

[coulw11.001. Tr: BJF. 1 September 90: Edited version] Transcription conventions can be found on the last 2-3 pages of each transcript.

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WITTGENSTEIN AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Meeting 11: 16 April 87

PLEASE NOTE: Both Meeting 11 and Meeting 12 focused on the topic of criteria. Professor Coulter believes that in many respects session 11 was made redundant by session 12, in which he feels the expository work was better. We decided to keep both in the set because there are some points raised in 11 that were not covered in 12.

TOPIC: Criteria

READING: 1. Hacker, P. M. S. (1972).

INSIGHT AND ILLUSION:

WITTGENSTEIN ON PHILOSOPHY AND THE
METAPHYSICS OF EXPERIENCE.

Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press --

Chapter 10.: The Problem of Criteria.

2. Hacker, P. M. S. (1986).

INSIGHT AND ILLUSION: THEMES IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN
(revised edition). Oxford, UK:

Clarendon Press -- Chapter 11.:

Criteria, Realism, and Anti-Realism.

Jeff Coulter: Ok. Criteria. If you'll look at the end of the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS you'll find in the index, if you have a copy with an index - I think some of the paperbacks were done without

indices - you'll find a whole list of things under the heading "criterion" and "criteria": Criteria of ability, of capacity, for a dream, for an experience, of guessing thoughts right, of having an opinion, identifying my sensation, criteria of identities, sameness, criteria of image, of intended projections coming before one's mind, of learning a shape, for looking without seeing, for mastering the series of natural numbers, for meaning, for mistake, outward criteria for inner process, physiological criteria for seeing, criteria for raising one's arm, reading, remembering right, an inner sensation, of states of mind, symptoms, talking to oneself, temporality of thought, criteria of understanding. So it's clearly a central concept in respect of Wittgenstein's later work, and I guess most of these things that are listed here have to do with personal attributes, faculties, capacities, dispositions, activities, and so forth. And in respect of criteria of ability, capacity, dreaming, understanding, remembering, and many of these things, of course, the notion of criterion is really that notion which has prompted a good deal of misreading of Wittgenstein as a Behaviorist. In particular his insistence upon behavioral criteria for the identification, for the very availability of the various things we speak of as 'mental properties' of persons, 'experiential properties' of persons, and so forth.

Whenever you read Wittgenstein speaking of behavioral criteria, however, it's as well to bear in mind a passage that arises somewhere in ZETTEL - and I was unable to find it, I was just trying to track it down - it's somewhere in the ZETTEL where he notes a caveat on his usage, but which usage I think is nonetheless clear if you read him without putting on Behavioristic spectacles in the first place. Which is when he is talking about behavior, he's trying to talk about it in the ordinary way that we would, in our everyday language, talk about people's behavior, and not in the rarified, quasi-technical sense, in which people like Hull and Tolman and early Skinner and J.B. Watson and others talked about behavior. And in the way in which we [Tr: ethnomethodologists] somewhat artificially have occasion to set up a distinction between behavioral event and action, in order to make those other points about the nature of conduct, in which behavioral event is more or less the same as 'bodily movement'. In I guess it was Hull, or maybe Tolman, I can't remember, 'behavior' ought to be rendered as 'thin colorless bodily movements'. And that's of course not at all what

Wittgenstein means by behavior. He means by behavior what we ordinarily mean: what people are doing, what they are getting up to, their chatting, talking, apologizing, insulting, answering telephone calls, conducting classes, and all the rest of it. That's behavior.

But, there are various places in which it's clear as well that it's not JUST conduct that counts as criteria for the availability of, or the assignability of the mental and experiential predicates to people. There are so many places in which Wittgenstein adds to the expression "Behavioral criteria" something like 'UNDER certain circumstances', or 'IN surrounding circumstances'. And this leads various commentators, for example John Cook in his paper "Human Beings" - which is a good one to read - in Peter Winch's edited collection STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN. [Tr: 1969, London, UK: Routledge and Kegan Paul] It leads people like Cook to argue that circumstances are co-criterial with behaviors in the ordinary sense in respect of the warrantable assignability of the mental and experiential predicates to persons, or the ratifiability of their avowals.

And so the question, I guess, is raised: What is the relationship between a criterion and the thing for which it is a criterion? Is it an entailment relation? Is it an inductive relation? What sort of logical relation is it? And here is where Peter Hacker - and in an identical vein as well Stanley Cavell makes exactly the same point - which is to note that here Wittgenstein transcends the established dichotomies yet again, only this time a dichotomy which has been laid down and insisted upon by the traditions of formal, classical logic. Let me just read you the relevant bit from Hacker, and then I'll try and find the relevant bit in Cavell. The Cavell reference to criteria is from his paper "Must We Mean What We Say?" which is the lead piece in his own book of same title. But he makes exactly the same point as Hacker. So what is this point? It is the following: Page 293 in the 1972 edition of Hacker's INSIGHT AND ILLUSION. That's the first edition.

To sum up the results thus far: the criterial relation holds between sentences and derivatively between other entities. [JC: I'll come back to that in a moment. That might sound obscure.] It is a fundamental semantic relation

unrecognized by classical logic. It is weaker than entailment but stronger than inductive evidence. It is a relation of a priori, non-inductive, or necessarily good evidence. It replaces the notion of truth-conditions which occupied so fundamental a position in the realist account of sense. [Tr: Hacker (1972), p. 293]

Ok. First of all, let me just clarify what Hacker means there when he says "the criterial relation holds between sentences, and derivatively between other entities". Actually you should already get a sense of what he's about there, because we've talked about the semantical transformation of ontological questions before. As he says earlier in the text, at the bottom of page 286:

The simplest way of introducing order into the medley [JC: of heterogeneous items allegedly connected by the criterial relation] would seem to be by treating entities specified in the material mode as criteria as derivatively so specified. [Tr: Hacker (1972), p. 286]

And the "material mode" meaning, for example, pains have criteria. As distinct from in the formal mode - to use Carnap's expression - the concept of pain has criteria of application. Which is a direct transposition and makes no fundamental difference to the issue.

Since the criterial relation is, as we shall see, a grammatical or logical relation, a matter of linguistic convention rather than natural law or extra-logical necessity, it is to be thought of as holding between linguistic entities. Thus one may of course speak of states, processes, and events as having criteria, and of phenomena, kinds of behavior, characteristics, as being criteria. But this is the equivalent, in the material mode, of speaking, in the formal mode, of words, phrases and expressions as having criteria, and of sentences, (or 'propositions', bearing in mind Wittgenstein's usage here), 'evidences' or grounds as being

criteria. Facts and states of affairs are of course spoken of as being and having criteria, and there is no harm in so doing as long as it is taken that facts and states of affairs are logical constructions. To claim that the fact that *p* is a criterion for the fact that *q* is tantamount to claiming that *p* is a criterion for *q* which in formal mode may be restated in terms of a criterial relation between '*p*' and '*q*', [JC: or the concept '*p*' and the concept '*q*', or the expression '*p*' and the expression '*q*'] i.e. a sentential relation. [Tr: Hacker (1972), p. 287. *P*'s and *Q*'s italicized in the original]

Hacker is here, as you can tell by contrast to his later work, he's still a little bit into the logician's garb, the formal logician's garb: sentences, propositions. We still haven't quite emancipated ourselves from the fetish of the notion of the 'sentence', or the 'proposition'. Whereas in fact what we would eventually be speaking about are 'utterances' and 'expressions' of which sentences are just a particular sub-set.

One important reason for taking the terms of the criterial relation to be sentences [JC: or expressions] and not, e.g., propositions concerns the doctrine of avowals explored in the previous chapter. [Tr: Hacker (1972), p. 287]

Ok. I'll take it that you've all read the chapter, so I won't go through lots and lots of examples. We'll get down to the nitty-gritty of the case. And we can talk about the examples, and play around with issues afterwards.

What does it mean to say that a criterial relation is not an entailment relation? It is to say that you cannot strictly and deductively derive '*q*' from '*p*' given the occurrence of '*p*'. In other words, to use a concrete example, if '*q*' - let us say, saying something like "I am in pain" - is a criterion for '*p*' - let us say the presence of pain - or to put it in the formal mode - if the avowal of pain is a criterion for the assignability of pain in discourse, then if an entailment relation holds, whenever you get '*q*', you get '*p*'. It is entailed. So that would mean that whenever I say that I am in pain, that entails I am in pain, if

the criterial relation is an entailment one.

