ones in appealing to which, in describing which, we RETAIN THE CONCEPT (here of pain) whose application these criteria determine. And this means to me: In all such circumstances he has satisfied the criteria we use for applying the concept of pain to others. It is because of THAT satisfaction that we know he is feigning pain (i.e., that it is pain he is feigning), [JC: And not something else] and that he knows what to do to feign pain. [Tr: Cavell, THE CLAIM OF REASON, p. 45. Capitalized terms were italicized in the original]

Now we come to the crux of Cavell's remarks here:

Criteria are "criteria" for something's being so, not in the sense that they tell us of a thing's existence, but of something like its identity, not of it's BEING so, but of its being SO. Criteria do not determine the certainty of statements, but the application of the

concepts employed in statements. [Tr:
Cavell, THE CLAIM OF REASON, p. 45]

And there is a sense in which this reading is in some significant extent consistent with the notion of 'autonomy of grammar'. Since, as Wittgenstein argues, criteria are laid down in grammar, and grammar is autonomous - in the specific sense of autonomy that Wittgenstein intends - then "Criteria do not determine the certainty of statements, but the application of the concepts employed in statements." Criteria determine identity, but NOT a thing's existence.

Ok. It seems to me that this is helpful to some extent, but I still have the following issues to raise about it, which I'll throw on the table, and then we can have a discussion. Ok?

IF criteria determine the application of the concepts employed in statements, or let's say in utterances, then what can we mean by the "satisfaction of a criterion"? What can we mean by the satisfaction of a criterion? According to Cavell, a person who is hoaxing, or feigning pain - and this is the same sort of analysis that Hacker (1972) gives us - is satisfying criteria for being in pain. But in those circumstances, the satisfaction of the criteria does not, so to speak, put you in the presence of the real phenomenon of pain. So we have a notion of criterial satisfaction, but the absence of the phenomenon for which the criteria are criteria.

Now it seems to me that there is a bit of a problem about that. If you notice the way in which it tends to get set up in Hacker - in the 1986 - is in terms of notions like weeping and wailing. He doesn't use the term that Wittgenstein uses which is "pain-behavior". Now, pain-behavior is a quasi-philosophical, or quasi-technical term. We don't go around talking about pain-behavior; we talk about weeping, wailing, grimacing, screaming, moaning, crying, and the rest of it. But it seems to me that when Wittgenstein is talking about pain-behavior, he means exactly what he says, i.e., that behavior that is criterial for the presence of pain. That is, weeping because of pain. Weeping from pain. Crying from pain. Screaming in pain, or in agony, or whatever. NOT just doing the thing which is now detached. So not just having a thing which is called a pure weeping, which is not an enactment, say - if I could use that - which is not weeping from pain, or not weeping out of grief, and the other kinds of possibilities that weeping is

embedded in, but just weeping. But there is no such thing as 'just weeping'. So, the very characterization of the conduct ITSELF presupposes the satisfaction of some criteria. And if the conduct is properly characterized as 'weeping from pain', i.e., pain-behavior, then it ENTAILS that there's pain. Otherwise it's not pain-behavior, it's play-acting, hoaxing, feigning pain. So what we've got working here is the subtle detachment of the characterizations of behavior, which are now made to stand as criteria, and that's what is giving us all the problems about how you can have a criterion for something, which is not a symptom of it, a criterion, which when satisfied nonetheless you could be in circumstances where the thing isn't there. Which seems to me to be in some significant sense paradoxical. And I don't think it was Wittgenstein's intention. And I think, although when I first read Canfield's WITTGENSTEIN: LANGUAGE AND WORLD on criteria I thought: He's just got an entailment notion of criterion. I now think that this is the sort of thing he was on to, although this is not the kind of argument he uses. Because Canfield insisted that criteria in Wittgenstein are entailments, and NOT something that is half-way between entailment and inductive evidence - some kind of brand new logical relation. It seems to me that this therefore means that Cavell is not quite on the mark when he says - describing the case of hoaxing, and rehearsing, and feigning, he says:

And this means to me: In all such circumstances he has satisfied the criteria we use for applying the concept of pain to others. It is because of THAT satisfaction that we know he is feigning pain. [Tr: Cavell, THE CLAIM OF REASON, p. 45. Capitalized text was italicized in the original]

It seems to me that that is a mistake for these reasons. And that again what we have is the problem of, in a sense, 'talking philosophy', instead of as Wittgenstein insists we do: describing what is already in front of our noses, only it's difficult to see because it's so obvious, but sometimes it's not so obvious. The problem with the first Hacker treatment of criteria was that despite itself it tacitly re-introduces the notion of something like pain being an entity in back of, or behind, the things that give you access to it, which the whole point of Wittgenstein's analysis is to smash that. Is to smash that idea of pain as something that is kind of a hidden,

private phenomenon. That you can only have INdirect access to it through an inference from behavior in circumstances.

So, to put it in a nutshell, the satisfaction of the criteria for something entails its presence. Now, that does not mean of course at all that there's no practical problem in insuring oneself that criteria have indeed been satisfied. It's not that criteria, so to speak, self-evidently satisfy themselves. It's not that, so to speak, knowing what the criteria ARE for saying of someone that he understands, for saying of someone that he has a certain ability, for saying of someone that he remembers, or dreams, or has had a dream, or is in pain - it's not the case that knowing those criteria, you thereby are sort of given a PROOF PROCEDURE, or a fail-safe algorithm for going about the world now identifying CERTAIN cases of those things. But what it means is that you know what sorts of things DO, SHOULD, COULD, CAN satisfy the criteria, and then it becomes a matter of where doubting ends. And this whole discussion of criterial satisfaction, it seems to me, leads very nicely into Wittgenstein's last work ON CERTAINTY. Which is essentially an attempt to put Skepticism in its place. [Tr: Wittgenstein, L. (1969). ON CERTAINTY. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Reprinted 1972 by Harper Torchbooks]

And here I think Cavell gives a helpful hint. The last paragraph on page 45.:

This is enough for me to conclude that Wittgenstein's appeal to criteria, though it takes its importance from the problem of skepticism,...

And I should add there, principally skepticism about OTHER minds, other experiences, other sensations, other mental states, and the rest of it.

...is not, and is not meant to be, a refutation of skepticism. Not, at least, in the form we had thought a refutation must take. That is, it does not negate the concluding thesis of skepticism, that we do not know with certainty of the existence of the external world (or of other minds). On the contrary, Wittgenstein, as I read him, rather affirms that thesis, or

rather takes it as UNDENIABLE, and so shifts its weight. What the thesis now means is something like: Our relation to the world as a whole, or to others in general, is not one of knowing, where knowing construes itself as being certain. SO IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT WE DO NOT FAIL TO KNOW SUCH THINGS. Then the problem is: Why does the skeptic - how can he - take what he has discovered to be some extraordinary and hitherto unnoticed fact?

And then he carries on the discussion of Skepticism. One of the things, you see, that Wittgenstein does in ON CERTAINTY is to make the proposal that the applicability of a concept of KNOWING something has its own specific occasionality. And it's THAT that has been LOST by the skeptic. So that KNOWLEDGE has its own criteria with their occasionality of satisfaction, along with all of these other concepts in the language, that pertain to human circumstances, and that the skeptic in employing these concepts is - as he must perforce in order to establish his thesis - is assuming that - at least in some circumstances - criteria can be satisfied for their applicability, otherwise the concepts have no sense, i.e, they can have no proper application, and therefore they can have no criteria, and therefore the very words he uses have no meaning. So that when a Skeptic says something like: "One can never ever be certain that another person is in pain. All one can do is be more-or-less confident", and all the rest of it, then he is simply depriving the notion of certainty, and the notion pain, and, in fact, of MEANING, and indeed cannot but speak in an incoherent self-defeating fashion. That's the real thrust of ON CERTAINTY, though there are many, many other matters taken up around these topics.

