

[coulw2.002. Tr.:BJF. 1 September 90: 2nd edited version] Transcription conventions can be found on the last 2-3 pages of each transcript.

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WITTGENSTEIN AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Meeting 2., Thursday, 22 January 87

TOPICS: BLUE BOOK; History of the Study
of Logic; Calculus Model of
Language; The concept of 'meaning';
Ostensive and Verbal Definition;
Relations of BLUE AND BROWN BOOK conceptions
to those found in the PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS.

READING: BLUE BOOK (first 74 pages of the
BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS)

See also: Coulter, J. (forthcoming).
Ethnomethodology and the logic of language.
In G. Button (Ed.) ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND
THE HUMAN SCIENCES. Cambridge U. Press
for a fuller discussion of the history of
logic.

Jeff Coulter: As I mentioned last time, THE
BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, as I guess it says on the
cover, were the preliminary studies for the
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. And there are
various things that Wittgenstein says in THE BLUE
AND BROWN BOOKS that are subtly changed, indeed by
any serious criteria improved, when the same sorts
of points are again treated in the PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS. And yet many people find the PI

[Tr: abbreviation for PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS], many people find when they open the PI and start to read it through, that it's simply too elliptical and its organization, which is very like that of the TRACTATUS before it, is not conducive to following a thread of argument consistently. At least, there are some paragraphs that do go together very nicely, and you can follow a thread through some of them, but then zap!, in comes a point from left field apparently, and it can throw people off. So, a good way into the PI is to read the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS because this is discursively written. It's not paragraphed in that difficult sense; there's a general flow to the argument. And yet in various ways some of the sophistication and subtlety that you find in the PI treatment of various of these topics is blunted somewhat due in part, as Wittgenstein himself argues, I think rightly, to the very discursive layout of the argument. You see the thing about these topics is as you read through on matters like 'meaning', 'thinking', 'expecting', 'following a rule', stuff of that sort, and you read Wittgenstein's observations, many other things start to crop up in your mind as you read these things. You start to get: "Well..... but what about so and so?" And in the discursive presentation of the argument, people can find themselves running out of patience, because they simply don't find a sort of punch line arriving early enough for them to get the sense of where the argument is going. In fact in lots of ways, the argument of the whole of the BLUE BOOK can really only be grasped as a totality. And so what Wittgenstein's trying to do in the PI is to produce paragraphs that encapsulate a clear cut thought, point, argument all in one go. So it's more punchy that way. But to that extent it can also be difficult to approach unless you've had some sort of prior induction into it.

The BLUE BOOK is primarily concerned with the topics of 'meaning', 'criteria', 'rules', the same sorts of things that permeate the considerations of the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. And although there are some digressions here and there, or apparent digressions - I think it's arguable that some of the things that seem to be digressions may not in fact be such - there's a certain sort of flow to the argument.

Let's just back-up then for a moment and recollect where we left off last time, or what we talked about last time. Wittgenstein is here representing himself as somebody who, having achieved a certain kind of breakthrough in formal logic, is now systematically repudiating the very bases of that breakthrough. Now formal logic itself, of course, is a long historical development that could loosely be dated to an interest in the properties of winning arguments in Athenian society. Logic begins effectively, as best we can tell, or as the folklore of the discipline of logic would have it at least, logic begins when people developed an interest in formalizing principles that appeared to inform the construction of winning arguments. Why would this be important? Well it's important because the idea that was current in ancient Greek society was that you could avoid bloodshed if you can generate agreement through the use of the 'logos', of the word, rather than generate agreement by beating down your opponent. And one way of trying to reach agreement on something that begins as a disagreement is to have an argument about it that can come to a successful resolution, where both sides now find themselves aligned together. So, a winning argument was a very prized form of linguistic praxis. A winning argument was a very major form of linguistic praxis, and the earliest logicians, the Megarians and some of the pre-Socratics, were not only interested in codifying the principles of winning arguments for their own sake, but in order to instruct, for example, people in how to conduct trials of lawbreakers. Because, of course, somebody who has broken a law in a system of repressive penalty, in a society with repressive penalty, there's no need to have an argument with respect to the individual's guilt or innocence. These matters are not settled through argumentation. But in a system of restitutive justice, these matters are settled through argumentation. So one of the prime social locations for argumentation where it is indeed an institutionalized life and death matter is in the law court. And you can find in Aristotle's TOPICS, and you can find in various of the treatises of the Eliatics, instructions for how to win an argument in a court of law that are based on the principles of the 'logos'.