One of the things Wittgenstein is concerned, of course, to deny is that an avowal of pain ENTAILS that somebody has pain. Because he's not daft. He knows very well that just saying you're in pain doesn't so to speak entail that you have pain.

BUT, unlike the philosophical opposition, he does NOT want to throw the baby out with the bath water, and to deny that there's any kind of systematic conventional relationship between saying "I am in pain" and indeed being in pain. Or, as one would put it in a traditional logical way, he wants to deny that there is merely a CONTINGENT relationship between things like saying "I'm in pain", and being in pain - in the sense that there might be a purely contingent relationship between tying your shoe laces in a bow, as distinct from a double bow, and being a Boston University faculty member - where that's a purely contingent relation. If you find some sort of correlation between them, it's very difficult to figure out what they might actually have connected together. You just find those two facts and nothing more.

Caesar Mavratsas: Would that be an inductive relationship? [JC: ((head nod yes))] Yeah.

Jeff Coulter: It's not even clear that you could say that it's a relationship except that it's sort of a- Yeah, there's some sort of relationship. You can't however- Well, I suppose you could make an induction out of it. Let's take it very very slowly.

All right. Insofar as there are contingent relations between things, Wittgenstein tends to use notions like "symptomatic" - something's being symptomatic of something, something's being a rough and ready index of the possibility or probability of something's being the case. So in that sense you might make some sort of inductive remark, which is of course very, very readily available for revision.

What Wittgenstein argues in respect of the claim that saying "I am in pain" is just a contingent thing that has really nothing essentially, or significantly to do with being in pain - that it's just a disengageable surface behavior that has no deeper relationship with being in pain - what he says about that is that whilst indeed saying that you're in pain doesn't entail

that you're in pain, it is not just a symptom of being in pain in the sense that we can speak about the symptoms of diseases where sometimes the symptoms can be used as good evidence that the disease is there and sometimes that you might be radically misled. Let me read you the bit from the BLUE BOOK on that.

If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we may ask in a particular case "why do you say this man has got angina?" then the answer "I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood" gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was "His throat is inflamed.", this might give us a symptom of angina. I call "symptom" a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion. Then to say "A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him" is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of "angina". But to say, "A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat" is to make an hypothesis. [Tr: BLUE BOOK, p. 41]

So, he wants to argue that symptoms are empirically correlated evidences, but that criteria are somewhat other than this. And in this particular example in the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, it seems as if, given that example, criterion is that which, when it's available, DEFINES the phenomenon. And so in this case it appears to be an entailment relation. Indeed in the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, criterion is in various places set-up as a necessary and sufficient condition, or a defining evidence. But this is completely discarded in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS in favor of a much, much more subtle - I wouldn't like to say middle-road - but a more subtle kind of characterization.

What is that characterization? And here, as you can see, when somebody like Hacker finds it necessary to revise his account after 14 years or so of study of Wittgenstein, you can see it's a very tricky thing to get right.

Let's settle on "symptom" for a moment as something that is relatively straight-forwardly discussed and described in Wittgenstein's corpus. It comes up, I think, again in the INVESTIGATIONS, but not in any significant way, I don't think. Symptoms [Tr: JC is leafing through the index to the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS], only once does it come up in the INVESTIGATIONS, whereas criteria comes up about 30 or 40 times. It comes up at 354. Let's just take a look at that.

354. The fluctuation in grammar between criteria and symptoms makes it look as if there were nothing at all but symptoms. We say, for example: "Experience teaches that there is rain when the barometer falls, but it also teaches that there is rain when we have certain sensations of wet and cold, or such-and-such visual impressions." In defence of this one says that these sense-impressions can deceive us. But here one fails to reflect that the fact that the false appearance is precisely one of rain is founded on a definition.

355. The point here is not that our sense-impression can lie, but that we understand their language. (And this language like any other is founded on convention.) [Tr: PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, paragraphs 354 and 355]

Ok, so that's about the only place in which he speaks of symptoms in the INVESTIGATIONS. And it's in a very similar way to the way he characterizes them in the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS. It's going to be complicated, so I'm going to have to work through it for a while.

All right. So let's settle on symptoms then as empirical evidences that are contingently related to the presence of a phenomenon, and in that sense, indeed, give some inductive support to the claimed presence of the phenomenon.

In the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, the contrast is with something that DEFINES the presence. And defining is as much a matter of entailment as you can find. How then can Wittgenstein claim in the INVESTIGATIONS to have hit upon a new logical relationship that is neither one of mere empirical contingent regularity on the one hand, and not a

defining or entailment relation on the other? Ok?
So that is how the question is set up.

Go ahead.

Ed Parsons: I just wanted to say that one of the differences in the two articles - in the earlier article doesn't Hacker make a greater distinction between symptoms and criteria and tries to draw a more distinct line? But here he takes that down.

Jeff Coulter: Yes I think that's true. But let's hold off on the comparison of Hacker's treatments for a while. Ok? We'll work through the thing.

All right. Let's stick for purposes of the discussion to the kinds of concepts of phenomena that we've looked at at some length already, like: understanding, and having pains, etc. But remember that for Wittgenstein criteria are much more generically significant in the weave of life. So for our examples we'll stick with those things. Let's take a few of them. In Paragraph 269 he says:

269. Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man's behaviour for the fact that he does not understand a word: that it means nothing to him, that he can do nothing with it. And criteria for his 'thinking he understands', attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one. And, lastly, criteria for his understanding the word right. In the second case one might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but which I 'APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND' might be called a "private language". [Tr: PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, paragraph 269. Capitalized text appeared as italicized in the original]

Don't forget there though of course 'appearing to understand' is not the same as 'understanding', so there really isn't a private language.

Ok. Another place would be where he says something to the effect of: Do not forget that inner states stand in need of outer criteria. [TR:

JC is looking for a particular paragraph in the PI]
Oh yes, 580.

580. An 'inner process' stands in
need of outward criteria. [Tr:
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, paragraph
580]

Which more or less sums up the force of his
private language argument. Let's take another one,
258. No it's too complicated for the present
purpose.

Page 222e, where he says that:

The criteria for the truth of the
CONFESSION that I thought such-and-such
are not the criteria for the true
DESCRIPTION of a process. And the
importance of the true confession does
not reside in its being a correct and
certain report of a process. It resides
rather in the special consequences which
can be drawn from a confession whose
truth is guaranteed by the special
criteria of TRUTHFULNESS. [Tr:
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, page 222e.
Capitalized text appeared as italicized
in the original]

And after that he gets into the business of
dreaming.

(Assuming that dreams can yield
important information about the dreamer,
what yielded the information would be
truthful accounts of dreams. The
question whether the dreamer's memory
deceives him when he reports the dream
after waking cannot arise, unless indeed
we introduce a completely new criterion
for the report's 'agreeing' with the
dream, a criterion which gives us a
concept of 'truth' as distinct from
'truthfulness' here.) [Tr:
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, pages
222e-223e]

Remember the discussion over dreams in Dement's work on REM's [Tr: Rapid Eye Movement] as new criteria for dreaming.

Ok. So criteria come up all over the place. And, it is distinguished from symptom. But it is NOT an entailment relation. It CANNOT be an entailment relation. It cannot be an entailment relation for a variety of reasons. One of them has to do with the whole notion of the autonomy of grammar.

A symptom, a symptomatic relation is an empirical regularity relation that you can take note of. But for something to be a symptom of something else presupposes independent criteria for what that something else is in the first instance. It's like the first move to make. For something to be a symptom of something, an empirical evidence for something, presupposes that you have a way of identifying the thing in the first instance.

How could you identify something in the first instance without empirical evidence? ONLY IF you draw a distinction between HOW a concept enters the language via the use of samples, and then how you can go on to make factual or empirically based assertions about the thing for which you now have the concept. So the first point is to make a distinction between something which is a bit of empirical evidence, and something which is a sample for concept formation.