In particular, what Wittgenstein does in ON CERTAINTY is to put KNOWLEDGE in its place. Is to note that so many aspects of our relationship to ourselves, to our experiences, to others, and to the world in general - whilst it may involve the capacity to describe, report, and all the rest of it - does not consist in a relationship that is properly describable as KNOWING THINGS. And that's a very, very important point that he makes and elaborates at length.

So I'll stop now and see what people want to say about it, because that's really all I wanted to raise about criteria.

Dusan Bjelic: I just wanted to clarify: You're saying that criteria are satisfied only when there is an entailment to it?

Jeff Coulter: The other way round.

Dusan Bjelic: Ok, say it.

Jeff Coulter: The other way round. That the satisfaction of criteria entails entailment.

Dusan Bjelic: Ok. Now what confuses me is a situation where criteria are satisfied, but there is no entailment. Or you're saying that that is what Cavell is taking wrong?

Jeff Coulter: Right. The notion of "satisfaction" has an implicit contrast to the notion of something "failing to satisfy". [DB: Ok] And FEIGNING pain FAILS to satisfy the criteria for being in pain. [Insert: Again not in any absolute sense of pain as a specific entity]

Dusan Bjelic: Ok, then Cavell's analysis, besides that it shows that he understands Wittgenstein incorrectly, demonstrates what?

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, but he's on the way. He's on the way, I think, to getting it right. The diagnosis of the mistake here, I think, is two- or threefold. First of all, it's the notion that in all such circumstances he - the person - has satisfied the criteria we use for applying the concept of pain to others, including cases of hoaxing, feigning, rehearsing, and so on. I say no. I say that criteria for hoaxing, feigning, and the rest of it - they are not the criteria for being in pain.

Eileen Crist: But that's not true though. You could think of a superb actor. Somebody who was really capable of doing pain-behavior, and never being caught at it. It's conceivable. You would really be put in the presence of pain by that person, and you might not ever have the criteria to know that that person was feigning. Something would have to break down, and then you'd say: Oh, I had criteria - for the 'feigning of' pain

behavior. But as the feigning is going on, and as long as it's not breaking down, the criteria you have are the criteria of pain-behavior.

Jeff Coulter: Appear to be.

Eileen Crist: Well, they are, because they are. Why do they appear to be?

Jeff Coulter: Because in the way you set up the example they are not. Right? Because the guy's not in pain. [EC: No, he's not] So he's play-acting. But he's such a good actor, and you never get access to any contextual information that would lead you to know that he was acting. Right? It's like the eternally successful lie. [EC: Yeah] Ok, nobody ever finds out. But the way you set up the example, of course, is one in which we know what the criteria are that are being satisfied. They are play-acting and not being in pain. But you wouldn't know in that case. You wouldn't know which criteria. You would have to be said to THINK that you know, be SURE that you know, but in fact, as it turned out, you didn't know.

Eileen Crist: But it might never turn out.

Jeff Coulter: But it might never turn out. That's right.

Eileen Crist: So you would be sure that you knew?

Jeff Coulter: Yes. Sure. Oh sure, some people can trick you forever. No it's not ruled-out by this discussion. That Gedanken experiment...

Eileen Crist: No, it's paradoxical, in a sense, that it could be pointing to Wittgenstein as a Skeptic, if in fact Cavell's... Do you see that at all?

Jeff Coulter: Yes, yes.

Eileen Crist: If Cavell- If this is a true representation of Wittgenstein's? I mean if criteria are logical, and they are not empirical, you could have that kind of entailment. [JC: mm mhm] What I just said - it could make sense. It would hold. You wouldn't be able to-

Jeff Coulter: But wait a minute. Don't forget the hard and fast distinction between the logical and the empirical is broken down in logical

grammar, because the grammatical rules are the rules governing the USE, the application of concepts, and criteria.

Now, in order to get the full brunt of the argument against Skepticism, we have to get into ON CERTAINTY - which we could start to do in a while if you like. We could start picking it up a bit.

But that kind of Gedanken Experiment that you've just given, speaks to the question of the occasional undecidability of criterial satisfaction, rather than its being a refutation of this argument, I think. THAT practically, sometimes, it can be said, in some Gedanken Experiment, that somebody could not have known which criteria were being satisfied - or rather, would have said those criteria were being satisfied, but would have in fact been mistaken, but could have never found out that they were mistaken - doesn't refute the argument - it just speaks to the occasioned character of the practical difficulties - on occasion - of, sort of, discerning criterial satisfaction.

Eileen Crist: But it's also, perhaps, pointing to other criteria that are more invisible, such as that you know a person, for example, and you know that they can't act that well, for instance. So that you would have criteria working around this criterion, and having to (hold them in place). So you could also have a distinction of somebody that you absolutely don't know, and then if you were asked: "Well, was he really in pain?" And then you say: "Well, I don't really know whether he was in pain." It seemed that he was.

Jeff Coulter: Right. Absolutely. And it's very important to note that behavioral criteria, like pain-behavior as criteria for pain, are not the ONLY criteria for saying of someone that he is in pain. You could say that if there were reason for doubt, i.e., genuine reason for doubt, as opposed to possible reason for possible doubt - genuine reason for doubt in a circumstance - then matters such as the person's character would figure into your considerations. But character assessments are not criterial; they're more symptomatic.

Dusan Bjelic: So in other words, that would be part of knowing - the context will reveal criteria. If you know that that is a person who cannot act, or that is a stage, or whatever - some elements of the context - then we can make the

distinction that criteria are defeated, or that is not-

Jeff Coulter: No, no. We don't want to say "criteria are defeated". We don't want to say that.

Dusan Bjelic: Or, that we are talking about different criteria.

Jeff Coulter: Right! We don't know which criteria are in fact being satisfied.

Dusan Bjelic: But if you have - as she said - a description of the context, then that can help us to make a distinction between 'criteria for acting' from 'criteria for pain'? [JC: Yeah]

Now, back to Cavell here. What he's saying is that if I get a concept then criteria are satisfied, and you are saying No, you have to have act, for instance you have to feel pain in order to satisfy the criteria?

Jeff Coulter: I'm sorry, I missed that Dusan.

Dusan Bjelic: I understood that what he's saying here is that if you have a concept of 'pain', then the criteria are satisfied.

Jeff Coulter: No, no, then you know what the criteria are.

Dusan Bjelic: Right. But that doesn't mean that the criteria are satisfied? [JC: Right] Now, could it have been argued that what Cavell in fact is saying, that he's not giving analytical criteria for satisfaction of criteria, but rather tell us about the social ability for [JC: Sense making]. Right, sense making. And, so in another sense, having a concept are only, so to say, social conditions for having criteria satisfied.

Jeff Coulter: Of course. Yes, I think so.

Dusan Bjelic: Ok.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Could I go back to something Eileen said? You were talking about genuine reasons for doubt, and you said a person's character is symptomatic, not criterial. I'm a bit puzzled by that. [JC: For pain?] Yeah. Because in some ways it seems to me like it should be criterial. That people's characters do indeed enter into things as criteria.