Logic develops its first formal structure, again as best we can tell, in the syllogism, which is basically a codification of rules for moving from a set of premises to a conclusion that have a binding force. So that you find yourself in a

position of self-contradictory irrationality if you accept the premises and deny the conclusion of a properly formed syllogism. So it's almost like the syllogism, which is distributed in its parts either between speakers or in the turns of a single speaker, the syllogism has this sort of mysterious binding power on you. You can suddenly turn round and find that indeed now you're subject to its coercive character, and that was sort of it's almost mystical property. So if you accept that Socrates is a man, and then you accept that all men are mortal, bang! before you know it, you've got to accept that Socrates is mortal. That was the sort of way in which the thing worked.

Now, logic develops as a way of formalizing rules of inference that are not just restricted to arguments, certainly not just restricted to simple sorts of arguments with major and minor premises and conclusions. Logic becomes concerned - if I could just reify it for a moment to stop having to get bogged down in all the historical detail - logic becomes interested in propositions, because propositions are the key elements of arguments, at least insofar as arguments have been the primary focus for logical codification. Because it's propositions that are related together as the parts of an argument, and the propositions state facts. So we have an interest in the logical properties of fact-stating propositions at the center of attention for some centuries. And then, of course, if one is interested in the logical properties of fact-stating propositions, one gets interested in the logical properties of the components of propositions. So one develops an interest in the logical powers of the connectives, 'or', 'then', 'if-then', 'either-or', 'and', 'but', and so forth. And one gets interested in the logical properties of predicates: 'is a man', 'is red', 'is black', 'is blue', whatever there may be, for things that are predicable of subjects. And the idea is to write the rules that appear to govern the inferential possibilities, and the combinatorial tolerances for connectives, predicates, and the rest of it.

What happens is that given that logic eventually develops larger ambitions than codifying the rules of inference in arguments toward codifying rules of inference in general - toward codifying what people like George Boole and others refer to as 'the laws of thought', or all of human reason - one finds the ambitions of logical formalization extending over time, up to the point at which, of course, logicians realizing that all

reasoning is essentially linguistically mediated, linguistically constituted - that all thought, all conceptual thought is made possible by language - the interest is in establishing a logic for language.

But the attempt to establish a logic for language immediately founders upon various issues, various difficulties that are caused by the way the logicians themselves are approaching the problem. First of all, the tendency to think of the whole of language as basically consisting in sets of possible propositions, fact-stating propositions. The tendency, as Dave [Tr: Bogan] pointed out last week, to construe or to over-over-emphasize the referential functions, or representational functions of linguistic usage. And the temptation to try to force non-representational, non-propositional, non-referential forms of usage into a propositional mode, into a referential mode, and the corollary claim that natural languages as they are actually spoken by the vulgar, by the laity, by everyday folk in their everyday practical affairs, that natural languages are full of redundancies, colloquialisms, vaguenesses, indeterminacies, ellipses, metaphors, exclamations, all kinds of stuff that really don't lend themselves to the sort of formalizations that had been attempted, and that you find in the history of logic from Leibniz through Boole, through Russell and Whitehead's PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA and, of course in the TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS of Wittgenstein - generally treated, including by Russell, who was the supervisor of Wittgenstein when he presented this as his doctoral dissertation, generally recognized as the apotheosis of the achievement of the formal logical analysis of language and its properties.

The argument was that the logical analysis of language must really be the establishment of a kind of an ideal language which expresses what in ordinary language is hidden from view. The ideal language, or the logical calculus, captures the underlying core of human reason that is systematically masked or muddled by the surface usage. So, for example, I'll just remind you of the characterization by Russell of the purpose of PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA:

In a logically perfect language, the words in a proposition would correspond one-by-one with the components of the corresponding facts, with the exception of such words as 'or', 'not', 'if',

'then', etc. which have different functions. In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for the simple things that enter in, one word for each simple component. A language of that sort will be completely analytic and will show at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied. The language which is set forth in Principia Mathematica is intended to be a language of that sort. ... It aims at being that sort of a language which if you add a vocabulary would be a logically perfect language. [Tr: Russell, B. The philosophy of logical atomism, I - VII. MONIST, 1918 and 1919. Reprinted in: R.C. Marsh (Ed.) LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE, 1968. Allen and Unwin. Quotes from the latter source, pp. 197-198]