Hacker, in his first (1972) treatment of criteria, speaks of the criterial relation as a relation of a priori, non-inductive, or necessarily good evidence. Thereby fudging this crucial distinction. In his rewrite (1986), he says the following - and it's absolutely critical to his change of position. And it could only have been arrived at by getting clearer about the notion of 'autonomy of grammar'. I'll read it to you. This is on page 314 of the 1986 version of Hacker. Here it is beautifully and clearly put:

In an attempt to emphasize that criteria for p are grounds or reasons for asserting that p, while distancing the notion of a criterion from that of empirical evidence, it has been said that criteria are 'logically necessarily good evidence' or 'non-inductive evidence'. [JC: as in page 293 in his first treatment] This correctly stresses

the fact that criteria are logical, not empirical, fixed by grammar or convention, not discovered in experience. It brings out the fact that criteria are grounds for judgement, answers to the question 'How do you know?' and hence connected, broadly speaking, with verification (though not with [JC: the doctrine of] 'verificationism'). It is also a way of highlighting the fact that the criteria for p, just like evidence for p, do not entail that p. [Tr: Hacker (1986), page 314. "P's" italicized in the original]

So the notion of evidence is a way of noting that there's not an entailment relation, but that there is something LOGICAL about something's being a criterion for the identification of something else, in the fundamental sense. To specify a criterion is one way to answer the question: How can you tell, how do you know that it's a '...'? And you come up with criteria.

Nevertheless, the inevitable associations of the term 'evidence', in particular the implication of a 'gap' between evidence and what it is evidence for, have contributed to confusion. [Tr: Hacker (1986), page 314]

Including the confusions of both Cavell and Hacker in the 1972 rendition. And my own, when I was talking about criterion in my work. I treated it as an a priori evidential relation, a conventionalized evidential relation.

BUT, this implicates a gap between evidence and what it is evidence for.

For it has suggested that in observing that the criteria for p are satisfied one falls short of observing that p is the case, or that in inferring from the criteria for p to p (e.g. in justifying one's assertion that p by reference to the criteria for the truth of p) one is inferring from the observed to the unobserved, from what is present to view to what is hidden. [Tr: Hacker (1986), page 314. "P's" italicized in the original]

So it sounds like if you say "I am in pain" is a criterion for being in pain, then it's just evidence. Now, what is it evidence for? The pain. Where's the pain? So you are back with the private object argument. You're thrust back into the notion that pain is really sort of something hidden and behind all of this surface effluvia, all of these things that Wittgenstein's spoken of as criterial for pain, and yet by the invocation of the notion of evidence, and the logical entailment of that - the distinction between something's being a bit of evidence and what it's evidence FOR - you've re-introduced the very thing you're trying to knock out as a grammatical monstrosity, namely the private object of knowledge.

So, Hacker goes on:

But even in the case of psychological predicates and attributions of abilities, what is thus justified is not hidden or transcendent. On the contrary, A manifests his anger in appropriate circumstances in his tones of rage and fuming demeanour, and he manifests his ability to ϕ in ϕ ing, shows that he can ϕ by ϕ ing. A's anger (not the 'fact' or 'circumstance' that he is angry) is expressed in his angry behaviour (not hidden behind it) as his amusement is manifest in his chuckle and the twinkle in his eye, and his delight in his joyous exclamations. So too, the artist's skill is manifest in his paintings (and his activity of producing them), not hidden behind the canvas or something concealed from which his deft brush-strokes flow, just as the dancer's abilities are manifest in her pirouettes and graceful movements. [Tr: Hacker (1986), pages 314-315. "A's" italicized in the original. ϕ is theta]

Not that the graceful movements sort of flow from independent things called 'abilities'. So, your using the word correctly MANIFESTS your understanding - is not just evidence for something else, namely that which stands behind their manifestations, namely the understanding, which might now be mental again.

You see the issue here? Absolutely crucial. And here's the rub:

(Breadcrumbs, as Austin pointed out, are evidence for bread, but a loaf of bread on the table is NOT [JC: evidence for bread.]) [Tr: Hacker (1986), page 312]

You see this whole way in which the criterial relation has been interpreted? And it's partly Wittgenstein's fault. Because there are places where he does speak of criterial evidence, where he does speak of criteria in terms of evidence. But it's quite clear that that's not his intention. It's not, you see, he wants to say that 'You see the criteria being satisfied and then you've got evidence for the thing that you are really talking about'. So you SEE the pain behavior, but you're not really seeing the pain. Rather seeing the pain behavior is seeing that the person is in pain in the appropriate circumstances. It is seeing that the person is in pain. It's not that you have on the one hand some external, superficial evidences, however conventionally connected to the presence of pain, and therefore there is now a sort of a distinction, a wedge to be driven between the evidences and the thing for which they are evidences - rather as bread crumbs are evidence for bread. But rather, you see that the person is in pain in and through seeing the pain behavior in the appropriate circumstances. It is badly articulated as an evidential relation. And this is exactly why Hacker is effectively revising his earlier argument.

Ok. So, it's not an evidential relation, or at least perspicuously treated as an evidential relation. That there are many, many different kinds of criteria for the assignability of things, and these are to be differentiated from the symptoms of things - is still maintained. But that criteria are not evidences is now established, is now argued for, but it's still a confusion. Because if they are not evidences, and we're told that they are not entailments - Wittgenstein in many places says: 'Pain behavior entails pain? Well how absurd. He many times says to his fictional interlocutor, who accuses him of crass behaviorism: So what you're really saying is 'pain' is 'pain behavior'. He says: On the contrary, nothing could be further from the case. So it's not an entailment relation.

What then is the way of characterizing this? And now in order to understand it you have to introduce a distinction between something's being empirical evidence for p, and something's being a

sample for the concept formation of the concept p. And a sample is not a bit of empirical evidence.

What is a sample? For Wittgenstein, a sample is something that can be indicated, in the real world, which has the function in instructional circumstances of symbolizing a class of phenomena. It's anything in the real world that has the function in language acquisition and instructional circumstances of symbolizing a class of phenomena.

And what Wittgenstein wants to propose is that samples, for example a red patch on the wall pointed to in the process of teaching someone the meaning of the word "red", though as you know from the critique of ostensive definition and the Augustinian picture, that is not a sufficient condition for concept-acquisition, but it may well be a part of it. THAT red patch serves as a sample. It is, for Wittgenstein, now incorporated into language because it becomes itself a symbol. And, in Baker and Hacker's notation they speak of it this way: [JC puts on the board an arrow (-->) which points upward and to the right.] They speak of it with that sign. What that means is the pointing to the sample - pointing to the sample.

Now the fact that a sample is indeed a bit of empirical reality, if you like, could lead you to think that what people are getting access to in the course of language acquisition, or concept formation, for phenomena in the world, are empirical evidences. But not so. The role of something in the world depends upon the language-game in which it figures. In language acquisition, in instructional language-games, somebody's groaning and writhing can be pointed to, and now used as a sample in the course of the acquisition of the concept of 'pain'. In some different set of circumstances, that same kind of behavior - of writhing and groaning on the floor - can be pointed to as evidence of somebody's just having been struck badly. In some different circumstance it can be pointed to as: "That's going to happen to you if you don't tell us where the guys have hidden the microfilm.", etc., etc.

The issue here then is that in the process of concept formation criteria are laid down in the form of samples, but they are NOT, they don't have the role of empirical evidences in those language-games. They are the ways in which the very concepts of the phenomena are acquired, or they are part of the ways in which the very concepts of the phenomena are acquired. And in

that sense, given their paradigmatic role, they are NOT just evidences, they are part of what is involved in acquiring the concepts. And that, I think, is the crucial thing that's now come clear through a careful reading of the material on autonomy of grammar, and the criterial relation, and the problems surrounding the notion of criteria as evidences.

SO, how then to characterize criteria, in the case of pains and understandings, and thinkings, and imaginings, and abilities, and so forth?

[Tr: Tape change]

Jeff Coulter(cont): Essentially what he says is that they are grammatical rules, but I want to get the quote correct. I would have done this [Tr: find the particular quote in the text] before but I haven't had the book [Tr: Hacker's]; I'm sorry. [Tr: JC's copy was made available to seminar members to xerox to prepare for this meeting] I'm not finding it; I'm going to hold everybody up.

All right. Effectively what he says is that the criterial relation is a grammatical rule relation.