Jeff Coulter: Well, I can tell that somebody is in terrible pain without knowing anything about their character, on many occasions. [DD-S: Yes] So it's not really a criterion. But it might be a consideration when it came to wondering whether or not a criterion had been satisfied. That is, a paradigm case might be: We leave the class now; we all go round the corner to the water fountain, and suddenly we see somebody in the corner going [Tr: JC does pain-behavior]. We go over and we start tending and say: "What's the matter?", etc. And one or two things might happen, either a broad beam into student prank, or further problems and difficulties, and then we lift him, take him up-stairs, call the doctor, etc. And the issue there is that if we, say, have independent access to something like the fact that - for example "rag week", which in Britain is where students are allowed to play stupid jokes all around the campus. What ever the equivalent might be. Let's say we know it's "rag week", so students are allowed to do anything more or less and get away with it. Like April Fool's Day. So there might be there some genuine reason for wondering. Up to a certain point, that's not a perverse thing to bear in mind, and one might try all sorts of independent checks. If the person can speak, you might find out who he is, and other things about him, while waiting for the doctor to come. Because usually the convention would be: If there's no reason to doubt, then take it on face value. So you do still send for the doctor. But in the meantime you might make other sorts of checks, etc. So the point is genuine doubt requires some sort of circumstance to make it an occasioned, intelligible thing to entertain. But going out into the street, seeing some kid get knocked off his bike, falling around, gashing himself, and starting to cry, and all the rest of it - Would you really stand there and doubt it? As Wittgenstein says: Try in a real case to doubt, and you'll find it's not doubting but insanity. Or it's so perverse it's not doubting. Doubting requires an occasion for doubting. And not any old kind of expression: "I doubt that that's a case of pain." could count as it, because doubt too has criteria. Doubting has it's occasionality, has it's criterial occasionality.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Well, there's something - I'm not clear myself about what it is I'm going after - but what we've got here are criteria that are generally, and for all practical purposes broadly recognizable. And what I want to fool around with is that it's sort of like a comic-strip version of life. That there are places

where we do refinements on that. And I want to play around with the edges on the refinements of how the thing gets done. Not the prototypical, central case, [JC: Oh absolutely] but playing around on the edges of it.

Jeff Coulter: Absolutely. But don't you see that this connects back to the whole problematics of rules [DD-S: Yes], because criteria are rules. And the whole point about rules is that the rules do not determine their own actual, sort of, correct application. The criteria do not themselves tell you what exactly is going to satisfy them where, and when, and how. But they tell you what kinds of things are criteria. Now you have to figure out whether THAT THERE IS satisfying the criteria. It's not really a question of deciding. You have to SEE THAT, but IN seeing that it's a case of pain, you ARE SEEING THAT the criteria are being satisfied. Now, if the criteria are not satisfied - You might not know that, as in your case. It might be that one aspect of context is concealed from you. So you might not know. In which case the criteria, whatever you thought about them, were NOT being satisfied. But one thing is for sure, things are satisfying SOME criteria to be whatever they are.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: It's the "some", it's the central "some", that I'm fine on. And I don't quite know how to talk about it, but it seems to me that in places like that, that you might have something like someone's character being indeed a criterial feature, because it is part of how I decide something. Like I know old Bogen over here isn't going to ever admit to ever having any pain about anything when he stubs his toe when he's riding his bicycle. So, Ok, for him to now be standing in a corner going [Tr: demonstrates visual pain-behavior] like this, then I'm going to say to myself: Ok, knowing Bogen, I know that this is VERY serious pain. And it's a question of what should I do now, not a question of I wonder how bad it is. I know it's bad.

Jeff Coulter: But that's not laid down in grammar. What Wittgenstein is talking about are the criteria that are laid down in grammar.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yeah, but it seems like somehow that there is something about it that is laid down in grammar, because we do have those questions that we raise as ways of trying to satisfy the question: Is this so, or not? And they conventionally come up, over and over again,

and it is something that we all use, and know how to use, as a way of asking that question.

Jeff Coulter: Yes, but whatever the particulars of an inquiry, or of a set of considerations might be, they are organized by the criteria that are laid down in grammar. That's really all Wittgenstein is saying. That is, whatever practical steps you have to take in checking something out, or telling what it is - if it's not a self-evident case - and even self-evident cases are cases where it's simply that the criteria are satisfied without any question, i.e., transparently satisfied. In those cases where you have to engage in some sort of considerations, or deliberations, or inquiries - those will be organized by - if they are to have ANY relationship whatsoever to the phenomenon in question - they'll be organized by its criteria.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yeah, maybe it's that that I want to push out a bit more, to take apart. What does it mean to be organized by those criteria? Because it seems like there might be something more there that might help to, sort of, deal with this concept of criteria.

Jeff Coulter: Well, let's take the case of Bogen. The implicit contrast there is stoicism vis-a-vis the natural expression of pain. [DD-S: Right] So the considerations that you were entertaining there revolve around the contrast class stoicism vis-a-vis natural expression of pain. That is, are we in the presence here of a natural expression of the pain, or are we in the presence here of indeed a natural expression of pain, but of a pain that is much more severe than we are, in fact, being lead to believe, i.e., there's stoicism at work? That's the sort of thing that organized that concern about Bogen. OR, if Bogen were a cry-baby, maybe the pain is LESS than he's making it out to be. That is, these considerations of 'intensity of pain' vis-a-vis the nature of the reaction are matters that might be decidable in reference to such general considerations as: the kind of person he is. But then the kind of person he is is itself derived from satisficings of prior criteria for lots and lots of other things. That is, we've had paradigm cases in which we've know damn well what's struck Bogen's foot has been a brick. And there he's stood, not even wincing. Stuff of that sort. So, now that might factor in. But all of these things are organized by these questions of which criteria are being satisfied, in Wittgensteinian terms

anyway [DD-S: Yes].

Jeff Stetson: Did you mean that term "satisficing"? When just a moment ago you used that term "satisfice"?

Jeff Coulter: No I think I should have said "satisfying". What is "satisfice". That comes out of Decision Theory.

Jeff Stetson: Herbert Simon. But you grabbed the first thing that seems reasonable. Along that line, the first thing that will satisfy what you need to know - If one were looking at a mystic, and knew that it was a mystic, and they are talking about seeing angels moving about. Do you have to go to another person's criteria for making that a reasonable experience?, or what is left to you is something I don't understand?, or the person's crazy?, or a whole variety of descriptions one could make?

Jeff Coulter: Well, that is a concept in the language that is not used in grammar identically with the concept of 'mental illness'. 'Mystic' is not 'schizophrenic'. In fact, if a schizophrenic can get himself to be construed as a mystic, he'll get out of mental hospital. Right? [JS: Ah!] Maybe. It's like Peter Winch says about the Oracle consultation among the Azande - you have to know the culture of the mystics to know what counts as proper mysticism. Like in the Pentecostals, you have to have the grasp, you have to be a master of the culture to figure out what could count as GENUINE speaking in tongues from babbling. Yeah? And that you get through experience, and mastery of that culture, and the criteria for satisfaction of 'speaking in tongues' as distinct from... What is the contrast class, Eric, to that - Genuine speaking in tongues from... What would it be? Does it have a technical designation?

Eric Helmer: Just ecstasy...

[Tr: Tape change]

George Psathas(cont.): ... it may be between the occasion of the use of the term, or the occasion of when the criteria might be said to be satisfied, whether one KNOWS the criteria, in any postulatable way, statable way, one may be able to recognize that that which has criteria is present, is being satisfied, without knowing the criteria themselves in any way that you could list them. I

can see there is pain, but I cannot delineate for you what the criteria are for pain. I know that on this occasion that is pain, but I can't now give you the listing of what the criteria are. As I hear what the argument is: but nevertheless they must be present, or else one couldn't [JC: Couldn't tell] couldn't tell. [JC: That's clear] Ok, so that's clear. Second case, however, where it's not the logical grammar-

Jeff Coulter: By the way, it's telling in the case of the other. You don't use criteria to tell in your own case, don't forget. [GP: Yeah] There is this asymmetry between first, and second and third person cases. You don't sort of use criteria, or appeal to criteria, in your own case, you simply EXPRESS your pain. You satisfy the criteria, but you don't USE the criteria to conclude in your own case that you're in pain. -- Sorry George, that's a point I've missed, and it should be made. Yeah, go on.

George Psathas: However, the other issue is when you undertake to use the concept on a particular occasion, it's not the logical grammar of the concept that enables you to use it appropriately. That is, you may use it inappropriately. [JC: Of course, one could misuse it] Yeah, misuse it. - So what is there that would enable you to know whether you are using appropriately?

Jeff Coulter: Well, being able to tell that the criteria for proper use are satisfied.

George Psathas: But if you accept the argument that you can't tell necessarily, in any sort of explicatable fashion, what the criteria are that are being satisfied, but you simply can know that the thing is present...

Jeff Coulter: No, no, you can't know THAT the thing is present without knowing THAT the criteria have been satisfied. Because if the criteria aren't satisfied, then the best you can be said to be doing is 'believing' that it's present.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: But that's not how we talk.

