

[coulw8.001. Tr.:BJF. 31 August 90: edited version] Transcription conventions can be found on the last 2-3 pages of each transcript.

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WITTGENSTEIN AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Meeting 8: 19 March 87.

TOPICS: 'THE SAME', 'PAIN';
Criteria; following a rule; private
language argument; grammar and nature.

READING: Malcolm, N. (1963). Wittgenstein's
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. In N. Malcolm
KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY: ESSAYS AND LECTURES
(pp. 96-129). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Reprinted in: G. Pitcher (Ed.) WITTGENSTEIN: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (pp. 65-103).
Page references in the following transcript
are from this reprinted version.
This essay is also reprinted in H. Morick (Ed.)
(1967). WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PROBLEM OF
OTHER MINDS. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Jeff Coulter: I've been handing out the
Malcolm article: "Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations", which is an overview of a number
of themes that we have actually touched on so far.
The focus is on the relationship between language
and experience, particularly in experience:
sensations, feelings, moods, and so forth. And it
has an account, which is a rather elementary
account, but it's a useful reminder, of the

anti-private-language argument. It has a discussion of rules, expressions and descriptions, criteria, and it also attempts to rebut some early criticisms made by Strawson, who is another quite well known analytic philosopher - criticisms of Wittgenstein by Strawson. And there is a brief passage or two on 'forms of life'.

What I thought we might look at for a while was the section - or rather not so much look at this, but spin off of it - the section on the "the same", the concept of 'the same', something as being the 'same' as something else. It starts on page 70. of the xerox.

And Malcolm discusses this issue in relationship to the problem of knowing when one is experiencing the same sensation - which is a topic in Wittgenstein's discussion of experience. Where the issue here is that 'sameness', or 'identity' can be thought of, pretheoretically, as something UNproblematically, immediately obvious. Namely, that if something is the same as something else, then it is self-evidently so. Particularly in the case of one's own experiences.

One wants to say 'Surely there can't be a difficulty in knowing whether a feeling of mine is or isn't the SAME as the feeling I now have. I will call this feeling "pain" and will thereafter call the SAME thing "pain" whenever it occurs. What could be easier than to follow that rule?' [Tr: Malcolm, p. 70; emphasis in the original]

'Seeing the same thing again', 'having the same pain', 'hearing the same word', 'doing the same thing', 'describing something in the same way'. The issue is that "identity" appears to be something that belongs to the bedrock of existence. Something is the same, is identical, then it is, so to speak, 'given' that it is so.

Wittgenstein in the PI [Tr: PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS], paragraph 216:

216. "A thing is identical with itself." - There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in imagination

we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted.

We might also say: "Every thing fits into itself." Or again: "Every thing fits into its own shape." At the same time we look at a thing and imagine that there was a blank left for it, and that now it fits into it exactly. [Tr: PI, paragraph 216]

But note 215. [Tr: paragraph 215. in the PI], where the issue of 'sameness' is raised very pointedly. It starts out:

215. But isn't THE SAME at least the same?

We seem to have an infallible paradigm of identity in the identity of a thing with itself. I feel like saying: "Here at any rate there can't be a variety of interpretations. If you are seeing a thing you are seeing identity too." [Tr: PI, paragraph 215]

If you are seeing a thing, you are seeing that it is the same thing as itself. Then Wittgenstein asks:

Then are two things the same when they are what ONE thing is? And how am I to apply what the ONE thing shews me to the case of two things? [Tr: PI, paragraph 215]

What do you make of all that, 215 and 216? Any comments?

[Tr: pause]

Are two things the same when they are what one thing is?

Caesar Mavratsas: I mean that means that they will never be the same, because they can never be what one thing is.

Jeff Coulter: But that's the same as that.
[Tr: JC holds up two matches]

Caesar Mavratsas: Yeah.

Jeff Coulter: That's a match, and that's a match.

Dave Bogen: Yeah, but one is in your left hand, and one is in your right hand.

Jeff Coulter: Right. You can say either that they are the same, or that they are different. So, it's not that you can be looking at the ONE THING, and now, in some sense, using its intrinsic properties, to find that it is the same as THIS thing, in virtue of ITS intrinsic properties, because IT is the same as itself. The argument being that - and you can surely hear it bubbling up - that 'sameness' is context-dependent and purpose-relative. What is the same as something else depends upon your purposes of discrimination, and classification, and the context of your practices.

First of all, 'sameness' has an implicit contrast to 'difference'. And if one wants to say that one thing is the same as something else, that presupposes a criterion whereby a difference can be ruled out. And now we are immediately into the business of the difference between "relevant" difference and "irrelevant" difference. So that in making adjudications of 'sameness', it seems as if in the case of ONE thing it's done criterionLESSly. It seems as if 'This is the same as itself.' is a criterionless judgment, but, of course, there is NO context, outside of a certain metaphysics, in which one wants to say that something is the same as itself. So, language would be idling completely if I were to assert, and, in fact, Wittgenstein would probably say it's not even an assertion, it's language idling, if I wanted to say: "This match-stick is the same as itself". And yet, of course, one has that picture that 'sameness' is maximally, so to speak, predicable of just one thing.

All right, so, the argument then is that assessments of 'sameness' and 'difference' are susceptible to judgments in respect of purposes and contexts of practice - or "relevance structures", if you want to use the Schutzian language. And in that sense, he begins to attack the notion that PHENOMENA in the world, WHILE we may talk about GRAMMAR providing us with what the phenomena in the

world might be, there's something in the world independent of grammar that's going to tell us what is the same as something else, and what is different from something else, and all grammar does is to reflect that somehow. That sameness and difference are given, and grammar simply REFLECTS the way that sameness and difference is pre-existently, pre-independently provided for. So, that grammar, so to speak, therefore is still, according to THAT conception of the concepts of 'sameness' and 'difference', grammar is a reflection of a pre-existing ORDER, and NOT, as Wittgenstein is insisting upon arguing, the reverse. Namely, that whatever order, or whatever ways in which we classify, characterize, etc., is a function of the grammar that we, as a species, develop.

In the context of the "private-language" discussion, this becomes very pointed, because the notion of a self-evident, self-emanating 'sameness' is very powerful. And it appears to be the idea that we are the sovereigns with respect to what counts as the $n+1$ th same occurrence of a pain. That thereby compels in some way - thereby can compel us - to use the word correctly in any next occasion. Because it's the same pain, we can use the same word, and we know it's the same pain because the 'sameness' of the pain is given self-evidently to us. And what Wittgenstein wants to propose is that that is, in fact, NOT the case - though it's a very powerful intuition that he is trying to combat.

And Malcolm's discussion here, I think, would have been helpful if he'd introduced it in relationship to the general issue of 'sameness' and 'grammar' - 'sameness' and 'difference' and 'grammar'. Because it is GRAMMAR that provides for the functioning criteria in context FOR judgments of 'sameness' and 'difference', rather than 'nature' that provides GRAMMAR with its necessary ways of carving-up nature.

And we can tell that someone has made, what for us are, as the communication community, the correct judgments about 'sameness', in virtue of what they do and say, and in the circumstances in which they do and say what they do and say. So, it's not as if one can posit, so to speak, in ADVANCE of someone's conduct in its circumstances, the 'sameness' of their experience, on the grounds that they have experienced that experience before. In other words, it's not that someone's having had an experience ONCE now provides them with an

infallible criterion of identity for the recurrence of that experience such THAT we're prepared to accord to them ultimate sovereignty INDEPENDENTLY of any other aspects of their behavior, and of their circumstances.

So, for example, if I say: "I'm experiencing a tickle", or "a case of nausea", and you know of me that I have experienced these things before in circumstances where you'd be perfectly prepared to accord me the right to claim that, but IN THIS CASE, I don't appear to be behaving in any way in accord with the criteria for having that experience predicable of me, then the fact that I claimed to know what I mean because I have had it before, and this is the same thing, doesn't necessarily win the day. In other words, the argument is: one has to live-up to the criteria for successful predication on EACH occasion for the claim to be experiencing 'the same thing', even if it is like right inside me - or right inside you - to hold good.