Ok. What about the business of behavioral criteria and circumstances? Are we to treat, for example, my saying "I have a pain" as a criterion for my being in pain in the non-entailment, but non-inductive evidential sense, i.e. as a grammatical rule relation? IF it's the case that under certain circumstances my so saying is simply not a criterion for my being in pain, as for example, when I'm in a theater. Here it looks as if Wittgenstein wants to have his cake and eat it. On the one hand he wants to say that these kinds of expressions are criteria, but on the other hand they may not be. And Hacker introduces in this connection a concept that Wittgenstein doesn't himself use, but I think he's trying to be honest to Wittgenstein's intentions. He introduces the notion of "defeasibility" from the philosophy of jurisprudence taken out of the writings of H. L. A. Hart. And defeasibility simply means, in the philosophy of law, that the applicability of a law might be defeated in certain hitherto unspecified contingencies. When certain hitherto unspecified contingencies obtain, the applicability of a law, or a rule might be over-ruled or defeated. [Tr: The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights. In A.

Flew (Ed.) LOGIC AND LANGUAGE, 1st and 2nd series.
New York, NY: Doubleday-Anchor, 1965]

So, what one could argue perhaps is that something like "I am in pain" is a defeasible criterion for someone's being in pain. It's a criterion all right; it's not merely contingently connected to being in pain, after all it's part of the concept formation of pain. It's part of how the concept is learned. It's a conventionally connected expression with pain. But it's defeasible. That is, there are circumstances in which it can be over-ruled as, in fact, a criterion, i.e., there are circumstances in which you can encounter persons who say that they are in pain, and yet you're not in the presence of the phenomenon, you're not in the presence of pain. They are not in pain. You know that they are not in pain, even though it seems that a criterion is satisfied.

Ok. And again, it is as if we are now being shoved back into the notion of the private object that lies behind the superficial surface expression.

What Wittgenstein, I think, is proposing is a bit more subtle than this, though this was the sort of way I used to read him, i.e., the Hacker way, as speaking of criteria as defeasible. And it's still helpful in the sense that it preserves the notion of relations between these behavioral manifestations, and so called inner-states, inner-experiences that doesn't allow it to degenerate into the pure contingency, or pure empirical regularity, or symptomatic relations on the one hand, nor a strict entailment on the other. Because, of course, if criteria constituted entailments, you couldn't have such a thing as defeasibility.

So it did seem to capture something about the way we actually reason, and the way the world works. And yet it's ultimately somewhat unsatisfactory, because if it's a criterion, THEN it's a CRITERION. And so what do you mean by saying that it is a DEFEASIBLE criterion? As I said, it seems as if you want it both ways.

If you look at the first edition of Hacker, this is the kind of thing he says. At the bottom of page 289 in the 1972 edition he says;

In his discussion of the criteria for
'to see something' in 'Notes for

Lectures', p. 286, Wittgenstein stresses that although we would have no use for this expression [JC: i.e., to see something] if its application were severed from its behavioural criteria, it is perfectly possible for someone to see red and not show it, i.e., for 'He sees red' to be true but for the criteria for it not to be satisfied. This possibility of concealment is an essential feature of our concepts of 'inner states'. Conversely it is equally essential that the criteria for 'p' may be satisfied yet 'p' be false. What a person says is a criterion for what image he has (PI paragraph 377), but he may be lying; pain behaviour is a criterion of pain, but one may be pretending (PI, paragraphs 244, 249-250); certain sensations of wet and cold, such-and-such visual impressions are criteria that it is raining, but sense impressions can deceive us (PI, paragraph 354). The criterial relation, barring Wittgenstein's introductory passage in the BLUE BOOK, is conceived as distinct from and weaker than entailment and, a fortiori, than mutual entailment. [Tr: Hacker (1972), pp. 289-290]

Then Hacker goes on to the classical logician.

To the classical logician this of course would suggest that the criterial relation is merely some kind of inductive evidence. [Tr: Hacker (1972), p. 290]

Well. There's a sense in which the very way that Hacker sets that up should already give us some feeling that something has gone wrong. Because IF "He sees red" is the case, but the criteria for it are not satisfied, then what sort of things are these criteria? What are we talking about? Conversely, it's equally essential that the criteria for 'p' may be satisfied, yet 'p' be false. What kind of criteria are these? What a person says is a criterion for what image he has, but he may be lying. So what sort of criterion is this? GRANTED it's not an entailment relation, but why would one want to call it a criterial relation IF it doesn't bring you in the presence of the

phenomena, so to speak? IF it's not indeed the way you fundamentally find yourself encountering the phenomena? And so from here we get Hacker's conclusion on page 297:

A criterion is not decisive evidence, it can always be rebutted by citing additional evidence which will defeat the criterial support, though in the absence of defeating evidence the criterial evidence justifies a cognitive claim. It is defeasible, but being defeasible does not imply being defeated. Grounds for rebuttal must be available, for a grounded belief is innocent until proven guilty. [Tr: Hacker (1972), p. 297]

A very lame way of circumventing the core problem. "A criterion is not decisive evidence. It can always be rebutted by citing additional evidence which will defeat the criterial support..." Well if additional evidence defeats the criterial support, why do we call it a criterial support rather than a "symptom"?

Now, Wittgenstein somewhere writes that there's a fluctuation in grammar between symptoms and criteria. And that indeed is significant. What today might be construed as a symptom, might eventually be treated as a criterion. That's true. But that's read in connection with this kind of argument as basically meaning that the whole thing is fuzzy, and we really can't make these sorts of distinctions.

One way in which the business of criteria and defeasibility have been connected is in Cook, in the essay I mentioned earlier, where Cook speaks about circumstances as CO-criterial with behaviors. But he then makes ALL OF THAT defeasible. So we're still in difficulties.

I'll just finish this off, and then I'll open it up, because I'm sure you've all got questions, and we can have a good discussion.

Where I think we can get out of the problem is partly through making this distinction, through denying that criteria for 'p' are evidences for 'p'. There are not evidences for 'p'! They're not conventional evidences for 'p'. And they are not defeasible evidences for 'p'. At all. That's part of it. That's the first move we make.

The second move I think we make would follow Canfield in his book WITTGENSTEIN: LANGUAGE AND WORLD. Where what Canfield argues - and I think I've mentioned this before in a passing way, but I'll try to be more specific about it now, and we'll see how it flies - Canfield picks up Hacker on the notion of criteria as defeasible. And says more or less the same sort of thing as Hacker is now saying, i.e., this is sort of sloppy, in a sense. It stretches the notion of criteria to speak about the criterion being satisfied, but the thing for which it's a criterion not being there, OR the thing being there, but the criteria for it not being satisfied. So he has a go at Hacker on this. But what he wants to note is that there's still something IN what Hacker is trying to get at. And what he proposes is that the DEFEAT of one or more criteria is always in terms of other specific available criteria. In other words, that whenever one or more criteria are over-ruled, they are over-ruled because of the invocability of other specific criteria. In other words what he says is - and something that has been completely neglected and missed - is that we don't only learn criteria for pain, for assigning pain. We also learn CRITERIA for someone's PRETENDING to be in pain. It's not that you have criteria for pain which can be over-ruled by finding out that somebody is pretending to be in pain, and so now we are left with the notion of a criterion being satisfied but somebody's not being in pain. No, it's not that. It's that there are multiple criteria for being in pain, and there are multiple criteria for pretending. And we have to learn. First of all we learn what 'pain' is before we can possibly understand what 'pretending to be in pain' could be. Because 'pretending to be in pain' presupposes 'pain'. You can't pretend to be an 'x' unless you already have the concept of an 'x'. And identifying 'pretense' must satisfy the criteria for what 'pretending' could be. So a defeat of a criterion must be criterial. In other words, if a criterion is defeated, it is defeated criterially. [TR: JC writes on the board] The defeat of a criterion is itself governed by criteria. - We can play around with that and perhaps make it more precise, and have a look at how Canfield sets it up.

When I first read Canfield on this, I thought: Here's a logical regimentor, another Quinian, wants to get all back into the calculus. Because the notion of defeasibility has great appeal. It allows both for the obvious conventionality of the relationships that Wittgenstein is pointing to, and

also for the obvious ways in which the conventionalities are circumstantial. So that indeed it's not to deny that screaming and moaning are criteria for pain, and that in seeing somebody's screaming and moaning in the appropriate circumstances, you are SEEING that they are in pain. It's not to deny that to say that in other circumstances screaming and moaning might be part of play-acting. And that sometimes you might not see the two together, i.e., you might encounter a scene in which somebody is screaming and moaning, and only as the scene unfolds do you see the camera peaking over the top, and then the person gets up off the ground, and you find it's tomato catsup, and all the rest of it. And one wants to be accurate and truthful to the way the world works. And so the notion of criteria being defeasible appeared to capture the subtleties of the relationship between conventionality and circumstantiality. And yet, of course, it leads to that kind of absurdity in the first edition of Hacker, where there's really no longer a point, certainly not the sort of strong point Wittgenstein wants to make with the concept of criterion as that which brings us into the presence of the phenomenon, as that which provides the justification for claiming that the phenomenon is present, as that which can indeed provide for truth claims about the identification of phenomena IF one wants to say that criteria can be satisfied, but the thing that those are criteria for aren't there. It doesn't work. It's not satisfying. And yet it seemed to us - certainly to Hacker, and to many of us who had been thinking about Wittgenstein - that that was about the best that could be done.