George Psathas: But you're not able to explicate the criteria. You see you do speak...

Jeff Coulter: Oh, no, people do make all kinds of claims to knowledge that turn out, in fact, not to have been properly justified. Or maybe in SOME cases, though these can't be the rule, they have to be the exception - in some cases they NEVER get to find out, as in Eileen's case, i.e., they never get to find out that although they were saying things like "Oh, absolutely, the guy was suffering dreadfully" - Indeed the best that could be said of those who said that was that they BELIEVED that he was suffering dreadfully, because in fact he wasn't, i.e., however much they may be saying "I know", indeed they did not know, because the criteria were not satisfied, though they never knew the criteria were not satisfied. And therefore they would not KNOW that what they should have said was "I believe..." That's the way it works.

George Psathas: So, it's an inappropriate use, but at the time it's used it's not even known that it is inappropriate.

Jeff Coulter: Of course, and that is indeed true. Right?

George Psathas: Ok, but take that for a moment, and now I think you can see the puzzlement is then: If I can't describe the criteria, if I can't be certain that they are indeed being satisfied-

Jeff Coulter: Oh, wait, what's this about describe the criteria? Yes you can describe them. You must be able to describe the criteria.

George Psathas: No, I thought you said you couldn't - You didn't have to in order to be able to use the concept.

Jeff Coulter: Oh, yeah, you must be able to. You don't have to do it there and then, but you must be able to, otherwise there's no criteria satisfied for the attributability of that concept. If I can't tell you what kinds of things amount to being in pain, at all, then you've got good grounds for wondering whether or not I know what the word "pain" means. If I can't say "Well, being in pain is like when people groan, ...

George Psathas: Right, but it isn't DONE that way, that is, people go about speaking without ever being called upon to provide the grounds for their having said that "I know that person is in pain". [JC: right] It's an "in principle" argument that

you're making, not an actual, in circumstances, what people might be required to do in order to speak.

Jeff Coulter: Well, yes it is an argument like that, George, because what it's saying is: If whatever they're doing is intelligible in trying to figure out what 'x' is, and that's a very special kind of thing, and that's not usually the case, we usually just see it. But in those circumstances where we're trying to TELL what it is, then the considerations, and deliberations, and inquiries, and investigations, and all the rest of it, are going - if they are to be intelligible at all - they are going to be governed by the criteria for the possibly relevant concepts in the language. That is, we come across someone who is doing something like doubling over in pain. But we might have some reason to doubt. Like it's "rag week", or "April Fools Day". But now the thing we have in front of us is now - let's put it in Garfinkelian brackets - you remember the "Formal Structures..." paper - it's quite a helpful one - where he says: Yeah, it's not yet decided, or he uses the Spanish question mark as well. It's not quite decided. Is it pain, or isn't it? Well, now a whole bunch of logical grammatical resources come into play. [Tr: See Garfinkel, H., and Sacks, H. (1970). On the formal structures of practical actions. In J. C. McKinney and E. A. Tiryakian (Eds.) THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY (pp. 337-366). New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts] The kinds of things that are criteria for pain, the kinds of contrast classes that are related conceptually to pain, like Stoicism, hoaxing, rehearsing, feigning - There's not an infinite set. That's the point that Cavell makes here: Rehearsing, feigning, and hoaxing are circumstantially relevant, but not clearing his throat, responding to a joke, or making a telephone call, or conducting a revival meeting. So what organizes your ways of looking and inquiring is indeed the logical grammar, if it's intelligible at all. The kinds of things that you're looking for are the kinds of things that would enable you to say the criteria are satisfied.

George Psathas: Without necessarily saying - it would enable you to say it, but it's not required that YOU say it.

Jeff Coulter: Well, it depends on the success or failure of your inquiry. Like the coroner's case in Garfinkel's writing.

George Psathas: Right, but it can operate at the level of the un-stated, and assumed, or known in common, or taken-for-granted, without requiring explication, or the other side of it could be that... Yeah?

Jeff Coulter: Oh yes, of course. It's not that people are sitting around doing Wittgensteinian analyses. [GP: Right] Right, but what they're doing is illuminated by, I think, by this whole- [GP: Right] Because I'll tell you why. Partly because what Wittgenstein is saying is that ALL criteria are PUBLIC criteria. That's the first crucial point. And socially shared. And acquired through intersubjective language training. Grammar is public, and intersubjective, and social. All criteria are public. And that's one thing we've understated today, but I think it's quite clear that's the whole thrust of it. It's that all criteria are public criteria. For everything, including the INTERNAL stuff. As Wittgenstein says: The inner stands in need of outward criteria. For us to have a concept of the inner, it has to have outward criteria. So they're all public; they're all shared. But that does not mean that people, when they're trying to tell what something is, sort of speak in the technical language of criterial satisfaction, any more than when they are answering a question, they speak in terms of producing a second-pair-part of an Adjacency Pair. [Tr: On adjacency pairs see: Schegloff, E. A., and Sacks, H. (1973). Opening up closings. SEMIOTICA, 7, 289-327]

George Psathas: Ok. So all that means, I think, to get back to the earlier question is that people may THEN subsequently discover that although speaking and having been understood to be in agreement with regard to something, it can turn out that they were mistaken, that is was otherwise, that something was lacking or missing. So that what it does is make the [JC: on occasion] - on occasion, sure, right - so what it does is make any particular occasion of speaking in which one uses, with certainty, the concept, it may turn out to subsequently require, because of a possible misunderstanding, and all of those things, to require revision or explication.

Jeff Coulter: Not on ANY occasion.

George Psathas: No, I didn't say that.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah you did.

George Psathas: I did? On any occasion?

Jeff Coulter: Yeah. Perhaps you didn't mean to.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Any particular occasion.

Jeff Coulter: No. This is a particular occasion. I'm not wondering that you might all turn out to be automata.

George Psathas: Now, wait a second. Let me take that back. So it isn't any occasion. What I want to get at is that it's also possible that-

Jeff Coulter: That there may arise certain occasions on which you can't tell. Of course.

George Psathas: Ok, but isn't it also possible that both parties will agree to simply let it pass, that is, it never becomes a questioned matter which requires any sort of explication? [JC: Sure] So, therefore, if you accept that, and this is not to down-play this particular point with Wittgenstein, but if you accept that, then it is possible subsequently to discover that what they were certain about was something that they were both wrong about.

Jeff Coulter: Yes it can. That does happen. Yeah, of course.

George Psathas: So, therefore, to speak with certainty, and with agreement does not mean that the criteria are indeed satisfied. Is that what I was getting at? [Tr: He ponders of himself]

[Tr: general laughter]

Jeff Coulter: Ah, wait a minute. No, no, I don't think you can say that. [GP: You don't think so.] No. To speak with APPARENT certainty.

George Psathas: Ok.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: But Jeff we don't talk like that.

Jeff Coulter: Well stop talking like that!

[Tr: general laughter]

Darleen Dougias-Steele: Well wait a minute, I thought Wittgenstein was not out to revise the world.

Jeff Coulter: Well listen - no, no - wait a minute. We may say things like: "I'm absolutely certain that he's sick", but saying it doesn't make it so.

Lena Jayyusi: But that's talking with certainty.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yes. I am very certain when I say it.

Jeff Coulter: All right, if you want to say that's talking with certainty - Yes, all right. But that is not making it so.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: But that's what we call it. For me to speak that way, and whether I'm right or wrong, whether the criteria are, as it turns out in the long run, actually met or not, at the time I am speaking with certainty. I KNOW that that is the case.

Jeff Coulter: No, you don't know that that is the case, if it turns out not to have been the case, even if you said at the time "I know it's the case".

Darleen Douglas-Steele: But we speak that way.

George Psathas: Yes.

Jeff Coulter: Yes, but what's the point you're making? We do say that, but what's the point you're making about it?