Caesar Mavratsas: But what if you have learned to tolerate pain, and say that you experience ONCE a pain, and you are not used to that kind of pain, and you act very weirdly. And then the next time that the same pain occurs, you are in a better position to tolerate it, and not behave in the way you behaved the first time?

Jeff Coulter: That would have to be what one would call 'a fall-back account', and that would stand as a way of over-ruling the operability of some criterion.

Let's introduce the whole business of "criteria" in a systematic way, because it is much misunderstood, and it is also discussed nicely in Malcolm. A criterion of 'sameness' of pain - let's talk about pain because that is Malcolm's example - as an experience. The argument remember in Wittgenstein is that criteria are not contingently connected to experiences - public criteria. They are not contingently connected to experiential judgments. They are connected to experiential judgments as their grounds of justification. And there is a whole array of diverse kinds of things that count as criteria for the various predicates. In regard to something like 'pain', or 'hope', or 'thinking', or 'having an image', the very avowal, the very claim to be having an image, to be in pain, to have a thought, and so on, are part of the criteria that justify the ascription. But we know full well, and it is part of mastering the language of experience, we know full well that people can

make avowals of pain, and of hoping and of thinking, and of this and that, when in fact they are not in pain, and they are not hoping, and they are not thinking, and they are not having an image. This does not mean that the avowals of these matters are not criteria. What it means is that they alone, they taken by themselves, whilst they are indeed criteria of justification, are not criteria which guarantee the correctness of the judgment. They are, in other words, to use a term Wittgenstein doesn't employ but which he clearly was alert to, they are "defeasible". There are defeasible criteria for pain, and sameness of pain; image, and sameness of image; thought, and sameness of thought. Meaning they are defeatable. But the way in which a criterion for a judgment of sameness of pain, of sameness of experience, is defeated is itself criterially bound. In other words, the public criteria are criterially defeasible. In other words, not any old thing will grammatically count as a successful overthrow of an 'apparent' criterial satisfaction. So, in the case of judgments of sameness of pain, or of sameness of thought, or image, or whatever, one of the things that is a criterion is the avowal of it. So that the avowal of pain is itself a criterion for being in pain. No doubt about it. In fact it is in Wittgenstein's analysis acquired as a substitute for the pre-linguistic expressions of pain, not as a descriptive locution. Ok, so, saying "I am in pain" then is a criterion for being in pain. But we know that one can lie about the matter. One can be engaged in playacting. One can be actually in a play, and so on. So that criterion is defeasible. In fact ALL criteria are defeasible. Like going like "AWKaaaW!" That's defeasible. I'm not in pain, and yet I may seem to satisfy a public criterion for having a stabbing pain in my left side.

Now, how are these things over-ruleable? They are not over-ruleable in any old way. There are, in other words, standards or criteria for defeating other criteria. The argument then is basically that the criteria are not contingently connected to the judgments in the sense that it just so happens that somebody could say he's in pain when he's in pain, and his saying so has no necessary relationship to his being in pain; it's merely contingent. He could say anything and still be in pain. It's not like that. But neither is it a strictly deductive relationship, or a relationship of entailment. So, that if I say "I am in pain", that entails that I'm in pain. It's something called a 'criterial relationship', which is neither

pure contingency, nor strict entailment or deducibility. A criterial relationship is a relationship of conventionally good evidence for justifying the claim. And all criteria are defeasible, BUT the defeasibility of any criterion is itself governed by criteria. So, a claim about the sameness of something is governed by criteria. There are ways in which, when I hold up these two matches, I can ask you "Give me the same thing", or "Say the same thing". And you'd say what I just said. And then somebody can find a way in which it is not the same thing, partly because I said it first, and then you said it, and you are not me. The ways in which these criteria bounded judgments are defeated are themselves criterially governed. And one of the things you just did is to instantiate a criterion for defeating a criterion. But the thing is that criteria are not indefinite, and not infinite either, otherwise there would be no stability or orderliness to grammar.

Right. Back to 'the same' and then we'll take some comments.

The argument that Wittgenstein goes into about 'sameness' and judgments of 'sameness' has to do with the whole business of following a rule. As he puts it in paragraph 225. in the PI:

225. The use of the word "rule" and the use of the word "same" are interwoven. (As are the use of "proposition" and the use of "true".)

226. Suppose someone gets the series of numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, by working out the series $2x + 1$. And now he asks himself: "But am I always doing the same thing, or something different every time?"

If from one day to the next you promise: "To-morrow I will come and see you" - are you saying the same thing every day, or every day something different?

227. Would it make sense to say "If he did something DIFFERENT every day we should not say he was obeying a rule"? That makes NO sense. [Tr: PI, paragraphs 225., 226., and 227.]

What I think this means is that obeying a rule, or

following a rule, IS doing the same thing, but now the question is what counts as the same thing?

Caesar Mavratsas: Following the rule.

Jeff Coulter: Yes. Yes. There has got to be a sense in which one can satisfy the judgment that the practice, or the operation, is being done in the same way. But nothing in the rule lays down in advance what is to count as going-on in the SAME way. Nothing in the statement of the rule. So, from some standpoints, or by certain standards, for certain purposes, one can say that there are quite wide varieties of different things people can be doing and still following the rule, the same rule.

The thing then that Wittgenstein is saying in noting the conceptual connection between the concept of 'rule' and the concept of 'sameness' is NOT, as it has often been misunderstood to mean, that in following a rule you are doing something by rote, or by repetition, or by strict- or you are reproducing 'simulacra' of the thing previously done. That is not a necessary part of what it is to follow a rule. But neither does the rule specify in advance HOW you are to make the judgments of 'sameness' or 'difference' in respect to the thing that consists in following the rule.

Page 72. in Malcolm:

It is easy to suppose that when you have given a person the order 'Now do the SAME thing,' you have pointed out to him the way to go on. But consider the example of the man who obtains the series 1, 3, 5, 7 ... by working out the formula $2x + 1$ and then asks himself, "Am I always doing the same thing, or something different every time?" (226.) One answer is as good as the other; it doesn't matter which he says, so long as he continues in the right way. If we could not observe his work, his mere remark 'I am going on in the same way' would not tell us what he was doing. If a child writing down a row of 2's obtained '2, 2, 2' from the segment '2, 2' by adding '2' once, he might deny that he had gone on in the SAME way. He might declare that it would be doing the same thing only if he went from '2, 2' to '2, 2, 2, 2' in ONE jump, i.e., only if he DOUBLED the

original segment (just as it doubled the original '2'). That could strike one as a REASONABLE use of 'same'. This connects up with Wittgenstein's remark: "If you have to have an intuition in order to develop the series 1 2 3 4 ... you must also have one in order to develop the series 2 2 2 2 ..." (214). One is inclined to say of the latter series, 'Why, all that is necessary is that you keep on doing the SAME thing'. But isn't this just as true of the other series? In both cases one has already DECIDED what the correct continuation is, and one calls that continuation, and no other, 'doing the same thing'. As Wittgenstein says: "One might say to the person one was training: 'Look, I always do the same thing: I ...'" (223). And then one proceeds to show him what 'the same' IS. [Malcolm, pp. 72-73]

So, one of the arguments here is that for a whole array of things in the world, 'sameness' is something that is MOST unobtrusive to the perceiver. 'Sameness' is something that you have to be drilled to recognize; you have to be trained in. And that goes as well for being able to tell when you have 'the same' pain, though that sounds tremendously counter-intuitive. And yet it isn't. Or rather, it is counter-intuitive, but it happens to be right.