Now it strikes me that in the re-reading of the autonomy of grammar, and the re-assessment of the notion of defeasibility, and Canfield's contribution, in particular, we are getting a better handle on it. And it's actually a simple idea, one that should have struck us all before. Which is that, the kinds of things that can over-ride certain criteria would themselves have to have criteria. That is to say that: NOT any old thing can over-ride a given criterion from an array of criteria. That is to say, for example, it's not that you now have a sort of open-ended set of possibly defeating circumstances in the world. But you have an orderliness to the possibilities of defeat of certain criteria. And note as well, of course, that IF - and here's a further logical point to make - IF you find that the criterion that you have witnessed being satisfied, i.e., pain behavior, is over-ruled by finding that it was

play-acting, then you've really got to say that it wasn't pain behavior at all. That you've really got to go back and say: It merely looked like pain behavior. It was play-acting behavior. Whereas in the way it was originally set up we'd say: Yes, yes, it's pain behavior, but it's criteriality for pain is over-ruled in virtue of its being part of the context of play-acting. Now, of course, one can admit the obvious, and say that: In the context of play-acting, the screaming and moaning is not pain behavior. It's not genuine. It's not the real thing. It's not pain behavior; it's quasi-pain-behavior. It's pretend pain behavior.

So, when you defeat a criterion, you really do defeat it. It's not that a criterion is satisfied, but that the thing for which it's a criterion is not present. OH NO. Which would be the case if you said that: Here you have pain behavior. Pain behavior is a criterion for pain. In these circumstances, however, though the criterion is met, i.e., he's pain behaving, there is no pain because it's in a play. You've still allowed that it's pain behavior. So the criterion has been satisfied.

On the contrary, the defeat of a criterion is its radical defeat. It's not pain behavior. It satisfies different criteria; the criteria for play-acting. And it's getting this set of issues together that I think lead us to see that there is a unity. And indeed that grammar is encompassing of intelligibility.

A last word before we throw it open.

The business of empirical evidence.

In saying that criteria are NOT well specified as evidences - you get that point? - that if you treat criteria as evidences, then it creates a gap between the evidence and what it is evidence for. And in the case of things like pain, understanding, and all those mental things, to do that would completely destroy the whole point of Wittgenstein's argument, and would allow back in a distinction between 'seeing that someone is in pain' and 'merely seeing them pain behaving', and now inferring that they are in pain, guessing that they are in pain. It would allow skepticism to come back in about other minds. It would allow all of the bad old bogies that the whole notion of criteria was invoked to destroy, i.e. Cartesianism - as one of the primary foci of attack that Wittgenstein uses the notion of criteria to engage

in.

Ok, but that doesn't mean that, of course, they are not often empirical things. What does one mean, however, by saying that the criterial relation is a grammatical rule relation? And what has that got to do with "the empirical"?

Let me just read you another section. -- I'm having trouble finding it, but the thing I'm looking for is where he makes a distinction between empirical evidence and grounds.

In fact, why don't we just stop there and throw it open.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Jeff, although you can't find the reference, can you talk a little bit about that distinction between empirical evidence and grounds? Can you sort of give the gist of what it is that you're remembering there?

Jeff Coulter: It's that grounds for properly saying that something is there - it can involve an empirical reference that justifies the claim, but it's not an evidential relationship. You really do see that someone is in pain; you don't just see their pain behavior, which is a bit of evidence for the thing that it's evidence for, namely the pain. Empirical grounds are different from empirical evidences. But he puts it so nicely that I wanted to find it, and I can't quite find it.

Anyway, there were lots of people that wanted to ask questions.

Jeff Stetson: Our old example about the phantom limb? For example, say the arm is severed from the elbow down, and say I have a pain in my hand. The empirical evidence is that there is no hand to have the pain in, so how can you have the pain? Are these ranked in any way? Is there some difficulty in saying "Well, I'm sorry. Obviously you don't have the pain, though you can scream and moan and yell and everything else, and I don't have a meter to go in your head and say 'pain', and what not. But simply someone says "I have a pain in my hand". The evidence of non-handness is...

Jeff Coulter: ...is now a criterion for phantom limb. {JS: yes} It's a new game. It's a new game in that sense. It's like the invisible

light in a sense. Before the development of the concept of the phantom limb, the lack of the limb would be a decisive criterion for over-ruling the claim of pain there. But almost certainly what sort of happened - I mean to speculate about it - is that the new language-game has come into being because of the persistence, obvious suffering, other criteria are being fulfilled so evidently - not evidentially but evidently - that compassion requires us to postulate something like that as like grounds for now handling the problem, conceding the thing. Though you'll still find some physicians will dismiss the notion. I guess that's about the best I can do with it.

But now that that game is played, now it has it's own criteria. Like one criterion for saying of someone that they are suffering from phantom limb pain, or that they experience phantom limb, is precisely that they make these insistent claims about having pains, and they show obvious distress, and all the rest of it, and they don't seem to be play-acting, and they don't seem to be pretending, etc. And it goes on and on and on. And so finally you give in. And in giving in you have this new game, which has it's own criteria. That's one of the ways in which you get this sort of fluctuation between symptoms and criteria, by the way, is with conceptual developments.

Did you have something else in mind there? Is there something that you figured might be subversive of the claim Wittgenstein was making in that?

Jeff Stetson: No, I just wanted to see how that example would be handled.

Dave Bogen: I'm still confused along similar lines with some of Hacker's stuff around page 315, in the new (1986) edition, and it has to do with the language. It seems to me he's saying that here:

So too, the artist's skill is manifest in his paintings ... not hidden behind the canvas ... just as the dancer's abilities are manifest in her pirouettes and graceful movements. [Tr: Hacker (1986), p. 315]

Now the relation between pirouettes and graceful movements, and the ability to dance is being argued as a criteria relation. Correct?

Jeff Coulter: Yeah.

Dave Bogen: Yet it seems to me that there's something different about abilities than, say, what we've been talking about under the heading of examples from pain behavior.

Jeff Coulter: This is exactly the place I was looking for - I'm sorry Dave I'll come right back to that. This is where he says:

... it would perhaps be more correct (or at least less misleading) to say that a criterion for 'p' is a grammatically [JC: i.e.] (logically) [JC: in the logico-grammatical sense] determined ground or reason for the truth of 'p'. It is a decisive ground? Is it defeasible? Or can it be both? [Tr: Hacker (1986), p. 315 - the p's are italicized in the original]

Dave Bogen: Ok. Let me make the point, and see if it works out this way. It seems to me that language of an ability being manifest in, or expressed in - that language admits to the sort of distinction between- that's replayed in the notion: this is evidence for. That in expressed or manifest it leads us to think of something which stands behind that, and that this might have something to do with circumstances under which ascription of an ability is relevant, or questions as to somebody's ability is relevant. Because you wouldn't say of a dancer that they lose their ability to dance when they leave the stage. Right? They maintain that ability unless some other circumstance comes into play. And abilities in that sense seem to be different than the examples from pain, because we don't normally question someone's ability to experience pain. So you might talk about HERE I think an evidential relationship that- that she dances like that may be evidentially related to that she is a good dancer, or that she is able to dance.

Jeff Coulter: She's able to dance. Yeah.

Dave Bogen: Right. Evidentially related in this sense. It's criterially related to what dancing is, or what good dancing is.

Jeff Coulter: Being able to dance IS, INVOLVES, criterially, dancing like that - where "that" now can be satisfied by a bunch of

paradigmatic kinds of performances. That's what it is to be able to dance "well", or to be able to do the pirouette. I don't quite see the issue you're raising here. An ability is not something lying BEHIND its manifestation. It's being able to. An ability is a nominalization of being able to.

Dave Bogen: Right. But isn't that a fair nominalization? That is to say, somebody has the ability, whether they are doing it or not.