Darleen Douglas-Steele: But then what you want to be saying is that-

Jeff Coulter: Is the point that you are making that whenever I say "I know", I therefore know?

Darleen Douglas-Steele: No, it's that there are criteria there for knowing that are different from the ones that you are claiming about knowing, I think.

Jeff Coulter: There's an interesting thing. See, saying "I KNOW" licences you to all sorts of inferences with respect to the speaker, but it is NOT a criterion of knowledge.

Eileen Crist: So you're going back to the referential use of language. You're appealing to some facts behind language, which language can represent or misrepresent. And in a certain sense you're coming back to the referential use of language it seems, in a certain way. Or am I wrong? I think this is what's...

Jeff Coulter: No, no, Wittgenstein never denies that you can use language to refer to things. What he said though is the referents are not the meanings of the words that you use in referring to them. And what quite that's got to do with that I'm not sure. When I say "I know" I'm not referring to anything, really I'm making a claim.

Edith Rosenthal: She means referring to an objective fact. Is that what you mean?

George Psathas: Referring to 'a something': I know that person is in pain.

Jeff Coulter: The only thing I'm saying is saying "I know" is not a criterion for actually knowing - that's all - which I thought I heard in Darleen's discourse.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yeah, that's true.

Dusan Bjelic: Just a point here. I think one of the problems that we are seeing here, that we have heard in Sociology since Goffman, that what people take something to be that that is what it is. That the parties agreement somehow determines what a thing is. And I think that then when you have a situation where people think that the criteria for pain are satisfied, in effect they are only acting a pain. It does not mean that the criteria for pain are satisfied - as they think that they are. As for instance an Ethnomethodologist will say, or Goffman will say. But in fact through analytic analysis we can find out that only what is satisfied is criteria for acting a play. And their belief that the criteria for pain are satisfied only indicates that the criteria for acting a play are satisfied. So their belief cannot be analytic grounds to say that criteria for pain are satisfied, only because they believe so.

Jeff Coulter: Who is the "they"? I'm sorry I'm finding it a bit difficult.

Dusan Bjelic: Well, "they" - to use, for example, two observers seeing a person acting a pain, and they both believe that the criteria for pain are satisfied.

Jeff Coulter: Let me stop you right there for a second, because you've just said "they believe that", which presupposes that they don't KNOW that.

Dusan Bjelic: No, I agree with you. But I'm saying they will go around and say "Well, he really felt pain".

Jeff Coulter: But whether they are to be said to have 'believed' it, or 'known' it, depends upon whether he really satisfied the criteria for being in pain.

Dusan Bjelic: I know, but what I'm saying - for instance they can say: "He really had tears in his eyes". That can be an explanation for the criteria of feeling in pain. Or another person can produce another utterance which demonstrates that the person knows what the criteria for pain are. So even if we have two utterances after that, that will indicate that the criteria are satisfied, that doesn't mean that the criteria for pain are satisfied just because they think so. But only through analysis of context, and finding out that only criteria for acting of pain were satisfied.

Jeff Coulter: Yes, but then it would be wrong to say that analysis is omni-relevant in cases of encountering people in pain. Analysis is only OCCASIONALLY relevant.

Dusan Bjelic: No I'm just saying: This analysis is important for the argument that what people take things to be that a thing IS, as we heard in Sociology since Goffman, or Ethnomethodology - Well if parties state that that thing is an 'opening', then it is an 'opening'. [Tr: On openings see: Schegloff, E. A. (1968). Sequencing in conversational openings. AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, 70, 1075-1095. and Schegloff, E. A. (1979). Identification and recognition in telephone conversation openings. In G. P. Psathas (Ed.) EVERYDAY LANGUAGE (pp. 23-78). New York, NY: Irvington Publishers]

Jeff Coulter: Ahhh, that's the phenomenological fallacy. Yes. That is that the appearances- Yeah, I get what you're saying.

Dusan Bjelic: But what I'm saying is that I heard that they are saying that that is the only foundation of our certainty to claim that is so or not.

Eileen Crist: Or you could use the example of witch craft as a better example than pain, witchcraft among the Azande. You have that problem of knowledge and belief, and how you assess the insider's point of view. Wouldn't that be a better kind of-

Dusan Bjelic: No, no, actually I'm-

Jeff Coulter: Yes it would for that point it would be better, I think - but anyway. Because there's a matter where to say that they know there are witches is actually to be showing that you are a part of their belief system, or their system of orientation [DB: Right], whereas as to say that they BELIEVE there are witches is already to put a distance between you and them.

But around the business of pain, I'm not quite following. Say some more.

Dusan Bjelic: Well, actually what I want to say is to point to differences between, say, an Ethnomethodological approach and a Wittgensteinian approach. That for Wittgenstein, I think he has that analytic perspective that if the parties to a phenomenon agree that that phenomenon IS, it does not necessarily mean that that is because...

Jeff Coulter: Right. Fine. Let's take that up. The local parties in a given occasion MAY be mistaken about the characterization of some of the things that are going on in that occasion. And it MAY, though it's very rare in practical affairs for the most part, it MAY on some occasion NEVER be revealed to them that, in fact, though they thought it was thus-and-so, indeed it wasn't. Obviously the case. And Wittgenstein is not trying to stipulate, he's trying to elucidate.

Now, but when he talks about agreement, Wittgenstein is not talking about the necessity of agreement between some parties to an occasion as the touch-stone for truth, or the touch-stone for intelligibility. He's talking about a much deeper and vaster kind of agreement. Agreement in

training is the primary thing he's talking about, like our preparedness to agree in the concepts we use. And our commonly taking those kinds of things as criteria for those kinds of things. It's the broader kind of notion of agreement as the foundation for grammar, if you like. If there's any foundation for grammar it's the common agreement in our training, and judgments, and reactions to training in the language we speak.

But that doesn't mean that he's saying that any particular- Like he says about mathematics: He says: It's essential that there be a good deal of agreement with respect to the products of calculations for calculating to be an institution, and for us to even have a concept of what it is to calculate, as distinct from mis-calculate. But that doesn't mean that majority opinion is right when it comes to what 2 and 2 equals. Like we take a poll, and now that we find that if most people would say it's 5, then therefore it's 5.

So, that's why he's saying it's not agreement in opinions, it's agreement in forms of life, whereby he means agreement in the way we operate, for the most part. Just agreement in the way we work, the way we judge for the most part. So, for example, he says about use - and this whole business of use is often misunderstood - it's classically misunderstood in the history of philosophy departments by the Arnie Neiss philosophy department in Oslo, Norway - where they took ordinary language analysis to involve the necessity of polling people for the meanings of words. They figured if you're going to talk about common use, and proper use, then you've got to get a poll. So they polled people: What does "marriage" mean? Well, of course, if you ask what does "marriage" mean, what you do is you tend to come up with either lexicographic definitions, or biographical accounts of its significance. Whereas what Wittgenstein is speaking about is the concept of 'marriage', say, or the concept of 'promise', or the concept of 'pain, or the concept of 'comprehension', or 'perception', or whatever. And that's investigated logico-grammatically.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Ok, can we pull out something like how we would fool with the concept of 'pain' if we wanted to try and talk about it through the use of conventional criteria. So if we have conventionally, publicly available criteria about which we agree on the use of the word "pain". I don't know where I'm going, so let me play for a minute. [JC: Sure] Ok. If we then get into a

situation where we wind up in an ER [Tr: emergency room] with a patient whose parent says "My child is in pain. She's really in pain. I know her; she's not like this; she's really in pain." And she satisfies all the criteria. You or I would walk in and we'd look at her and we'd say: "My god, this child is in pain; we've got to do something for her". Turns out she's not in pain. It turns out that she doesn't have some diagnostic sign like for abdominal pain, she doesn't have left reflex reactions - you can push here here but not here. And so she's not really in the kind of pain that she's doing. But publicly available criteria are all satisfied. Like any next person could walk in, except a physician who knows exactly where to push would say "No, that's not pain".