As Wittgenstein says: "...isn't THE SAME at least the same?" [Tr: PI, paragraph 215]. I mean haven't we hit bedrock here. Isn't there something outside of grammar, for God's sake? Do we have to be talking about training, and language-games, and judgments, and grammar, and concepts. I mean isn't that just sort of given? The answer is, in very significant respects: Absolutely not at all! Absolutely not at all. 'Same' contrasts with 'difference' - 'Same' and 'difference' are dimensions of judgment; dimensions of judgment are learned in learning the language-games. And there are different criteria for making these determinations depending upon the language-games in question. And the criteria are defeasible, but when they are defeated, they are criterially defeated.

Again, part of the notion of the autonomy of grammar.

Dave Bogen: I just wanted to return for a second to the issue of pain and private language. It seemed listening to your presentation, that what Malcolm is saying is that our strong intuitions concerning a private language are something like a fetishization of certain criteria, i.e., self-avowals of pain, or something like that. Yet it would seem that, on the other hand, self-avowals, for instance, are not criterially weighted equally with other, say, aspects of expressing pain. If this is so, then self-avowals might have to be weighted more heavily. And indeed if you track it back, then I think the counter-intuitive move to me is when it is asserted that you don't need to be trained in pain in order to feel pain, it seems. {JC: sure} You need to be trained in language in order to acquire the CONCEPT of pain.

Jeff Coulter: And in order to TELL when the pain is the same.

Dave Bogen: In order to tell when the pain is the same. {JC: right} Which is different than the feeling of pain. {JC: Absolutely} Ok.

Jeff Coulter: Of course there is no training in feeling pain.

Dave Bogen: All right. So, but then if I want to talk about pain, I'm forced to put it in quotes, and take up the concept. {JC: yes} All right. So there can be the private feeling without the private language?; that's the notion, right? So, the two are separated out.

Jeff Coulter: But then remember that the private feeling is not the radically Cartesian privacy of feeling. The private feeling is the same as when it's simply like when one can play Patience by oneself. One can be isolated, alone. There need be no others present, so to speak. But that's not Cartesian privacy that is being attacked here. That's the notion of the feeling that only you can have and know you have.

Dave Bogen: But I have the feeling that the 'forms of life' discussion that we had last time is going to haunt a little bit for the rest of the term, because it seems to me that if now when Malcolm talks about Wittgenstein's point that criteria are not CONTINGENTLY connected to concepts

- He talks about them as ESSENTIALLY connected to concepts, which is different than his justifications. {JC: yes}. Now if you talk about them, on the other hand, as justifications, then with the issue of 'pain' you get into the situation where somebody could continue to make the self-avowal of pain, and it doesn't seem to be a defeasible criterion. Right? If they are adamant about their pain? Right? When is it defeasible? In what way would it be a defeasible claim? It seems to have more weight than that, unless you just say they are insane, for instance. You know, they have a history of not understanding their own bodily feelings, or something like that. But it has this more weighty character, and it doesn't occur as a justification, but seems to be essentially bound-up with the various tolerances of the concept of pain.

Jeff Coulter: Well the thing is that someone else might say, I suppose, that like: If there are NO other criteria satisfied except the adamant first-person avowal, then you have now like a decision to make as to whether or not to treat the thing charitably, or to postulate something like, I don't know, psychosomatic illness, or, I suppose the phantom limb here is a good example, where people can say that they have a pain, and it's in their leg, even though their leg has been amputated. And if they go on long enough, then instead of saying "No you're crazy", we construct this notion of the phantom limb in order to accommodate the apparent sincerity of their avowal.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: But it's not just based off of a purely individual self-avowal, right? That decision as to whether that is an adequate claim or not is not made only in reference to the self-avowal, it's made in reference to an array of other things, for instance that we have had access to other patients who have had reports of pain where they have lost limbs. We also take into consideration what we think of that person, and in what situations those kinds of claims are being made. So, it's not like then anywhere and everywhere a self-avowal is now going to be weighted. It's again a contextual matter.

Jeff Coulter: There is also a sense in which you can conjure up this picture of the avowal "I am in pain". And it's not really just that, it's not just the avowal. It's the avowal AND things like the facial expression, things like whether or not it impedes your functioning, things like whether you get up out of bed in the morning, etc. Even

though there may be no groans, and no clutchings, and none of the other things. The notion of the avowal in and of itself is something of an artificial one anyway, isn't it? Even in the way we have been setting it up. Because the avowal really doesn't just come as a bunch a words from somebody's mouth; it comes out of a mouth, and a face, and a body that is in some difficulty. I mean if somebody were simply to sit here and say: "I am in tremendous pain" [Tr: said in a monotone]. It doesn't work. So there is tonality and all of those features involved in it.

George Psathas: You could have a machine speaking it.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah. Yeah.

But none of that goes against the notion that claiming to be in pain is a defeasible criterion of being in pain. Including your remarks.

Let's have a look at the bottom of 73 [Tr: page 73. of Malcolm]

The point to be made here is that when one has given oneself the private rule "I will call this same thing "pain" whenever it occurs,' one is then free to do anything or nothing. That 'rule' does not point in any direction. On the private-language hypothesis, no one can teach me what the correct use of 'same' is. I shall be the sole arbiter of whether this is the SAME as that. What I choose to call the 'same' will BE the same. No restriction whatever will be imposed upon my application of the word. But a sound that I can use AS I PLEASE is not a WORD.

How would you teach someone the meaning of 'same'? By example and practice: you might show him, for instance, collections of the same colors and same shapes and make him find and produce them ...

And, of course, these collections of same colors and same shapes are SAME in virtue of the criteria that the grammar-using community of socializers has available.

..and make him find and produce them and

perhaps get him to carry on a certain ornamental pattern uniformly (208). Training him to form collections and produce patterns is teaching him what Wittgenstein calls "techniques". Whether he has mastered various techniques determines whether he understands 'same'. The exercise of a technique is what Wittgenstein calls a "practice". Whether your pupil has understood any of the rules that you have taught him (e.g., the rule; this is the 'same' color as that) will be shown in his practice. But now there cannot be a 'private' practice, i.e., a practice that cannot be exhibited. For there would then be no distinction between believing that you have that practice and having it. 'Obeying a rule' is itself a practice. "And to THINK one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately'; otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it" (202. cf. 380). [Tr: Malcolm, pp. 73-74]

And that is the argument we have come across before.

I thought it was worthwhile reconnecting the criteria argument, and grammar argument to this business of 'sameness', because it's a good way in which to speak about the matter of grammar and nature, and their relationship. The notion that somehow grammar 'represents' the world in virtue of the way the world is independently of grammar. One way in which that's been argued is to note that: Well 'sameness' and 'difference' is given independently of grammar. What Wittgenstein is here saying is that is not the case. It's grammar, i.e., the practices and the rules of the language-games that provide for the criteria that enable you to make the judgments, that are purpose-dependent and context-dependent, about 'sameness' and 'difference'. But that's a very tricky one to really get your head into, because there is something tremendously 'same-y' about things being the SAME, right? I mean what the hell could there be different than things being the same? Right? You can see it. But it's rather like the illusion of seeing that that wall is white, you can see the whiteness of the wall, and it's the bloody whiteness of the wall that provides for how it is you call it "white". No, it isn't,

according to Wittgenstein. In a sense it isn't. The wall does not tell you to call it "white", anymore than the same two objects tell you... That whole business again of the relationship between grammar and nature.

Of course, nobody is saying that experiences, and the existence of an independent natural world, are themselves grammatical fictions. Nobody is saying that. It's a phenomenological argument in exactly the same way that the crass, early critiques of Husserl argued that he was an idealist insofar as he argued that consciousness constitutes the world. Many people thought: that's Berkeley, that's Bishop Berkeley. No. No more is Wittgenstein saying that there is no independent nature, and that it is all a grammatical illusion. What he is saying, though, is that: What that nature is, how it is to be incorporated and made intelligible into OUR human species practices is a matter of grammar. And grammar is autonomous.