So we have here the idea that in a logically perfect language you clean up the surface of ordinary language in order to find the core of its capacity to be an instrument of reason. So, for example, we have, as Russell and Whitehead and Wittgenstein used to say, a lot of redundancy in language. We have a lot of words that really mean the same thing. We have an awful lot of a-grammaticisms, ellipses, and all the rest of it, that we need to tidy up. And we need to make sure that when we are characterizing the logic of a language, we are concentrating upon its fact-stating and referential functions, because that's what links language to the world, and that's what we're interested in revealing. The logic of language is the logic of its ways of enabling us to reason properly about facts, about the world, about reality.

Ok, in the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, which are themselves, as I mentioned, preliminaries to the PI, in the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS we are at a midway point in Wittgenstein's systematic attempt to repudiate this traditional way of thinking about what a logic of natural language, or what a logic

of language and reasoning would look like. He'd already done some rebuttal work in earlier writings, in his notebooks in the 30's, in the PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR, in various other places. But the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS begin to lay down the major elements of his more mature thinking about these matters.

On the question of the calculus, or the ideal language, have a look at page 25.

For remember that in general we don't use language according to strict rules - it hasn't been taught to us by means of strict rules, either. WE, in our discussions on the other hand,

And "we" there almost certainly means: we formal logicians.

WE, in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to exact rules.

This is vary one-sided way of looking at language. In practice we very rarely use language as such a calculus. For not only do we not think of the rules of usage - of definitions, etc. - while using language, but when we are asked to give such rules, in most cases we aren't able to do so. We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we don't know their real definition, but because there is no real 'definition' to them. To suppose that there MUST be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules.

When we talk of language as a symbolism used in an exact calculus,

Again the "we" there is: me as formal logician of the TRACTATUS period, Russell, Frege, Carnap, Leibniz, Boole, et al.

When we talk of language as a symbolism used in an exact calculus, that which is in our mind can be found in the sciences and in mathematics. Our ordinary use of language conforms to this standard of exactness only in rare cases. Why then

do we in philosophizing constantly compare our use of words with one following exact rules? The answer is that the puzzles which we try to remove always spring from just this attitude towards language. [Tr: BLUE BOOK, p. 25-26; italics in original - here represented by capitalization]

Ok, so here's a clear passage in which Wittgenstein is trying, among many other passages, to undermine the notion that language proceeds, is used, is learned according to strict rules. But there's a danger in the way this passage has been and could be interpreted, and a danger that is, I think, clearly removed in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. The danger is to think that here Wittgenstein is now going to propound a version of language in which there aren't any rules at all, in which there's no order, in which there's no room for definition. And it's from passages like these where people like Frederick Waismann and others prematurely abstracted the idea that for Wittgenstein ordinary language is essentially vague. Big mistake, a very big mistake, but given nourishment by a certain reading of these passages. In fact note, however, he's talking about "strict" rules here. And by strict rule, what he has in mind are the sorts of strict sorts of categoricity rules of Frege and of formal logic, or of Russell and Whitehead's ideal language.

Dave Bogen: I wanted to raise one issue there, because I remember reading this and thinking about the problems that this passage sort of posed to me in the same way, concerning the notion of strict rules, and that the hazard was to read it in just the way that you're saying Waismann and others read it. On that notion of "strict", that somehow it implied that in whatever way we learn it, it's loose - that there's a loose way. But then when I looked at it again, it wasn't the notion of "strict" that was really getting in my way, it was the notion of "rules". That it seems that there's this problem in reading this stuff where- or probably there was a problem in writing it- where even the notion of "rules" as it would be conventionally meant by 'we philosophers' runs aground in that sort of passage.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, I think that's absolutely clear.

Ok, the BLUE BOOK starts out with the question: "What is the meaning of a word?" And the classical answer that had been given by formal logic to that question had been informed deeply by its attachment, its almost fetish, of the propositional function of language use, of the referential functions of language use. And so characteristically the kind of answer that you would get to that question would be: What is the meaning of the word? The meaning of the word is what it stands for. And there are various possible candidates for what sorts of things do the 'standing'!! These candidates range from objects in the world, facts in the world, ideas, Fregean 'Begriffen' or Concepts, with a capital 'C', Thoughts, with a capital 'T'. The meaning of a word is what it stands for; what it stands for could be any of these sorts of things, could be an object, a fact, or a thought, or something of that sort, depending on which philosopher or logician you read. But the relationship is a correspondence relationship. A word stands for, is in correspondence to something like a fact, or an object, or a thought, or in the TRACTATUS, and in the PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA, both of which were expressions of Logical Atomism, the most elementary, primitive, no-further analyzable meanings were given directly by the relationship of a word to a "Simple", with a capital 'S'. A Simple being some state of affairs in reality that you can't analyze down any further. The nodule of meaning. That when you hit that, it's self-evident. And the classical sort of thing that Wittgenstein had in mind when thinking about the relationship between a word and its meaning, as the relationship between the word and the Simple, is that of the name to its bearer.