Jeff Coulter: Sure. You're not all the time having to exercise your ability, but you've got to exercise it some of the time in order to be said to have it. It's like when Fodor goes around saying: Pay me enough and I'll stand on my head whenever you say "is a chair", but I know what "is a chair" means all the same. To which the correct answer is: How do we know that you know what "is a chair" means if everytime we say "is a chair" you stand on your head? So how do we know you have the ability unless we've got some manifestation of it?

Dave Bogen: But then, if you pose it that way, how do we know that you're posing it as an evidential question? Give me some evidence that you have it.

Jeff Coulter: No, it's not evidence. It is constitutive of your 'being able to' that you can do it in certain circumstances. That's what 'being able to' means.

Dusan Bjelic: Or definition of it.

Jeff Coulter: All right. Part- Well, Ok. Part of it.

Lena Jayyusi: It's realized in the act.

Jeff Coulter: It's realized in the act.

Dusan Bjelic: Ok. But what I understood part of his problem or question is, for instance, if she's a good ballet dancer and then suddenly she breaks her legs, or something, and she is not able to come to the stage anymore. Is it playing pirouette, or-

Jeff Coulter: She's lost the ability to dance.

Dusan Bjelic: Right. But my question- I think what he's trying to say: you don't lose criteria for playing good pirouette. And the

question: Is it the playing, or dancing, the actual dancing, the only one criterion for-

Jeff Coulter: Oh, no, abilities characteristically have multiple criteria.

Dusan Bjelic: So now what about a choreographer who is not able to walk, but is able to put into words to the dancer how to perform a good pirouette? It also has a criterion for what is a good pirouette.

Edith Rosenthal: No, that person is a good choreographer. It's a different ability.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: It's like knowing how to dance, rather than being able to dance - is what I think you're trying to get at.

Jeff Coulter: Well, it's the same thing then. In that context it's the same thing: to know how to dance is to be able to dance. It's like understanding and dancing and many of these ability concepts have multiple criteria, because they are exhibited. Like you exhibit your ability in doing what you are able to do. That IS to have the ability. It's not like here's the ability and there's the performance, in some disengaged way. But being able to is-

Caesar Mavratsas: But in Dusan's example, if the ballerina breaks her legs, and she knows how to teach somebody else how to dance well - what do you call that? It's an ability to teach. But she knows how to dance. She knows how to teach the other person.

Lena Jayyusi: She knows what makes a good dancer. She used to be able to dance.

Jeff Coulter: Set it up again for me Caesar. What are you trying to argue?

Caesar Mavratsas: A ballerina breaks her legs and she cannot dance anymore.

Jeff Coulter: So she's unable, she's lost the ability to dance.

Caesar Mavratsas: Yes. But she can still teach other people how to dance.

Jeff Coulter: Fine. Sure. So?

Caesar Mavratsas: So it presupposes she knows how to dance.

Edith Rosenthal: No, she knows how to teach.

Caesar Mavratsas: Yeah, but it's a difference.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, Ok. In that context, knowing how to dance - Yeah. Maybe capacity and ability sometimes are not completely interchangeable.

Caesar Mavratsas: Yeah.

Dave Bogen: That's my argument: that when we are talking about pain, and he tries to assimilate the two to each other. Pain is like a capacity, and only-

Jeff Coulter: No, no, that doesn't work at all.

Dave Bogen: No? Why not? Its not an ability. You don't have the ability to feel pain, or at least ordinarily we wouldn't ask people - we wouldn't propose that they have the ability to feel pain. They just-

Jeff Coulter: An ability is not an experience, and an experience is not an ability.

Dave Bogen: Right. But he assimilates the two to one another in this case.

Jeff Coulter: No, he's just saying that all kinds of different things have criteria. Remember that list we read. There are criteria for abilities, capacities - by the way he makes the distinction which of course is there in language. Dreaming, experience, guessing thoughts, having opinions, identifying sensations, images, mastering the series of natural numbers, meaning, mistake, raising one's arm, reading, remembering, expecting, symptoms, of understanding, etc. There's many, many.

Caesar Mavratsas: And there are family resemblances between all of these-

Jeff Coulter: In fact, of course, you could say pretty well everything that has a nominal compound form is criterially governed, which is just another way of saying it's rule-governed. It's grammatically provided for.

Dusan Bjelic: For that reason I'm arguing that if actually in effect the criteria for a good pirouette is intergrammatical connections, it's also to say a logical connection, logical space. That doesn't mean that it is only privatized by the person who knows how to dance. It's also part of the language of a choreographer who is teaching a child how to achieve a good pirouette.

Jeff Coulter: Ok. Well wait a minute now. One of the things you've introduced here is a complication in regard to values, in regard to aesthetic and other kinds of judgments. You're talking about GOOD pirouette. You're not just talking about pirouetting.

Dusan Bjelic: No, I understand that he's talking about good pirouette.

Jeff Coulter: No, we're talking about pirouetting. [DB: Well all right] Properly if you like [DB: Well, Ok, all right] Which is there's a difference between being able to do a pirouette and not being able to do one. Nobody wants to stipulate that's it's given in one clean cut uniform discrete way. It might be [DB: it's aesthetically], yeah.

You know the business of criteria with respect to moral, aesthetic and other kinds of judgments, is not really what we've been talking about. Because there's a sense in which first of all you have to have some notion of the difference between a pirouette, and - I don't know dancing enough to give you another kind of step - but whatever the other things are - arabesque, or whatever. And it's once certain basic paradigms have been mastered that you can then start to acquire ways of characterizing them on a gradable basis with respect to 'good - bad', 'effective - ineffective', and so on. Though there are many constructs for phenomena that kind of almost have built into them notions of valuation. Where in a way, as Cavell puts it, to learn, to acquire the concept is also, eo ipso, to acquire a value judgment in regard to this. Perhaps something like "justice" is a case. To LEARN how to use the concept of justice - Pitkin takes this from Cavell. The criteria for the application of such a concept are themselves moral criteria. But for other things you can have a distinction between learning the identificational criteria and then learning other kinds of criteria of evaluation.

So, I, who know nothing about dancing, might have somebody point out to me a pirouette, and then on some next occasion I can distinguish a pirouette from a arabesque, but I won't know yet what would count as a good one. You see what I mean?. I might not be able to do that, I'd have to learn it.

Dusan Bjelic: Well I don't really want to put emphasis on "good" one, I just wanted to point out that even if a pirouette is a bad one, or whatever, it has to be learned. And the one who is teaching you provides you with criteria which you can then satisfy by performing. And he satisfies criteria by explaining how to dance. And in another word, when Sacks speaks about certain types of conversation he said: Here is a logical space, or here is a logical ground for this for me to judge that this is a conversation or not. But it doesn't mean that that has to happen in order to prove that Sacks is correct. In other words, if we are talking about criteria as a logical ground, as an inter-grammatical ground, then it is available from different positions. If you can talk about criteria in dancing, then I'm saying it is not only those who are on the stage who are satisfying criteria, but also those who can put those criteria in words, and not be able to dance. They can also satisfy criteria.

Jeff Coulter: For what? For being able to pirouette?

Dusan Bjelic: For pirouette.

Caesar Mavratsas: But pirouette by itself doesn't have any criterion. Doing pirouette, or teaching pirouette.

Dusan Bjelic: Yeah, but do you recognize that? How do you judge that this is a pirouette? You have to have criteria for saying that this is a pirouette. So that is something that a dancer as well as the person who taught her must share the same criteria.

George Psathas: Criteria for recognizing, or is this criteria for doing?

Caesar Mavratsas: Yeah.

Dusan Bjelic: Is that answer?

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Well, criterion 'for the performance of' - somebody can know them, but to be able to know them is not the same as to be

able to do them.

Jeff Coulter: Well, to do- Well here's Garfinkel, right?, who says it very nicely, but I think it's there in Wittgenstein too. To be able to do is to satisfy recognitional criteria. You remember Harold when he says: member's methods for the production of conduct are identical, or isomorphic to the accountability of conduct - is another way of saying that your doing the thing IS satisfying the criteria for its being sayable of you that you've done it.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: There's a way in which that's not true though. For example, if you've worked on any kind of gymnastic equipment - I can tell someone how to do a "cast off hip circle regrasp", I can't do one anymore. And there was a time when I could tell you how to do it, but I couldn't do it myself. I knew what you were supposed to do, but I couldn't make my body do it. And there was something that my body had to learn that I wasn't able to say, that other people could say now to me: "Darleen you have to do this - You're not extending when you pop off the bar." There were things like that that they could say to me, and I didn't know what they meant. I could say them, but I didn't know what that meant as an activity until I did it.