Ed Parsons: Isn't it, to a certain extent, dependent on the world, when he talks about, in one of the paragraphs, about how an object doesn't keep changing its shape, and this table doesn't turn into something different, and in the next minute something different, and so on.? So, isn't 'sameness', and all that, relating back to the form of life, is, in fact, somewhat dependent on the world as it is given? [Tr: pause] Does he have to divorce it completely, or make it completely autonomous?

Caesar Mavratsas: Pitkin says that there is a dialectical relationship between language and the world. That would be one way to do that. [Tr: pause] And the point about the arrows, that arrows come from practices, and from hunting, and things like that, which have to do with properties of the world.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, these are FACTS about the world, that it doesn't vanish and come back again, and that you can call things the 'same' and 'different', and that they are 'hard'... These are facts about the world. But they are facts about the world only GIVEN a conceptual system. You can only have a fact in a conceptual system. So, to be able to state facts, presupposes the conceptual apparatus within which you can state what the facts are. A thing, an event, an object, is not a fact. A fact is a true statement about...

Dave Bogen: But you don't need to - just to follow this line - you don't need to be able to state, or make propositions or assertions about the thing in order to use it, in order for its tolerances to be usable. The sort of 'knowing how' aspects of things, versus the 'knowing that'. {JC: mm mhm, right.} So, in Caesar's terms, there seems to be, with the arrow example, something in here you would use 'natural' in the sense of 'of-courseness', natural to the trajectory of certain conceptual arrays, or something like that.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, that's right. You see it's tricky. I don't like this "dialectical" business. I'll tell you why. Because 'dialectical', the concept 'dialectical' explains it all, and so we really don't get down to detail. But that doesn't mean there is nothing to it. The issue is that there is no doubt about it that THE WORLD, so to speak, has got to have some constancies for any conceptual system to work. That is something we have to posit. And human nature has to have- like we have to have a certain kind of memory capacity, certain sorts of perceptual capacities, and the rest of it, for us to have any conceptual apparatus at all. But it is surprisingly limited, when you read Wittgenstein, and he does make these references to the role of THE WORLD in relation to OUR GRAMMAR, it's a surprisingly limited kind of a role that he invokes for it, compared to its role in other philosophies. Because the sorts of appeals that one wants to make to those things that are seen to constrain grammar are the most, as he calls it, the most GENERAL facts of nature, the most general facts of nature. Whereas the identifiability of a pain, or something's being the same as something else, might appear to belong to those GENERAL facts of nature, it turns out that they belong to language.

Edith Rosenthal: So grammar is primarily self-referential? It's going around.

[Tr: pause]

Jeff Coulter: I don't think we want to say that really. In any case, the grammar of concepts is not just the grammar of referring expressions. The language is a tool box.

Edith Rosenthal: But I mean as compared to referring to nature.

Jeff Coulter: No, you can use concepts to refer to things. Absolutely. {ER: yeah} You can use concepts to refer to things. The meaning of the concepts that you use in referring expressions, however, is not the things that you refer to with their use.

Edith Rosenthal: Say that again.

Jeff Coulter: The meaning of the concepts that you use to refer to things is not the 'reference'. The meaning of 'table' is not that [Tr: JC knocks on the table].

Eileen Crist: But a logician would agree with that also.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah. Yeah.

Eileen Crist: That's not a problem.

Jeff Coulter: Some would.

Caesar Mavratsas: Well, that's what Frege said.

Jeff Coulter: Frege? {CM: yeah} Right. Frege made a clear distinction between 'sense' and 'reference'. {CM: yeah} Sure.

Edith Rosenthal: It's sound. It's a symbolic sound. An accepted symbolic sound.

Jeff Coulter: What is?

Edith Rosenthal: Table. The word.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah.

Edith Rosenthal: It is not this [Tr: pointing to table].

Jeff Coulter: No. It's meaning is not this [Tr: pointing to table].

Caesar Mavratsas: That's the reference?

Jeff Coulter: Yes, if you like, that's the referent. But then what is the referent? The table is the referent.

Caesar Mavratsas: Yes. It's the thing that it stands for in this particular case.

Jeff Coulter: Yes, so what's the meaning?
We've not got into what the meaning is yet.

Caesar Mavratsas: But that's not the meaning.

Jeff Coulter: Right. Right.

Remember the limits of ostension, that whole argument about ostension, i.e., the indication, the pointing, the pointing out. It's THIS. It's very important that discussion, because, in other words, the use of a SAMPLE as a part of the learning the names for things, presupposes a whole bunch of language already into which it can now fit as a sample, and it can be understood that what you're doing is giving IT a name. And now WHAT are you giving the name? When you say this is a book, are you trying to instruct someone that "book" means 'square object'? Are you instructing them that it means 'black and blue with white things on' object? etc. In order to understand how ostension can work, you have already got to assume quite a significant amount of training and mastery of language for ostension to work. So the connection between language and reality, so to speak, or language and what is to be represented by the use of language cannot be guaranteed through the processes of ostension. That is not how language connects to the world, so to speak. ...

[Tr: tape change]

Dusan Bjelic: ... [Tr(class notes): Baker and Hacker make a distinction between grammar, reality and language] that we have some kind of content() set between 'world for itself' and 'world of ideas'. But it's rather those two worlds meet in the language. And also it's not that dialectical relationship between 'mind' and 'nature'. But it's rather a meeting point. And it seems to me that criteria is exactly that knot where grammar and reality meets. It is that where they are on the same place.

Jeff Coulter: Let's say "nature" instead of "reality",

Dusan Bjelic: Nature, all right.

Jeff Coulter: The natural world. Because 'reality' is not the name of a place. That already invokes the old metaphysics. That's how Winch can say: what is real and what is unreal belongs to language. It belongs to grammar.

In giving the criteria for the use of a concept, you- in justifying the use of a concept, you have to make sure that the criteria are satisfied in order properly to justify a use, or an application of a concept. And that means being able to 'tell' certain things about the world. What Wittgenstein argues though is that the PRACTICE of justifying, or giving criteria, can RUN OUT. That it's not as if you can go on indefinitely giving reasons. In other words there are rules that govern the specification of criteria. As he puts it: At the end of reasons, your spade is turned, and then you hit bedrock. And you simply have to turn around and say this is simply how we speak and think. And it is significant that he says that: This is how we speak and think, rather than this is how the world actually is. Because all that would be, saying "this is how the world actually is", would be a dogmatic assertion that our conceptual grammar is the CORRECT one in some absolute sense. But neither, and here is where he encounters a problem, neither does he want to say: This is how the world is FOR US. Or this is just OUR grammar. He doesn't want to say that either, because that would seem to imply that there could be WHOLLY alternative intelligibility systems. And that's ruled out; that's completely ruled out. Because the concept of 'intelligibility', the concepts of 'sense' and 'nonsense' belong to GRAMMAR. Now you could say the grammar is our grammar in the sense that it is the human species grammar, but that is just a tautology. That's part of what it means to talk about grammar. So, actually there is some good discussions where Wittgenstein tries to, like, imagine how our concepts of measurement might be different if we had flaccid rulers, and objects that changed their shape and size - in the REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS - and how we might have different concepts. He can't press the Gedanken experiments very far. And it is very significant that he can't do it. Because he wants to be doing two things at once. He wants to be trying to make sense out of something radically different, and yet noting that there is a sense in which it is nonsense, and he can't do it. Because there are LIMITS to what you can mean by 'measurement'. And there are limits to what you can mean by 'sense' and what you mean by 'nonsense', and there are limits to the sorts of things that you produce as justifications, and all the rest of it. So, what you continually find in reading this stuff about grammar is the way in which you feel that you have sort of gone outside of it somehow, and captured something outside of

it, and, of course that is part of the phenomenological illusion of thinking about these things because, of course, there is a sense in which - right - there are things to capture, and hold, and see and touch. Nobody wants to deny that. The issue is though when you are talking about the intelligibility of phenomena, and then you are talking about the satisfaction of criteria for conceptualizing phenomena, you are doing so all within grammar. There is a point at which as you are specifying criteria, you can go no further.