Dusan Bjelic: Could I just answer, briefly? I think that what you said, and I think what confuses you, that mother's stating that that is really pain, it's part of the criteria of acting a pain. So, that you take your child, and say "I know she has a pain", and it turns out to be that she is actually just acting a pain, it's a part of the criteria of acting a pain.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: To now discover that there is some other way of discerning the actuality of the thing?

Dusan Bjelic: Yeah, for instance, if the child reveals "Well, actually I don't want to go to school", or whatever [DD-S: Yeah], it turns out to be that she acted the pain, then that you, so to speak, believe that she has a pain, or that you are certain that your child has a pain, is a part of the criteria of acting a pain. That's how I understood it.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Ok, so the difficulty now is that: Do we have to walk around with correctives for the regular, everyday criteria of pain, then? It's like somewhere it sounds like there's a danger of sliding into this reified version of a REAL pain as opposed to... It's like we're getting into, or sliding into this "really real" problem.

Dave Bogen: I want to pick up on that point. Because I'm tremendously frustrated with the way in which we're dealing with criteria. I don't hold anybody to this version of it, but it seems like in the language that we're talking it - i.e., "satisfaction of criteria" - we've moved into a way of formulating abstract, logical relations

between criteria, on the one hand, and what they are about, on the other. The thing!, as it were, again. So you end up with talk about, say, something like entailment, which implies a (distantiation) of a logical operator - If p then q - and then defeasibility becomes - unless x, y, and z obtain. So we're talking now about inferences that are made, rather than- So you end up talking about it as if people are sitting here figuring these things out, and not just SEEING it that way. And when you SEE it that way,

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yeah, that's what I mean say "We don't talk that way".

Dave Bogen: No. I mean there might be cases where you figure it out, but in that case, as soon as you start getting challenged on pain, and you say "Well, she's not a faker", you're out of the domain of the criteria of for application of pain. You're talking about "fakers" now, and what constitutes a faker. You've switched a whole set of relations, right?

Dusan Bjelic: That's what I said.

Jeff Coulter: But what occasions 'faker'?

Dave Bogen: Any number of things!

Jeff Coulter: But at least one of those things has got to be...?

Dave Bogen: Pain. And it's relevant here on this occasion that you got there step-by-step that way. But you could have gotten there from.... You've got some other ways into faker, and that's what obtains now. That's what dominates the context, and it's no more the separation between the criteria and the thing, but you have conventional supports for warrantable movements of grammar, or something like that. Take it out of the inferential. Quit looking at it as 'figuring', or something like that, and move it to different criterial relations. But then you have the problem- See what you're trying to get is you still want to imply this distance between the criteria and the thing. And you do it every time you talk about the "satisfaction" of criteria.

Dusan Bjelic: But that is what Jeff is talking all the time.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yeah, I think so.

Dave Bogen: Yeah, I'm not saying that I'm holding anybody to... But I think that's the language - especially when we talk about entailment. Whenever you talk about entailment, you imply that distance because of the way, I think, we're used to taking 'sufficient conditions'.

Jeff Coulter: Mmm. But that's Hacker's part one (1972).

Dave Bogen: No, I know, but I thought you came back to it today as well.

Jeff Coulter: Where the thing is an inferential evidence for the thing.

Dave Bogen: And I'm saying we're slipping back into that at each point in talking about things.

Dusan Bjelic: He was talking against it. He was actually talking about Hacker part two. I think that that is what he is saying - that phenomena stands for criteria.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, I don't disagree with anything that you've said.

Dave Bogen: But the whole notion of defeasibility, for instance, also creeps in there that way. Because it brings us back. It's sort of again - when you set it up: If p then q - unless these obtain. And that's sort of a way of formally understanding defeasibility, so you get this movement from p to q, unless this. And it seems like instead what you're talking about in terms of defeasibility is the seeing of something, and then whether you apply these criteria, or a whole new set of criteria for something else, are occasioned by, for instance, somebody faking. And it's not these sorts of distanced logical movements. But defeasibility then has a funny feel to it, right?

Dusan Bjelic: Right, but at the same time, we are talking here about criteria as an analytic concept, as an analytic problem, therefore it is not that we should not now talk about it, and should simply now act as if criteria are creatures. We do that all the time. But what is now on the table is criteria in the sense of what criteria are. It is that we have to demonstrate that we understand that concept, therefore we are

discussing it. I mean that may be a very cold-blooded analysis of things that we are always obeying. But that is our problem. Right? Is to take it as analytic...

Jeff Coulter: Let me take this notion. I'm absolutely all in favor of the notion "Yes, these things in these circumstances you SEE, directly, right away". You certainly don't riffle through criteria, see what the things are that you're seeing, and then check them against the criteria, find a match, and then say "It's a so-and-so", mentally or unconsciously, and then suddenly you see it. It's obviously not that. Right? Though indeed that is the tacit "Information Processing" conception of perception that's around these days. So it's certainly not a straw-man you're attacking.

The issue, though, about criteria is: If you are to be justified in the claim to have seen, or if somebody is justified in saying of you that you saw, then it is in virtue of the satisfaction of criteria. Because there's a difference between actually seeing, thinking that you're seeing, being under the illusion that you saw...

Lena Jayyusi: You see pain, you don't think you see pain.

Jeff Coulter: You see THAT people are in pain; you don't see pain. There's no such construction. You see THAT they're in pain.

Lena Jayyusi: Ok. You see THAT people are in pain, but you don't THINK that you see they're in pain. That's a totally different kind of thing - when you think. I think you're confusing between what one can say in the first person, and second person, and third person. And also it strikes me that the analytic way of talking is getting entangled with the commonsense way of talking.

Jeff Coulter: No, the analytic way is supposed to elucidate how the ordinary way...

Lena Jayyusi: Yeah, but it's not really an issue there. I think somehow it's hammering at it; it's not quite revealing it.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yeah, you know where it comes? It comes in the "I know" business. [JC: yes] It's in the knowing that we're entangling it.

Dave Bogen: Or in 'reports' and 'seeings'. If somebody raises the issue of whether somebody that you've seen is in pain or not, you're not then filling out, or satisfying criteria for having seen someone in pain. You're doing something like having somebody inquire into your position as a reputable witness of pain behavior. You're not inquiring into pain; you're inquiring into your witnessable character.

Jeff Coulter: Or....?, Or....?

Dave Bogen: Or?, Or? Yeah, etc. Right? Like that. That's all I was just saying.

Jeff Coulter: Right. Yes, but all I'm saying is on the one hand one wants to say "You're absolutely right to say that we, for the most part, simply SEE, or SEE THAT 'x'. I agree with that. But the issue is that for us to say that, for the most part, we simply see 'x', or see that 'x' IS, PRESUPPOSES that there's an 'x' to be seen. And for there to be an 'x' to be seen means that the criteria for 'x' to be seen, rather than 'an hallucination', or 'y', which looks like 'x' there, means that the 'x' satisfies a criterion for 'x-hood', if you want. Because SEE is an achievement verb. "See" carries with it that it is there to be seen; that it's THAT that's seen. After all, 'seeing' is to be distinguished from 'thinking that he saw'. It's an achievement verb. You're not sovereign with respect to what you claim to see, any more than anybody else. In other words, it's not just up to you, because there's lots of guys around in mental hospitals who are diagnosed as hallucinators, who go around saying that they SEE the Spanish galleon coming at them. So, why do we say: "You DON'T bloody well see it"? Because the criteria for the Spanish Galleons coming at them are not satisfied, so to speak.

Dusan Bjelic: Jeff, let me just say one thing. I think I agree with you because I think that if we want to know criteria we have to look at the grammar of this concept. I think that's the whole thing that you're doing now. But I want to ask you another question: You said that criteria are rules. And that is what confuses me very often because it tends to be that rules... - when we talk about action as rule-governed activities, then it looks like that criteria in fact GOVERN somebody's activities. [JC: Yeah, so to speak] Where in fact Wittgenstein said is not the case, only things that criteria satisfy is a judgment about that activity. So it is not that criteria

govern somebody acting as for instance I act something, I am doing something.