So, a proposition, which is composed of words, is seen now to be a concatenation of names, where each word, with the exception of the connectives, like 'or', 'and', 'but', 'however', and so on, where each word, whether it be a noun or a verb, an adjective or an adverb - prepositions are different, the demonstratives are different - but the so called "substantives", whether they be nouns or verbs or adverbs or adjectives, STAND FOR, as names to bearers. They name Simples. Or, if they don't name Simples, they name 'complexes of Simples'. So, for example, 'red' is a name for a Simple. Red is unanalyzable; you can't analyze red any more than 'that's red'. It's ultimately self-evident in the early theorizing. But 'scarlet' is a form of slightly darkish red, so it's a concatenation of Simples; scarlet is a

Complex. That's the sort of idea that informs these early writings.

Later in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, when you come across Wittgenstein's paragraphs on simple things and complex things, and how what is simple and what is complex is context- and purpose-dependent, you find he's undermining the idea of absolute Simples and absolute Complexes. And when you read about his detailed discussion in the early paragraphs on naming - why should any logician or philosopher be interested in people giving names to things? - it's because he wants to undermine the idea that meaning is simply a matter of naming things, that the meaning of a word simply is NOT in any serious sense at all a matter of a naming relation. That the meaning of a word is not the thing it stands for in the exact analogy of the relationship of a name to its bearer. And one of the key passages there is when he thinks about what it would be like if all red things in the universe were destroyed. Would that mean that one had destroyed the meaning of the word 'red'? If one had destroyed everything red, would that mean that one had destroyed the meaning of the word 'red'? The idea being perhaps more simply graspable if we think of 'Fido' as the name of my dog, or the 'moon' as the name of the object that circles the earth. You destroy Fido or you destroy the moon, have you thereby destroyed the meaning or the sense of the names? Does it render those notions completely devoid of meaning? By destroying the 'referent' of words that are capable of being used in referring expressions, you do not necessarily destroy their meaning. And Frege had hit upon this in a preliminary sense in his distinction between 'sense' and 'reference'. Where Frege was looking at such cases as 'the evening star' and 'the morning star', where it appears that the evening star has a different meaning to the morning star. The evening star means the star that you see in the evening; the morning star is the star that you see in the morning, and yet it's been shown that it has the same referent, namely, the planet Venus. So, sense and reference had already begun to be prised apart a bit by Frege. What Wittgenstein wants to do eventually, of course, is completely to undermine the 'name bearer' or 'label for object' conception, not just of meaning, but ultimately also of reference. And we'll come onto those arguments as we proceed.

Jeff Stetson: How is this distinct from what Husserl was doing with phenomenological reduction, of getting down to essence of 'ball', for example,

or essence of 'red', to use the same example?

Jeff Coulter: The Simples and Complexes stuff? {JS: yes} I think it's very similar. There is a sense in which Simples are essences, but there may be some differences in the way in which Husserl treats essences and the way in which Wittgenstein treats Simples that show you can't simply inter-translate them without residue, but it sounds like a very similar thing. The 'eidos' is that which permits the same concepts to be used in referring to a multitude of different things, and yet we might not ourselves be able simply to articulate what that 'eidos' is, it needs phenomenological reflection. So, also we might not know in what provides the meaning to our words, because we need the logicians to clarify what the Simples are, and indeed, not only to clarify, but in fact to purge the language so that that's all we really have left, as in the Russell/Whitehead program.

Jeff Stetson: That was the end? {JC: yeah} Simples and Complexes was the end?

Jeff Coulter: Well propositions are built out of words whose meanings are provided by Simples. There are some words where the Simples are compounded, there are Complexes, like scarlet as an example, and then propositions are concatenations of names. [JC: This is VERY over-simplified, but we must move ahead! But see Peter Hacker's INSIGHT AND ILLUSION on the TRACTATUS notion of 'Simples'.]