Jeff Stetson: Can I bring up an issue about the 'sameness', about that phantom limb? Can we call that similar to the conceptual innovation of 'invisible light'? A phantom limb can have a number of 'reasons'. For example, physiologists say that nerve endings are tricking you. Psychologists say the patient is unwilling to accept the loss of the limb, and so on. The 'phantom limb' concept seems to be satisfying certain 'cause'. You get to the end of 'reason', and you have 'cause', perhaps, the phantom limb, something unexplainable. Kind of replacing something, similar to the invisible light, replacing something that is the same but is not there.

Jeff Coulter: It's an alteration of the criteria. It's exactly analogous. [Tr: pause] Well, actually, NO. It's not an alteration of the criterion, it's an EXTENSION. It is an extension of the concept of 'pain'. We now accept that you can be said to have 'pains' in limbs that don't exist. By family resemblance analogizing, you can now say that. In the same sort of way you can say now things like 'invisible light', and it has a meaning now, it has a use. Yeah, exactly right. Right, it's an extension of the concept, because we now have a new criterion. We accept it. I mean there might have been a world in which we wouldn't. We'd simply lock him up. "You're crazy. You can't have a pain in an area that doesn't exist." We didn't do that.

Dave Bogen: This is an off point, but that's an extension 'phantom limb', whereas 'invisible light' is an alteration, yeah, in a certain sense.

Jeff Coulter: Pain in non-existing part...

Dave Bogen: Is an extension.

Jeff Coulter: Is an extension like 'invisible light' is an extension.

Dave Bogen: In 'invisible light', in that pairing, the irony of the placement of the two terms consists in our taking light to be visible. Isn't the 'invisible light' formulation - this is just a small point - rather than being an extension, isn't it a candidate reconstruction of the concept of 'light'? Because otherwise we can't hear it as intelligible, nor hear its sense as ironic. That is, the concept of 'invisible light' is either heard as a reconstruction of the concept of 'light', or as non-sensical.

Jeff Coulter: Well we were prepared to extend the concept of light to cover electromagnetic phenomena that were not visible, because we already had an electromagnetic theory of light. So it's extension.

The argument that Wittgenstein gives is that really you can't have radical transformations of criteria for concepts. Why? Because you simply are not talking about the same thing anymore.

Dave Bogen: That was my point. Exactly. Is that light- Is that there is a certain sense in which you can't say "invisible light". And it is that sense in which you can't say it that makes it noteworthy. And it sounds like something that would be reported in POPULAR SCIENCE, and not chewed on in the bench discussions of the scientists. It is the sort of thing that would draw attention to it. {JC: yes, yes} That's what I was saying. And that it's that impossibility of its intelligibility that makes it significant, right, as an item. It is heard as an impossible construction which is proposed to be, in fact, the case. Hence, it is heard as a discovery.

Jeff Coulter: Well, yeah, because it comes over first as a semantic anomaly, and then it turns out not to be.

Dave Bogen: But in a certain sense it's saying that we are doing-in the concept of 'light', the old concept. It's got that innovative character.

Jeff Coulter: No, no. Because nobody says that "'light' now is all invisible, and you may have once thought that it was all visible guys, but it's now invisible." THAT would be a transformation of the notion of 'light'. If somebody were to be

able to establish a use of 'light' in which the notion of 'visibility' were not tolerated. For example, supposing the whole of the human species was blinded as a result of some cosmic disaster, but they still had their recollections of things, their memory images, etc. Maybe that would be a way now of saying that there is light, but it is no longer visible. We know there is light, except light is not visible. It would have to be something like that, perhaps. But then the concept of 'light' eventually will fall away.

In other words, there are sort of grammatical limits to concept transformation. There are certain kinds of latitudes, and then you are not any longer sure that you are talking about the SAME thing.

Edith Rosenthal: Well, it's permissible because it's a SUBset of light.

Jeff Coulter: Yes! It's not like you're saying: "We've encountered a tribe that has not been found before. We have translated their language, and we find that they have a concept of 'promise' in which when they say "I promise" they place themselves under no obligation to do anything".

Caesar Mavratsas: That wouldn't make any sense.

Jeff Coulter: Right. Because it's an incorrect translation. You are not talking about a weird new concept. "Hey, look, guys, we've found out a case of promising where they don't oblige themselves." No, it's a silly translation. When you say you "promise", it means you oblige, you're under some obligation.

Dave Bogen: You take the grammar, I mean it seems like there's some sort of, under the guise of the concept, a fetishization of the word going on, in a certain- Let me just spell it out.

Jeff Coulter: The word might be "gabobby".

Dave Bogen: No, no. Not that specific word, but the word in its different places. You say that this use of light is a subset of the other uses of light, all right, or something like that. Isn't it perfectly possible that light here means- they're unrelated. They don't even have a similarity to each other: the use of light here and the use of light there. Right? This might as well be light,

and this might as well be, I don't know, "gaboggy", or whatever. You are using the SAMENess of the word,

Jeff Coulter: No, you are invoking one criterion for light, namely its electromagnetic character. {DB: here?} In the invisible light extension.

Dusan Bjelic: I think I understand what he is trying to say. He wants to say that you can use different words, but are applying the same criterial rules. Like, for instance, in 'suicide talk', people can call 'suicide' having, at night, dreams. Or, for instance, they say "What a hell", and in the context of talk "what a hell" means 'suicide'. Or they use use all other kinds of things, all other kinds of words, but in this context means always the same thing. So, we can have different words for the same concept. For the same criterial rules.

Dave Bogen: I'm saying just the opposite, though. I'm saying we can have different concepts for the same word.

Jeff Coulter: The same word can express different concepts, yeah. Like 'table' - The 'table' you write on, and the 'table of contents'.

Dave Bogen: Self-evident, right? {JC: yeah} But in saying that, that even sounds sort of funny, doesn't it? Because then the word isn't the same, is it? What do we mean there by the 'same' word? Well we mean some sort of... {JC: yeah. yeah. Nice point} But now we're not talking about 'light' here- [Tr: omits because of overlaps] We need more in the 'invisible light' than just talking about it loosely, is what I'm saying. Right? {JC: yeah} We don't know how it was used yet. We really don't know the grammar on it at all, and you can't just enclose it by saying: "Well, that's sort of a subset- an extension of the concept of light". Because it might just be a political attempt to reconstitute the "facts" of the matter of 'lightness', or of light', something like that. I don't know what it is. That's all I'm saying.

Eileen Crist: You're saying that you don't want to take the scientific criterion as THE criterion, sort of, out of context?

Jeff Coulter: That is a court of appeal, you see, for the extension of the use. That there is a continua of electromagnetic radiation, within this

spectrum it's visible, outside it's invisible. So you employ one criterion for justifying the claim that light is present, even though the other criterion that one might have thought absolutely essential, namely its visibility,.... But there has got to be some family resemblances. You have to have some continuity of criteria, otherwise you're NOT talking about the same thing AT ALL. And then, Ok, somebody might want to say: "Well it's not enough for me. Light's got to be visible". But that's just a stipulation.

Caesar Mavratsas: It depends on your purposes.

Jeff Coulter: It depends on your purposes, yeah.

George Psathas: Yeah, I was going to say, isn't it a question of its use, within the various contexts of its use? {JC: Absolutely} So, that you can't say it's simply stipulatable that you now have a new concept just by proposing it. It could be by virtue of how you utilize it, that it is usable AS indeed a different concept, although it has the same letters.

Dave Bogen: Yeah, I think that the reason that that example continues to attract my interest is because, at least as I understand it and its use in this OTHER context, not in its original production whatever that might be, is that that 'invisible' does mark just that sort of radical break. That is the irony of the usage. And yet it's saying that can't be done.