Jeff Coulter: You may not have to APPLY criteria, but you have to live-up to them in order for your conduct to be what it can be seen to be. Like, for example, am I now teaching or just trying to teach? Etc.

Dusan Bjelic: Right. But you are not governed by criteria; you simply act.

Jeff Coulter: Of course!

Dusan Bjelic: But criteria is on our side. You see, we are judging that you are teaching.

Jeff Coulter: But don't give the mentalists the concept of rule-following! Or not rule-following. Don't give the mentalists the concept of rule-governedness. Which was my mistake back in 1970-71, and some of my colleagues. When we thought that, to say of some conduct that it was rule-governed ENTAILED THAT persons would KNOW the rules, and be able to say them, or would mentally be able to follow them. Not true! ALL conduct is rule-governed independently of whether agents consciously follow rules in the sense that for the conduct to be identifiably that kind of conduct, rather than that kind of conduct, it must satisfy criteria, i.e., it must live up to the rules governing the concepts of those actions.

Dusan Bjelic: Right, but when you have a pain, you don't have criteria in order to know that you have a pain. [JC: Exactly] Yeah, but WE have criteria.

Jeff Coulter: So, yes, my saying "Oaooh!" is not done, or my saying "I have a pain", is not done on the basis of my use of criteria. But my saying THAT is for YOU seeing me a criterion for saying of me that I am in pain, or rather can be said, under proper circumstances, to satisfy the criteria for my being in pain. Though I do it, as Hacker puts it, "criterionlessly". The avowal is criterionLESS. It has to live-up to, and satisfy, and DOES satisfy the criteria for YOU to say of me that I'm in pain. And therefore for ME to have my avowal ratified.

Dusan Bjelic: Right. That raises the question of Ethnomethodological understanding of practices. In practice it looks like on-going accomplishment as something that you're going about

following some rules, where in fact, as you say, criterionless is simply acting out... [JC: It's Dave's direct doing] Right, but then what Garfinkel is saying is analytic perspective, not perspective of actors.

Jeff Coulter: And if I may be so bold as to say there are passages in STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY [Tr: 1967, H. Garfinkel, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall] that look as if, though I don't think this is Garfinkel's intention, that look as if what he's saying is that people are all the time ACHIEVING, and acting methodically, and sort of "doing being" - all of that stuff - strikes me as overly cognitivized. But the essential heart of his point is the Wittgensteinian insight, I think, but better put by Garfinkel - namely that the production of conduct and its accountability are two sides of the same coin.

Dusan Bjelic: Couldn't we also say that another aspect of what Garfinkel's saying is that social reality is problematic, and therefore has to be accomplished, has to come to agreement. It's also that from the point of criteria, we know that reality is NOT problematic; it is given at a glance, instantly. So is not something that we have to come into agreement, as for instance when he talks about coroner's work.

Jeff Coulter: Well, Agnes is a better case. [Tr: Discussed in STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY cited earlier] You could read the study of Agnes the trans-sexual - and it has been read this way, though I'm still not wholly sure that this is exactly the way that Garfinkel intended it to be read - and I say that not because I'm trying to be excessively deferential to Garfinkel, but because in the text itself there are different kinds of clues - but it's been read as saying ALL gender is an achievement by Kessler and McKenna in their book GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH, just to take one example. [Tr: 1978, New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons] And Lena Jayyusi in her book on categorization [Tr: CATEGORIZATION AND THE MORAL ORDER. Boston, MA: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984] takes this up - the matter of "gender as achievement" - is in certain respects an over-extension of the notion of achievement. What really I think the point of the Agnes piece was - was to note that persons have to satisfy criteria of gender, and that there are ways in which they do so, but they don't, so to speak, have to be said to be continuously pulling it off, or managing it.

Like he talks about the management of sexual status. That's a strained - even I hear it as a Goffman kind of metaphorical way of talking about it. It's not true to the phenomena. But that's not to say that there isn't something important being noticed there, namely that, though it may be glance-available what gender is, for certain purposes of speaking about gender, not for all purposes, but for certain ones, that gender in its being so available satisfies criteria.

Dusan Bjelic: Yeah, but isn't Agnes exactly the case of playing with criteria? () [JC: Precisely] But that is not questionable, that is given at a glance. I think that's what Garfinkel is missing, that primordial agreement in forms of life [JC: I agree with you] - criteria which is not questionable, not achievable. It is given.

Jeff Coulter: I think what he's missing is something like a notion of what you're calling "primordial agreement". Let's leave it at that. Something like that. It's in some places - and I really should document this, it's all going on tape and the rest of it - there are passages where it does look like it's not only a bit over-intellectualized, but a bit OVERLY accomplished. Certain practices are described as a bit too excessively artfully managed, and all the rest of it. But then that's a good heuristic for certain purposes, but used just as a methodological heuristic it can alert you to all kinds of things. But there are places in which it looks like it's more than just a methodological heuristic. And it certainly has been read that way - as like we are all the time, even in our most primordial taken-for-granted whatevers, we're all the time DOING BEING, and we're all the time ACHIEVING.

Edith Rosenthal: I think that that was a reaction to the idea of the social structure as a sort of a mechanistic concept where the thing was just mindlessly going around and around without any friction in free space, and then Garfinkel comes along and says: This thing is actually being created moment-to-moment, and it's an accomplishment. And the language is somewhat ironic in saying that it's an achievement that we are doing, and if we weren't DOING it, it would not be there. And so then it swings over into being more of an effort than, of course, it really is, and it's no more of an effort than the bees making honey, which is where the analogy to forms of life - I think it's Malcolm that makes that point - is that in our ordinary lives things are not

problematic, they're problematic in the mode of analysis. They're not problematic in the sense of doing, or as Wittgenstein says: Social life is not an illness except to the philosophers.

[Tr: appreciated with laughter]

Jeff Coulter: Yes. And that one follows the rules blindly - would be another kind of cognate point. We follow the rules blindly. We don't think about them, and have to worry over them, and wonder what fits, and ... Exactly Right. And I think you're quite right. But nonetheless, it does seem to me that there's something to the argument that is slightly overly intellectualized in places, and overly - I can't quite find the right term - you know what I'm saying.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Only to the extent that it might be located now as a mentalistic activity.

Jeff Coulter: Or an overly effortful one.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Ok. It's not that it's not actually ongoingly being done. Right? It's not what you want to be arguing against?

Jeff Coulter: Well, I'm not sure in what sense it's the case that one is ongoingly doing being, say, [DB: ordinary] male, or ordinary. Yeah.

It's a heuristic, but it's sometimes read otherwise. Let's leave it at that for now. ...

[Tr: tape change]

Isamu Kamada: ... I've tried to overcome the argument between subject and object, or between subjectivity and objective behavior. But still you are emphasizing that my own experience, the first person experience, is TOTALLY different from the third person behavior, or his own action. And I thought Wittgenstein tried to say that my own experience is not private. It is the same as the third person behavior. We are just judging our behavior from our own observation of my own action, and that I just apply the criteria.

Jeff Coulter: You haven't read Malcolm, [IK: No], because Malcolm makes it very clear that Wittgenstein nowhere says that I observe my behavior, and then conclude from it that I'm in

pain, for example. What he says though is that my ABILITY to characterize my experience as one of pain is contingent upon language training by others, among other things.

Isamu Kamada: Of course, if I say "I am in pain", I do not observe myself. But how can I identify my experience with pain - the word pain - without any criteria for (being in pain)?

Jeff Coulter: You don't identify it.

Isamu Kamada: Then how can I call it "pain"?

Jeff Coulter: You don't identify it. Remember Malcolm's argument about that. You don't identify it; you express it.

Isamu Kamada: How? Why I can do so? [JC: Sorry?] If there is somebody who is acting pain behavior, then I can say "Oh, he's in pain". So, in that case I identify.

Jeff Coulter: In his case? [IK: Yes] Yes, you identify it as a case of pain. [IK: Yes] But you don't identify your own pain as pain.