Jeff Coulter: I'm not quite clear how that bears on the issue.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Well, because I think there's a difference between being able to say or describe that there's something that you can do. It's like Dusan's example of the ballet teacher who has her legs broken and can't dance anymore. You can be able to say these are the criteria for something, without now being able to do it. So, because you can say what the criteria are doesn't mean that-

Jeff Coulter: No, not SAYING what the criteria are, SATISFYING the criteria.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Ok, that's a distinction that I think is().

Jeff Coulter: In order for you to say of me that I'm now giving you an exposition of Wittgenstein, which is what I would say I'm doing, I have to satisfy the criteria for you to be able to go away and say of me that "He was giving an exposition of Wittgenstein". That's then what I'm

doing. So I'm only doing that insofar as I satisfy the criteria for your being able to say of me..., for you're being able to TELL what I'm doing. That's what is meant by accountability in Garfinkel. It's not Paul Attewell in "Ethnomethodology Since Garfinkel" where he seems to be saying: Doing interaction is the same as being able to talk about it. That's not what accountability means. It's satisfying recognitional criteria. What Garfinkel is saying is that: If I am doing it then I'm satisfying the criteria such that you can tell I'm doing it.

Dusan Bjelic: So, in other words, you are sort of saying criteria for doing that-

Jeff Coulter: Satisfying not saying. Not stating or listing. Anybody can do that. I can read English; I could read you the criteria out of a book for doing something in a physics lab that if you stick me in a physics lab, I wouldn't know the first thing. I wouldn't recognize a bubble-chamber, for instance. But I am a very good reader of English, and I can even-

[Tr: tape change]

Jeff Coulter(cont.): ... It's not a question of being able to say what they are. In fact, half the point of Ethnomethodology and Wittgenstein is we don't get to say what they are, by and large, as a matter of routine. It's satisfaction that's the issue.

Dusan Bjelic: Right, but the question is satisfaction of which criteria? It seems to me you are talking about satisfaction of criteria for dancing to be satisfaction of criteria for dancing. But I'm saying criteria for pirouette, or for recognition of something as pirouette can be also satisfied by saying, or by explaining how to do that.

Jeff Coulter: No, you might be able to explain to me how to swim, and you might not be able to swim yourself.

Dusan Bjelic: Right, but you satisfy criteria that you can recognize that that is swimming. In other words, you have criteria for recognition of this concept: swimming.

George Psathas: Jeff, (to change) a second. The criteria for doing recognizing - is what he's saying. The criteria for doing recognition work [JC: the criteria for telling what someone is doing] is - There are criteria for doing recognition work, which are not the same as the criteria for doing that which is the recognized activity, say the dancing. The criteria for doing dancing would be the doing of the dance. The criteria for doing the recognition of dancing would be something other than doing the dancing. Because I'm just indicating to you that I can recognize that as a pirouette without being able to do it myself. I admit I can't do it, but I'm able to recognize so that's doing recognition work, which has it's own criteria. They are not the same as the criteria for doing the activity itself. That's what I think he is talking about.

[Insert: Recognizing is not an action, rather it is an achievement. "I recognize him" or "I recognize that..." are achievement claims]

Jeff Coulter: Yeah?

Dusan Bjelic: But then-

George Psathas: Maybe it isn't what he's talking about.

Jeff Coulter: Fine.

[Tr: general laughter]

Dusan Bjelic: But then what is the point? For instance if you have some kind of evidence or recording of teachers telling dancers how to do a step - for instance, she explains in so many words how to do it. For example, "Put your hands far up left", and then gives some specific explanation of how to do that. And then says, for instance "That is a good pirouette", or "That is the pirouette that you're supposed to dance". And then the dancer tries and tries and finally she does exactly as the teacher said. So the action made and the sentences said by the teachers are becoming one. Now what are they now satisfying? Or isn't satisfaction of criteria in some sense identical between what she said and what she did, once now become identical things.

Edith Rosenthal: No, the language gives you the distinction because TO EXPLAIN is an activity [JC: Right], and TO DANCE is an activity. One is doing one and one is doing the other. The answer

is right in the grammar.

Jeff Coulter: Right, and one of the things that you might explain are the criteria for doing pirouettes to someone. It might be PART, only a part, of getting them to be able to pirouette.

Dusan Bjelic: Right, but my point is - it seems to me that the whole business of teaching somebody dance, or training someone in ballet, or anything else, is to achieve a point when what the teacher said and what the student does become identical, or to be that in some sense the doing of the student has satisfied criteria of her sentences.

Jeff Coulter: I'll tell you what's getting at me though. I think it's this - It's an ambiguity around "Tell". I think that this is at the heart of it. Isn't it? Maybe? In some of this? Telling can be discursive telling, like when I tell you. But telling can also be when you can TELL what someone's doing. You can just SEE IT. It's another word for seeing, or hearing, recognizing, knowing that. You can tell. That's the point, you see, and that's where a lot of this mess around Harold Garfinkel/Ethnomethodology exegesis is bogged down. Because when Harold talks about "accountability", it doesn't mean GIVING AN ACCOUNT. [Tr: Garfinkel, H. (1967). STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall] It's not Scott and Lyman on accounts. It's accountability, tellability. It means RECOGNIZABILITY. That's what it means. So criteria for telling - how can you tell what someone is doing, what they are saying, what they mean by what they are saying, did they understand, are they in pain? The telling is in virtue of intersubjective criterial satisfaction. The telling, in the other sense, i.e., discursive exposition, where the words come out of your mouth, of course, presupposes that you can TELL, but now you're telling in this discursive sense. Two quite different things, though very much related. It's important to understand that.

George Psathas: Yeah, but I would make another point, and I think that there's a fallacy in the argument that being able to speak, that is to TELL the other person 'how to', is sufficient to enable them to undertake to do the activity.

Jeff Coulter: Of course not, for most things. Right.

George Psathas: Yeah, for most things it isn't, and I think that dance is a good example where it isn't.

Jeff Coulter: And swimming is a great example.

George Psathas: Yeah, and the other that I've studied was in mobility instruction for the blind, where people have argued that they could tell someone how to do something. But it turns out that there's no way that you can do it without undertaking to observe them in the course of their doing and modifying what they are doing IN the course of their actually doing it, which also reveals how inadequate the telling is for an activity. Not that it's such a complex activity, but for any activity that you undertake to instruct. That there's more to it than the telling someone.

Dave Bogen: Not to belabor this too much, but I see a confusion on the other side of it. I'm not sure whether it's a confusion or not. But not having to deal with the 'knowing that', but the notion of 'knowing how'. That, you might say to somebody: "Do you know how to swim? Do you know how to dance?" - "Yes I do." - That's enough. That's a criterion for having the ability to dance.

Jeff Coulter: Is it?

Dave Bogen: Well, unless somebody says: "Do you know how to dance? "Yes I do." -- "But CAN you dance? Do you have the ability to dance?" -- You can pull off the distinction, and you might under some circumstances use 'knowing how' to conflate the two, or you might pull them apart, if you want more evidence.

Jeff Coulter: 'Do you know what dancing involves?' is very different from 'Do you know how to dance?', which I treat in most contexts as 'Can you dance?', 'Are you able to dance?'.

Dave Bogen: That's what I'm saying.

Jeff Coulter: That's what you're saying? Yeah, sure! Does that go against anything that we've argued?

Dave Bogen: No, but you could equally answer it as a teacher of dancing: "Do you know how to dance?"

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Let's play around with the specific, because 'dancing' may be too big. [DB: I was just trading on the words] "Do you know how to do a pirouette?" "Yes, I know how to do a pirouette. You stick your leg out, you wrap it around like this, you go up on your toe. I know how to do a pirouette." "NOW, can you do one?"

Lena Jayyusi: I don't think we talk this way, though. I don't think we say "Do you know how to do a pirouette?", meaning "Can you tell me?" I think when we say that we mean "Can you do it?"

[Tr: This seems correct with respect to the pirouette question, but consider: "Do you know how to get to the train station?" said to someone on the street, where it's done as a request for directions, as a kind of "Can you tell me?"]

Jeff Coulter: Not "Can you give a defective exhibition of it?".