Jeff Coulter: Well, it's not a PSEUDO-innovation, as somebody might want to say: "Ok, I can make sense of anything. How's about this: 'married bachelor'." And then you say: "Not possible. All bachelors are unmarried males." "But, how about bachelors of arts? This guy is a bachelor of arts and he is married, so he's a married bachelor." It's not that kind of spurious argument that one is talking about, right? Because clearly there is an attempt to ridicule the notion of grammar. It doesn't work, because, of course, bachelor, in the sense of unmarried male, is in the sense of unmarried male. Period. But nobody can any longer say about light that all light, in the sense of electromagnetic radiation, is visible. Can't say that. Because we have that infra-red and ultra-violet stuff.

Dave Bogen: For instance, 'married bachelor'. We are all at a stag party. Everybody else is married, but we are playing bachelors for the evening. But there is one person that is unmarried. And somebody said: "Would all the married bachelors please stand up?" Now you've got a sense to 'married bachelor' that's a bit perverse because of the context, but it's the joking character of it, right? Is that an extension of this prior literal sense of bachelor, or is that literal sense of bachelor a play on the joking possibilities of it. You can't side with one or the other, and say that one is an extension off the other. The grammar of the thing is that sort of possibility for play.

Jeff Coulter: You've provided the context of its use and intelligibility.

George Psathas: Well, are you raising a question of how do you get to metaphor, irony, etc., which would be other usages of that? Other usages which enable you to call it ironic, metaphorical, etc...

Dave Bogen: Well, I'm beginning to hear grammar, the notion of grammar, as some sort of serious foundational whatever, that now we get to metaphor, irony, joking, etc., as transformations off of that structure. And I'm not quite comfortable with that relationship, if that's what's intended here.

Jeff Coulter: But those are all language-games that can be played within grammar. But you see the issue is not very serious, but conventionality, the conventionality of ordinary use in describing, explaining, and the rest of it, is such that there might- I mean one of the things about metaphor and irony, and so forth, is the business of how far one can carry on speaking of conventionality. There are conventional metaphors, and there are metaphors that are basically ones that mess with the conventional uses of... Right? Nobody any longer thinks of electric current as metaphorical. But it once was thought to be, because it's based on the notion of the flow of electrons on the analogy of the flow of water. So, we use current for both. Nobody thinks of current now as metaphorical. It's become literal. Somebody once said that all metaphors are FALSE statements, which is also wrong. Because you can say "No man is an island", and that's true. No man IS an island. So, the issue really with metaphor and all these things is to see to what extent the

notion of conventionality holds up. Because you can have something like a completely novel metaphor, but for it to be construable as that, presupposes conventional, non-metaphorical uses.

But the question of the ordering of the priorities is what is puzzling me. [Tr: pause] Sometimes you can tell what kind of language-game you are playing in virtue of the kind of use you make of a concept. And sometimes you can only tell what kind of use you make of a concept if you get some independent access to the sort of language-game that is going on. So suddenly someone might come up with something that you can't hear in the sense of conventional, standard, ordinary, practical, everyday use, and resist finding it to be unintelligible, and instead find it now to be an attempt now at poetic expression, figurative expression, metaphor, and the rest of it. OR, as in the case of some schizophrenics, where you can't find any independent grounds for assigning that language-game design to them, to be thought disorder.

Dave Bogen: But do you see how you did that again? You took some mundane, ordinary, everyday, etc. and contrasted it with some poetic, perlocutionary, metaphor, joking...

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, because we don't do that most of the time, Dave. We're not poets most of the time. We're prosaic most of the time.

Dave Bogen: Or is it that we're literal most of the time? Is that what you're saying? I mean, would that be one way of expressing it?

Edith Rosenthal: No, we're conventional.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, we're conventional most of the time.

Dave Bogen: But I mean...eehh, Ok.

Bernie Phillips: Maybe this is pursuing that point, I don't know. But what I'm reading from this is that IF we, as we should, pay close attention to the conventional basis of grammar for then being able to go on to metaphorical, figurative language, IF we emphasize this conventionality to a great extent, and taking into account that we are not poets in general, and that we all of us do, and if we in our analysis - we, here in this room in our analysis - do as well, aren't we then missing out on understanding the

non-conventional aspects of metaphor? And not only understanding it, suppose it were indeed important for human beings to learn how to be more poetic, for whatever reason: to communicate more effectively, or whatever - then by our emphasizing the conventionality, we are going exactly in a direction which is, up to a point, important in terms of understanding this as a background, but if you pursue this as your only aim, then we miss out on a dimension of language that is incredibly important and that we don't understand very well, or use very well.

Jeff Coulter: Well, there's nothing to rule out studying anything - certainly not metaphor.

There are two things I want to say: First is you don't teach children metaphorical language. You teach them how to speak, and that means you imbue them with the conventionality of the language-games. So, ontogenetically, conventionality is first. No more than you can teach kids to doubt things before you've just taught them what they are. So, language acquisition could not be done by a process of imparting metaphor. That would screw them up completely. The second point is that the whole business of logical grammar as a way of characterizing language is, in Wittgenstein anyway, is largely in order to draw attention to the fact that we very often use metaphors that are unrecognized as such. So, when we say things like, and this is one of the sources of bad metaphysics, when we say something like: "A thought popped into my mind", it might be taken as part of the support for the Cartesian concept of the 'mind' as a space, in some ethereal part of the world, it coexists with the body, and now you have the problem of the relationship between mind and body. But then a good way of demystifying that is to note that people can say that they have a word on the tip of their tongue. But they don't feel inclined to want to put their fingers in their mouth and pull it out. And one of the things that Wittgenstein does so well is to find metaphor where it has been unrecognized as such. And that's quite tricky. And it is something that he argues is a metaphysics because, for example, the classical metaphysical doctrines of realism, materialism, idealism, nominalism, and on and on, all of those -isms, phenomenism, etc., it turns out that they get their purchase VIA unrecognized metaphorical constructions, plus other devices, other mistakes of reasoning. An unrecognized metaphor is one of them. So, it's not a barrier against recognizing

metaphor. Grammar does not seek to exclude the language-games of metaphorical use. But you find Wittgenstein being very literal minded by some criteria precisely because part of his target is the unrecognized metaphor. And that might give one the sense that he is after all really not giving metaphor its proper due, or not giving poetry, or other- Like when he talks about the 'tolerances' for concepts, and all of this, and he never really invokes the kind of example you did, about the married bachelor in the game. It's perfectly intelligible. And he is talking about intelligibility. It's in the context of a certain kind of attack that the exclusion of that makes some sense. And the argument about conventionality has its place.

But when one is generally talking about language and grammar, I suppose there is a sense in which metaphor, and other kinds of tropes, and rhetorical devices are NOT at center stage as much as they should be. Partly because there is not an awful lot of analysis that's been done of these things. There is stuff by Donald Davidson on metaphor that wanted to argue - and Austin used to say similar things - that metaphor is unconventional. But that's not right. There's lots of conventional metaphors. Lot's of conventional ways in which we put things together. But for Wittgenstein's purpose the issue is to detect the metaphor that masquerades particularly as a scientific, or a philosophical truth. Like part of Ontology - with a capital 'O'.

Edith Rosenthal: There's a cultural reference here. In another time and another place conscious metaphorical use would be quite popular. For example, in Shakespearean times. People diverted themselves by making up on the spot highly metaphorical, poetic, what they call 'conceits'. They just had a different use of language, and we don't do that now. So, there you are talking about time, cultural time. Nowadays we don't.

Jeff Coulter: But that's an acquired skill, that's acquired quite late on in the acquisition of language.

Edith Rosenthal: You mean late on in our lives or in this history of human life?