Isamu Kamada: So how? How I can say that I am in pain? Because I have just my experience.

Jeff Coulter: Because saying "I am in pain" is itself an expression of pain. It's a linguistic reaction.

Isamu Kamada: Expression! Expression of what? My pain. [JC: Yes] But what is the relation between the expression, and the experience?

Jeff Coulter: It's a part of your being in pain that you say things like "I am in pain".

Isamu Kamada: No, no. Natural expression is part of my experience.

Jeff Coulter: It's part of your being in pain.

Isamu Kamada: But linguistic expression is not natural response at all.

Jeff Coulter: No, no. It is a substitution for a pre-linguistic, natural response.

Isamu Kamada: Yeah. So I must know that my experience should be the same as the experience which is called "pain".

Edith Rosenthal: Are you saying how do you know to use that word?

Isamu Kamada: Yeah, I'm asking that.

Jeff Coulter: You neither know nor don't know. You've got to read your Malcolm. Right? When you say as a baby things like "Aaahh!", "Uuhh!". It's in those circumstances that you are trained to substitute for those PRE-linguistic reactions LINGUISTIC ones. It's not that you're taught how to identify something inside you for which you are now getting a label, and you now, like by interior ostension, find the thing that corresponds to the label. The whole of the argument, of the private language argument, and the ostensive definition argument, and the first-person avowal argument, that Wittgenstein makes, is an answer to EXACTLY that argument. Now, all of your arguments have been replied to by Wittgenstein. What you now need to do is to figure out why they don't work. But from what you are telling me it seems that you're not studying the arguments, because you are simply recycling the arguments that Wittgenstein is trying to handle, is trying to deal with.

Isamu Kamada: No, no, my position is that he was a skeptic. He was saying that we can not have any access to other's experience of pain. And in the same way, we do not have any access to our own experience.

Caesar Mavratsas: That's not what he's saying.

Isamu Kamada: I have my own experience, but I must connect this experience with the language, and there's a prob-

Jeff Coulter: Which experience?

Isamu Kamada: This pain experience.

Jeff Coulter: Well, how do you know it's pain?

Isamu Kamada: So, I'm asking that.

Jeff Coulter: Well, because you're taught to say "I am in pain" when you are in pain. For example. To put it very, very crudely. That's not

an exact description of the language acquisition process. But something of that sort is the issue. You are given NEW means with which to display your pain, to SHOW that you are in pain, i.e., by saying things like "I am in pain". "I am in pain" is not a description of some THING. It is itself A PART Of being in pain. You're thinking of "I am in pain" as an epistemically descriptive expression. What Wittgenstein is doing is saying it's not like that, though it looks like saying "I am in Liverpool", or "I am in Boston" - "I am in pain". NO! It might look that way, but that's surface grammar. You've got to read the stuff on avowals, and tackle that, rather than simply recycling the argument that that thesis is designed to undermine.

Isamu Kamada: No, no, what I'm saying is that the problem of the relation between my own experience, and my utterance, my expression, is the same as the "other mind". To know about other's mind is very difficult, and also it's very difficult to know my own experience, because I have my own experience, but I must know this has certain linguistic meaning, linguistic sense. And I must apply the sense to my own experience. The same thing we must do to other people.

Jeff Coulter: No. You're just recycling the whole set of arguments that Wittgenstein is spending so much time trying to destroy.

Isamu Kamada: Yeah, still he does not solve the problem of skepticism.

Jeff Coulter: Well, let's have a look at ON CERTAINTY and see how far he gets. [IK: Yeah] And I suggest we get into that, we start reading that, maybe for next time. Or maybe we could do that next semester - get into ON CERTAINTY, because I figure that we have our last meeting next time. I was thinking that we should probably throw it open for any kinds of residual issues and problems. -- But in respect of your question of skepticism, ON CERTAINTY must be studied. It may be wrong, but it must be studied, and there's no point, Isamu, coming along with the arguments that he's trying to destroy, unless you have counter-arguments to his. Otherwise we will simply be recycling our...

Isamu Kamada: Ok. A last question. You said that pain is a phenomena. Right? You said!

Jeff Coulter: Well, I don't know quite what I'm buying into if I say that. But let me say "yes".

Isamu Kamada: Ok. You are in the first person case of pain behavior, but from your point of view, in the first person case, pain is not the phenomenon, pain behavior is the phenomenon. So there is no pain (as a peopled) behavior. Only in your case, only your behavior, or your experience - there is pain phenomena - but there is no such phenomena.

Jeff Coulter: Oh, it's certainly true, I cannot have your pain. That's certainly true. But I can have the same pain as your's.

Isamu Kamada: Phenomena! Phenomena! You used the word. [JC: Ok] So pain-behavior is phenomena.

Jeff Coulter: It's absolutely true that I cannot have you pain, i.e., the numerically identical pain that you have, but I can have the same as yours.

Isamu Kamada: That was denied by Wittgenstein.

[Tr: General audience response]: NO.

Isamu Kamada: He denied it very clearly.

Jeff Coulter: Have a look at Malcolm. You haven't read your Malcolm.

Isamu Kamada: (But what about) Wittgenstein?

Jeff Coulter: Ok, but Malcolm is elucidating Wittgenstein. So right back to Wittgenstein. Very clearly he said-

Isamu Kamada: But Wittgenstein says, very clearly he says: He denied.

Jeff Coulter: Where?

Isamu Kamada: Your experience is totally different from others, therefore you cannot say that we can understand other's pain behavior....

[Tr: The meeting ended here]

TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

These transcriptions were prepared from an audio recording, the auditory quality of which was not always optimal. Participating members, especially Jeff Coulter, have reviewed initial drafts of the transcripts and have attempted to clarify portions that were particularly difficult to hear, and also provided assistance in correcting errors in transcription that were made during the production of the first draft of each session. The generous assistance of all those involved is gratefully acknowledged. Particular appreciation goes out to Jeff Stetson who took on the laborious task of copy-editing. Unfortunately, not all errors in transcription, and not all inaudible portions could be corrected given the time lag in producing the transcriptions. The transcriber apologizes for any remaining typographical errors.

The following are conventions employed in producing the transcriptions of these meetings:

- [x] square brackets: Text in square brackets is for the most part that of the transcriber. Such text is indicated by "Tr:" at the beginning of the brackets. It includes: 1. paraphrases of talk, 2. clarification of indefinite references, for example pointing, drawing or writing on the chalk-board, producing a behavioral display etc., 3. information about references to texts referred to in the talk, 4. other general remarks and clarifications and 5. indications of omissions and tape changes. PLEASE NOTE that there is almost always some bit of talk missing at the points of tape change. On occasion, comments in square brackets are insertions offered by those who have edited the text and are indicated as such by the initials of the person in question, e.g., [JC: xxxxxxxxx]. Also, if additions or deletions are made in text quoted during the class, then these changes are noted in square brackets, with the speakers initials included within the brackets.
- { x } braces: Text in braces is the talk of persons who are commenting on or responding to the talk of another person who currently has the floor. This talk is introduced by the initials of the person making the remark and/or comment, e.g., {JC: xxxx}.
- (x) parentheses surrounding text: Text in parentheses is the transcriber's best guess as to what was being said when there is some doubt about exactly what was said due to the poor auditory quality of the tape.

() empty parentheses: Parentheses containing no text indicate a portion of the talk which is not transcribable due to the poor auditory quality of the tape, although it is possible to tell that something was being said.

CAPITALIZATION: Capitalization is used to indicate titles (or partial titles, e.g.: INVESTIGATIONS for the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS) for books. It is also used to indicate vocal emphasis by the speaker in question, i.e., something which is spoken noticeably louder, or with more emphasis than the surrounding talk. It was not possible to underline text in the editing/text-formating system employed, which is why capitalization rather than underlining was used in the above cases. This also influenced the forming of terms in languages other than English, e.g.: Übersicht, vis-a vis, etc, which are neither capitalized, nor underlined, although occasionally are explicated in square brackets following the text in question.