[Tr: laughter]

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Depending on the context though, yeah? Because I think there are places where you-

Edith Rosenthal: "Do you know how it's done?", you might say.

Lena Jayyusi: But normally this is where we bring in assessments. I think that the (evaluative) question does enter into these things, because [DB: Directly] you can say: "Yes I do know HOW to.", but then the person does a pirouette where (he doesn't really know how to) [DB: Yeah] and that's where we bring in the distinction between a bad and a good pirouette [DB: You don't know how to dance] Yeah! But that's basically a way of assessing better or worse, and we have the criteria for recognizing. But constituting something as an 'x' I think has to do- some of them I think are partly gradable.

Jeff Coulter: Maybe pirouette is an aesthetic concept.

Lena Jayyusi: Driving is one of them, swimming is one of them.

Jeff Stetson: Could we go back to the "how"- "that" distinction? For example, the pirouette has ergonomic aspects about it. One can describe it, but that's not a "how" until the

actual doing of the activity. [JC: Yes] The instructor, the choreographer, would describe: "You lift your foot, you push off with one foot, you rotate your body, you turn your arms in such a direction as to put force so that you rotate."

Jeff Coulter: So that in coming up with that you show that you are able to 'describe'?

Jeff Stetson: Being able to show that this a component of a pirouette is different than the criteria for knowing how to do it.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, sure.

Dave Bogen: No, I think the language disguises that. I think that it's ambiguous in the whole notion of 'knowing how'. I think that it can work both ways.

Edith Rosenthal: You've got three grades there instead of two.

Jeff Coulter: 'Knowing how it goes' is not the same thing as 'knowing how to do it'.

Dave Bogen: Although knowing how to do it can have both senses I still think.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yeah, I'm thinking of the practice floor. You know if I said to somebody "Can you do the cast off hip circle? So you know how to? Do you know how to do a flip?" "Yeah!" "Will you show me how to do a flip?" - entails both concepts.

Jeff Coulter: I'd hear that as a rather poor joke is somebody said to me: "Do you know how to do-" If I said to someone: "DO you know how to do a back-flip?", and they said "SURE!". And I said: "Ok Show me." And they said: "Ok, well it goes like this you see, you lift your legs up and you roll back, and you, and you land on your feet."

[Tr: The assembled group expressed mild amusement at JC's seated demonstration of a back-flip, and then pandemonium broke out, i.e., multiple overlapping un-transcribable voices. And from this pack emerged:]

Dave Bogen: But the context that is applicable is exactly an instructional context, which is the one in which criteria are supposed to be applicable - or one of them.

Jeff Coulter: There's no doubt that people who can't do certain things can give instruction in those things. For example, you get a lot of coaches in basketball who can't really even lift their hands up to get to the basket, who can nonetheless train a good team.

B.J. Fehr: And you could say of them that they know how to play basketball.

Caesar Mavratsas: No.

Jeff Coulter: No.

Caesar Mavratsas: They know how to coach.

George Psathas: No, I think what's missing is that when you talk about instruction, the context part that is missing is that you are instructing a-someone-else. These are the examples that are being provided. And what's being forgotten is that someone-else then has to do something - in the course of some embodied action - to demonstrate that they've understood, and that indeed you know HOW to do a pirouette by virtue of what THEY then do, which is then recognizable AS a pirouette. [JC: Right] Simply to say you know how, and the other person then falls on their face, doesn't demonstrate that you know anything about pirouettes. [JC: Of course, absolutely] So what's left out of the examples is that all the examples of instruction is that there is someone being instructed, and by not including that it's like an easy way of arguing that all you need is to be able to say you know how to teach someone, without having to actually carry through on the doing of the teaching, which would then demonstrate that you DO know how.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: That's it.

Dave Bogen: It's a nice example, but then you have to pull in a third person whose watching this [GP: Sure, whatever], because if you keep it to the two people, then that poor performance could be enough.

George Psathas: Could be I was lying, it wasn't a pirouette I was teaching you - or whatever - it was the arabesque, or something.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, but be careful now. It's not just ramifying the numbers of personnel that's the issue. It's whether they actually instantiate the criteria.

Lena Jayyusi: That, in fact (in the) context, in regard to the point you were making, I think conventionally that's where the passive voice is used. We don't say "Do you know how to do it?" unless we're asking "Do you know how it's done?", or "Do you know how one would do such a thing?". And this is a way of conventionally distinguishing one usage from another. When you say "Do you know how to do a pirouette?", we mean "Can you do one?". Otherwise we would say "Do you know how it's done?" - basically.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah! We solved that one! Right? Next question. [Tr: peals of laughter from the group] No? [Tr: in all innocence] As Wittgenstein said, can't we get some solutions?

[Tr: more pandemonium]

Isamu Kamada: Wittgenstein distinguishes 'to know something' and 'to express how to do it'. [Tr: There is still some ambient discussion as background to Isamu which may or may not be related to his talk]

Jeff Coulter: But sometimes to be able to explain something is a criterion for knowing it.

Isamu Kamada: But, showing that you can DO IT may be a spurious criteria.

Jeff Coulter: It depends what it is. If it's knowing the capital city of so-and-so, or if it's - It depends what the object of knowledge is. Don't forget the general distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'.

Isamu Kamada: Ok, another question. Could you explain a little bit more about what you said that the criterion argument can defeat skepticism? How can you say that?

Jeff Coulter: Because the skeptic must use concepts which have criteria that are intersubjectively available in the first place, and by then trying radically to doubt the applicability of those very concepts, ends in self-contradiction. If, that is, the concepts are criterially governed,

and not just per impossible things that have contingent symptoms.

Jeff Coulter: Let's pick up the skepticism stuff next time, because I want to get on to ON CERTAINTY. We can talk about ON CERTAINTY which connects with this stuff. - Please have a look at the two Hacker pieces - it's most instructive. Compare and contrast the two Hacker chapters, the 1972 and the 1986. Most helpful.

TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

These transcriptions were prepared from an audio recording, the auditory quality of which was not always optimal. Participating members, especially Jeff Coulter, have reviewed initial drafts of the transcripts and have attempted to clarify portions that were particularly difficult to hear, and also provided assistance in correcting errors in transcription that were made during the production of the first draft of each session. The generous assistance of all those involved is gratefully acknowledged. Particular appreciation goes out to Jeff Stetson who took on the laborious task of copy-editing. Unfortunately, not all errors in transcription, and not all inaudible portions could be corrected given the time lag in producing the transcriptions. The transcriber apologizes for any remaining typographical errors.

The following are conventions employed in producing the transcriptions of these meetings:

[x] square brackets: Text in square brackets is for the most part that of the transcriber. Such text is indicated by "Tr:" at the beginning of the brackets. It includes: 1. paraphrases of talk, 2. clarification of indefinite references, for example pointing, drawing or writing on the chalk-board, producing a behavioral display etc., 3. information about references to texts referred to in the talk, 4. other general remarks and clarifications

and 5. indications of omissions and tape changes. PLEASE NOTE that there is almost always some bit of talk missing at the points of tape change.

On occasion, comments in square brackets are insertions offered by those who have edited the text and are indicated as such by the initials of the person in question, e.g., [JC: xxxxxxxxx].

Also, if additions or deletions are made in text quoted during the class, then these changes are noted in square brackets, with the speakers initials included within the brackets.

- { x } braces: Text in braces is the talk of persons who are commenting on or responding to the talk of another person who currently has the floor. This talk is introduced by the initials of the person making the remark and/or comment, e.g., {JC: xxxx}.
- (x) parentheses surrounding text: Text in parentheses is the transcriber's best guess as to what was being said when there is some doubt about exactly what was said due to the poor auditory quality of the tape.
- () empty parentheses: Parentheses containing no text indicate a portion of the talk which is not transcribable due to the poor auditory quality of the tape, although it is possible to tell that something was being said.

CAPITALIZATION: Capitalization is used to indicate titles (or partial titles, e.g.: INVESTIGATIONS for the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS) for books. It is also used to indicate vocal emphasis by the speaker in question, i.e., something which is spoken noticeably louder, or with more emphasis than the surrounding talk. It was not possible to underline text in the editing/text-formating system employed, which is why capitalization rather than underlining was used in the above cases. This also influenced the formating of terms in languages other than English, e.g.: Ubersicht, vis-a vis, etc, which are neither capitalized, nor underlined, although occasionally are explicated in square brackets following the text in question.