Jeff Coulter: In anybody's life. The sense of being able to play with the language. Being able to play with the language comes AFTER being able to speak it. {ER: Oh, I understand, yeah}

That's actually one reason why I think the notion of language-game can be a problem. Because really it's too serious to be thought of as a game. We do play games with language. But the notion of language-game is used only as an analogy with SOME of the features of games, not with all. Certainly not with the notion of games as a non-serious pursuit, though, of course, there are certainly seriously pursued games.

Dave Bogen: But if you were to look at the way in which language is acquired, for example to go look at parents with their children, you'd probably find them playing all the time. Not just that, but play would certainly be a big aspect of that acquisition. So, in fact, it WOULD be like play. The play of the language, as against the seriousness of the language, let's say.

Edith Rosenthal: Parents don't play with children about language, like in a 24 hour day. The kids just sop it up.

[Tr: They perhaps don't 'play with' the language, but they play WITH their children in and through the use of language.]

Jeff Coulter: It would be pretty perverse to try to bring up your kid to construct metaphorical devices and go around trying to use them.

George Psathas: Just a different question. Since you mentioned ontology, just briefly would you say that what he's doing is by-passing ontology through his proposals, or the study of, say, use. The examination of the logical grammar of concepts is really saying there is no need to, and nothing to be gained by doing what's been done under the heading of ontological studies.

Jeff Coulter: That's certainly one interpretation. That's certainly one consistent theme of interpretation that Wittgenstein is anti-ontologist. The other one is to say that really he's done a transformation on making ontological problems into pragmatic, semantic, grammatical problems.

George Psathas: Yeah, that was the other point I was going to make: That he's not seeking to abandon it, but he's proposing an alternative, or as you say a transformation, of what could be ontological studies.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah. Yeah. Because as he says: Look I'm talking about PAINS via the analysis of the concept of 'pain'. I'm talking about the imagination via the analysis of the concept of 'imagination'. Because the question "What is a table?" gets the same sort of answer as the question "What is the meaning of the concept of 'table'?" And yet when you make the grammatical transformation of the problem, it turns out that there are lots of consequential moves that are made in that kind of analysis that are not available if you don't make that move into the notion of grammar. So, there is a tendency, for example, as he says somewhere, to imagine that a grammatical move is a discovery of a new phenomenon. He speaks of a tendency among ontologists, for example, toward selecting particular kinds of uses and putting them at center stage, rather than others, the classical ones being referential uses.

Isamu Kamada: I would like to ask about reference and meaning. Frege and Husserl distinguish reference and meaning under the use of the German words: Ding and Bedeutung. But still they believe that reference is a sort of meaning. In our ordinary way of using the word "meaning", still we consider that reference is the meaning. For example, "What is the meaning of bachelor?" is actually depending on the context. Sometimes it means a degree, and sometimes it means (), and sometimes it means our being single. And in that sense, the meaning is the use. But still if you ask: "What is being single?", and "What is a marriage?". You can express: "Well, marriage is just two people who get together, and live together, and being committed to each other", and that is the meaning. Or you can say "Being married is different from being single, or being a bachelor". But still, we say the meaning of the marriage IS the difference. What do you think?

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, in giving a conceptual analysis of the concept of 'marriage', you are going to have to show its connections to all of the other concepts that connect with it, and the circumstances in which those connections make whatever sense they make. I don't see how that gets around the issue of references AS meaning.

Isamu Kamada: I am saying that in the ordinary way of using the word 'meaning', we are using the word as reference. So, if you ask "What is a marriage?", then you expect what actually 'marriage' is.

Jeff Coulter: You are explaining the meaning of the word "marriage" by giving examples of the use of the term.

Isamu Kamada: No, actual state, or illustration, or condition. So, reference. The ACTUAL object of the word, the reference.

Jeff Coulter: Well marriage isn't even an object.

Isamu Kamada: Well sometimes logicians use the word 'object' for 'reference'.

Jeff Coulter: Well if some logicians do, so much the worse for them.

Isamu Kamada: Wittgenstein also. In some books, he used 'object' for 'reference'.

Jeff Coulter: Let me put it this way: One of the reasons why Wittgenstein objects to the excessive use of the notion of reference is because of the following thing: We might ask "What does the word pain refer to?". And then the answer is "A feeling inside you that's nasty", or something like that. And then you might develop, from that, a characterization of the concept of 'pain' that leads you astray, (vis-a-vis) the private language argument.

The first diagnostic thing to note is that words refer via people using them to refer. But the notion that a word refers to an object has tended to be assimilated to the idea of APPLYING something to something. Fixing a label to an object. Or putting paint on a wall. Here the concept, there the thing. Reference is where you bring them together. You refer. Like mentally pointing, as the equivalent of verbally pointing. When you refer to something, you sort of mentally point to it. That's a problem, because then it can conjure for you, certainly did for Wittgenstein, the notion that the THING, the object, or whatever, THE REFERENT is the meaning of the word that you used to refer to it. And that's not right.

Wittgenstein is not denying that we refer to things. What he would say is: Watch out for that way of talking when the WORD refers to.... Because in a serious sense, words don't refer. We can say words refer as an elliptical way of saying: we use words in referring expressions, or we can use words to refer to.... And referring is an activity. And words don't engage in activities. We USE them in

activities. And one activity is referring to things.

But note that's a classical way of talking about words and meaning: Words refer to things. "What does that word refer to?" That's a way we have. That's a very misleading way. He's NOT saying: Rule that out of language; don't ever say that. Yeah! But provided you know what you really mean when you say it. "Words refer" - you mean we use words in referring expressions. And to refer is not the same- Or to apply a word to something, or to name something, is to be thought of as a particular sort of language-game, BUT it has tended to be thought of as a sort of mental pointing. Or as a kind of relationship where the referent IS the meaning of the word, because that's how you could use it in referring expressions.

Isamu Kamada: Are you saying that all words have referents?

Jeff Coulter: Of course not. Absolutely not.

Isamu Kamada: Yeah, for example, where is 'mind'?

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, and where is 'but', and 'however', and 'there', and 'this'?

Isamu Kamada: So, he tries to avoid the confusion, about the objects, and ...

Jeff Coulter: How Wittgenstein did? {IK: yeah} Yeah, absolutely. But that's not to say he's sort of anti-reference. He's not saying that we don't refer to things. What he says is: Be careful when you come across philosophers, and theorists saying something like "This word refers to...". Because it can conjure up a metaphysics if you're not careful.

Isamu Kamada: I think that sometimes a meaning means the reference. And Austin, maybe Austin said that a

Jeff Coulter: Well, that's absolutely wrong. The meaning cannot be the reference.

Isamu Kamada: But maybe Austin said: There are very many meanings in 'meaning', the word meaning. {JC: Absolutely} But Wittgenstein just defines that meaning is use. But there are very many ways of using the word meaning.

Jeff Coulter: No, no. Be careful. In that paragraph he says: "For a host of cases, though by no means for all, the meaning of a word is its use in the language." [PI: Paragraph 43] But that rules out something like the SIGNIFICANCE of a word. So if you say to me something like: "Liverpool". Right, Liverpool, great place. That's a meaning, that's a significance of a word. That's not its use. That's what it invokes. So, "for a host of cases, though not for all", and he says that explicitly.

Now, when we talk about 'meaning as use', we use it in a sloganeering way in order to differentiate the Wittgensteinian approach to the problem of language and representation, and so on, FROM other ones. But he's just as subtle as Austin on that. He knows very well there are many meanings of 'meaning'. There are many meanings of all concepts. I mean if Wittgenstein doesn't think that, nobody does!

Isamu Kamada: This question is related to that question. Let's suppose that you have a pain - maybe in your leg - today, and you go and see a doctor. And then you say "Oh, I have a very strange pain". And the next day you have another pain, only now maybe in your arm. And you go and see a doctor and explain "Oh, I have a pain". And the doctor asks you "Is this the same pain?". "What do you mean? I had a pain in the leg yesterday, and today I have a pain in my arm".

Jeff Coulter: But they may be the 'same' insofar as they are both 'throbbing'. Location is only one criterion for 'sameness of pain'. Mind you, you could hardly have the same pain in your head as in your stomach. But you might have the same pain in different parts of your body: a stabbing, sharp, jabbing pain. "And yesterday I had THAT pain here, and I then I had the SAME", though one might there say the 'same kind of', "pain".

Isamu Kamada: Therefore it depends on the context, {JC: Of course} the date, or location. But still the doctor asks him, or you: "Is that the same pain?", and you must look at your own experience. "Yeah, well, they are the same". But what is the criterion of his judgment?

Jeff Coulter: What he says and does.

Isamu Kamada: No, I mean: How can he judge he has a pain? Because my pain is my pain, and anybody cannot share that same pain. Maybe..., but I don't know. And what kind of criteria, or criterion I can use?

Jeff Coulter: No, no. YOU don't use criteria, you SATISFY criteria. This is very important. Remember the asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological expressions? When I say "I'm in pain", that's not a description based on criteria, that's an expression of pain. When I say of you: "He is in pain", or "Isamu is in pain", that is a description of you based on criteria. I can justify it by invoking criteria, like: "Well, he says so. He's an honest guy. And his face was contorted, and I just saw a needle stuck in back", etc. But for you, no. First-person psychological sentences, or expressions, are criterion-lessly avowed, but they have to satisfy the criteria for them to be acknowledgeable by us, as other than say: pretenses, or play-acting, or etc. So, of course, you don't use criteria. You don't say: "Well how am I going to judge what this is? Maybe it's a twitch. Maybe it's an ache. Maybe I'm just feeling blue. I'll have to think about it." No. "I have a terrible pain here, Doc. Arrwwkk." But your doing that now gives the doctor the criteria for defeasibly ratifying its presence.

Isamu Kamada: So, are you saying that "I have the same pain" is a kind of a private language because there is no public confirmation of that statement, so just a private language?

Jeff Coulter: Well, I've just been proposing that it can't be, that 'sameness' is something that is available in and through- is a claim that is ratifiable in and through your living-up to the public criteria for its ratification. Of course, it's not just up to you to say what's the same. Then something may SEEM to be the same, but not BE the same. This is crucial, and it keeps recurring in Wittgenstein, the difference between 'seeming to be' and 'actually being': one thinking that it is, and its actually being; believing that one has, and actually having. And this is the lever, this collection of concepts constitute the lever that Wittgenstein uses AGAINST the private language argument.

Isamu Kamada: Ok. That patient, me or you, use certain criteria or grammar of the linguistic community. And I said: "Oh, my pains are

different", concerning the location, concerning the date, and concerning quality or kind - They are the same. So he is using the criteria, the grammar. And still he is judging: "They are the same". But still you can say that his judgment is not enough.

Jeff Coulter: Well, you don't JUDGE that your in pain.

Isamu Kamada: Because he was asked!

Jeff Coulter: I might have to judge whether or not your in pain.

Isamu Kamada: But he was asked by the doctor!

Jeff Coulter: Yeah.

Isamu Kamada: And he judge it.

Jeff Coulter: Judged? But it's just not a use, right?

Isamu Kamada: Well, sometimes we actually do not JUDGE, but we SAY "judge". But maybe I can say "compare", or "intuit". But anyway my experience is that people SAY - with or without of the use of 'judgment'. So you can say it is a result of your perception, but anyway, he SAYS, or I SAY....

tape change]

Isamu Kamada: ...and I'm saying that, ok, the 'sameness', 'difference', or 'identity', 'individuality' - those things are (), and you can get the meaning from the relation between them. Maybe this is the position of Saussure. But still we don't referring to the different -- is an Old World expression -- referring to your own experience of the world, you cannot use those words. You must see your own experience, and then you can apply it - the meaning of the 'same'. "Yeah, they are the same." So I think our experience is so - has certain meaning. And the language, or words, has certain meaning, but their meanings are different in effect.

Jeff Coulter: Well, your experience has meaning in the sense that you can talk about it only because you have a language. THAT'S the sense of meaning we're talking about. Of course, you can have pain before you have the concept of 'pain', but you can't TELL that it is a pain, or SAY that it is a pain, or AVOW having a pain, or KNOW that

you've got a pain unless you have the concepts that are provided for you within the language. And in acquiring those concepts, you acquire the criteria for their proper use. But in your OWN case when it comes to expressions of pain, it's not that you USE criteria, rather you have to SATISFY criteria.

I may have to use criteria, in the sense of explicitly appealing to them, in justifying my claim that you are in pain. But I don't USE criteria in MY case, but I have to live-up to them. And indeed kids get drilled in doing this even with their own pains. For example, when they are told "That doesn't hurt so much. Stop screaming." And so they get a handle on what counts as a pain that is sufficiently...., and so on. And they may come with all kinds of locutions, like: "Well, I've got the same pain as I had last night, Daddy", and it's clutching.... No, no, no. And you might do all sorts of corrections on kids, until they live-up to... But they learn to live-up to them spontaneously, they don't learn to live-up to it by consulting the criteria in any explicit sense, or invoking them. But they are in that sense attuned to them, in the Hunter sense.

[Tr: JC recommends reading Peter Hacker on 'criterionless avowals' in INSIGHT AND ILLUSION (1972), and also the Malcolm chapter from page 89 to the end on 'third-person sensation sentences' - for a clarification of some of the issues discussed in this meeting.]

TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

These transcriptions were prepared from an audio recording, the auditory quality of which was not always optimal. Participating members, especially Jeff Coulter, have reviewed initial drafts of the transcripts and have attempted to clarify portions that were particularly difficult to hear, and also provided assistance in correcting errors in transcription that were made during the production of the first draft of each session. The generous assistance of all those involved is gratefully acknowledged. Particular appreciation goes out to Jeff Stetson who took on the laborious task of copy-editing. Unfortunately, not all

errors in transcription, and not all inaudible portions could be corrected given the time lag in producing the transcriptions. The transcriber apologizes for any remaining typographical errors.

The following are conventions employed in producing the transcriptions of these meetings:

- [x] square brackets: Text in square brackets is for the most part that of the transcriber. Such text is indicated by "Tr:" at the beginning of the brackets. It includes: 1. paraphrases of talk, 2. clarification of indefinite references, for example pointing, drawing or writing on the chalk-board, producing a behavioral display etc., 3. information about references to texts referred to in the talk, 4. other general remarks and clarifications and 5. indications of omissions and tape changes. PLEASE NOTE that there is almost always some bit of talk missing at the points of tape change. On occasion, comments in square brackets are insertions offered by those who have edited the text and are indicated as such by the initials of the person in question, e.g., [JC: xxxxxxxxx]. Also, if additions or deletions are made in text quoted during the class, then these changes are noted in square brackets, with the speakers initials included within the brackets.
 - { x } braces: Text in braces is the talk of persons who are commenting on or responding to the talk of another person who currently has the floor. This talk is introduced by the initials of the person making the remark and/or comment, e.g., {JC: xxxx}.
 - (x) parentheses surrounding text: Text in parentheses is the transcriber's best guess as to what was being said when there is some doubt about exactly what was said due to the poor auditory quality of the tape.
 - () empty parentheses: Parentheses containing no text indicate a portion of the talk which is not transcribable due to the poor auditory quality of the tape, although it is possible to tell that something was being said.
- CAPITALIZATION:** Capitalization is used to indicate titles (or partial titles, e.g.: INVESTIGATIONS for the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS) for books. It is also used to indicate vocal emphasis by the speaker in question, i.e., something which is spoken noticeably louder, or with more emphasis than the surrounding talk. It was not possible to underline text in the editing/text-formating system employed, which is why capitalization rather than underlining was used in the above cases. This also influenced the forming of terms in languages other than English,

e.g.: Übersicht, vis-a vis, etc, which are neither capitalized, nor underlined, although occasionally are explicated in square brackets following the text in question.