Ok, so, what Wittgenstein has to do in his discussion of the meanings of words is to mount an attack on the tendency to reduce the problem to one of naming, or reference. And one way in which he does this is to show how in learning the language, when we are acquiring words which can be used in referential language-games, or for referential purposes, the practice of establishing reference by pointing, or by 'ostensive definition', which links the word to the Simple or the object - simple object - which is it's meaning, CAN'T be, can't logically be the way in which we could begin to acquire words that have referential functions. Now some people have taken this to mean that Wittgenstein denies any role at all for ostensive definition; of course he doesn't do that. What he's doing though, he's saying: Look, from St. Augustine through various logical thinkers up to about Frege, who began to see some important distinctions, there's been a tacit picture, and in Augustine an explicit picture, of what language

acquisition looks like. And the idea is that kids acquire language, i.e., they acquire the names for things in the world, by being shown objects, and having the words or the names for those objects -- whether they be 'tables' or 'persons' or 'events', like 'someone running', that's 'running', and you see somebody running -- so it's not just nouns, it's also verbs -- or adjectives and adverbs, and the rest of it -- by ostensive definition, by having the things pointed out to the kid and the word expressed. So that the child now builds up an association between the word and the thing that's being indicated by ostension, by pointing, basically. And indeed that's certainly a part of what it takes to get the kid to acquire the language. There's no doubt that pointing to things and saying the word that stands for the thing is in some sense a way in which we can get kids to acquire language. But, says Wittgenstein, that could not be the primary method of language acquisition. The reason being that, for ostensive definition to work in equipping the child with a way of using the word properly, i.e., of being able to use the word in a meaningful way, of being able to make sense in his use of the word, in being able to make sense of other's use of the word, ostensive definition cannot be the way in which it proceeds. Why? Because imagine you're a parent, and you have a kid, and you're instructed now that the only way in which you can work with your kid in getting it to acquire language is through ostensive definition, from start to end. What in fact you would be doing if that was the restriction upon the mode of imparting language, what you'd be doing would be teaching the kid at best a whole bunch of sterile rituals in which a sound gets produced on the occurrence of the thing indicated. So, I could, say, point to a cloud in the sky and say "cloud, cloud", and the kid would say "cloud". And any next time I pointed to the thing in sky, the kid would come up with "cloud". Has it learned the meaning of the word cloud? Absolutely not. It doesn't know what a cloud is. For example, what am I pointing to? I know I was pointing to the cloud; what does the kid know I was pointing to? I might have been pointing to 'object in sky'; I might have been pointing to 'something grey' if the cloud was grey; I might have been pointing to something 'fluffy'; I might be pointing to 'something that occurs just before the rain comes down', etc., etc. So, ostensive definition already presupposes an awful lot of language acquisition already established before it can properly fulfill its function of instruction. For it to work, in other words, by itself on any given occasion, it must

already presuppose the capacity of the child to make certain linguistic discriminations, and also to know that what is being done in this ritual is that daddy or mommy is now giving you the name for something, telling you what something is called. And just pointing and saying a word, and getting the kid to repeat the word, even if the kid eventually comes up with the word spontaneously on the occurrence of the pointing, isn't going to tell the kid that what it's got is now a name for the thing. There's nothing in the ostensive exercise itself that is transparently available to the child as: daddy's now telling me what that's called. You've no idea that that's what's going on. It's just a rote kind of business. So, although Wittgenstein is not denying that ostension is a part of language acquisition, it certainly cannot be a primary or elementary part, and indeed it is actually quite a sophisticated achievement that occurs in connection with a whole array of other ways in which concepts are acquired.

Ok, now there's much more to be said about ostensive definition and the acquisition of rules of use for concepts that we'll come onto when we get into the PI later. For now let's just note that it's this fetish of ostensive definition that is in some respects informing, as well as all of these other currents of thought that are informing, the notion that the meaning of a word is the thing it stands for. And that in acquiring and using language, what one is doing is one is producing the names for the things that one has been exposed to in acquiring language.

So on page 1. [Tr: BLUE BOOK] Wittgenstein says:

What is the meaning of a word?

Let us attack this question by asking, first, what is an explanation of the meaning of a word; what does the explanation of a word look like? ...

Asking first "What's an explanation of meaning?" has two advantages. You in a sense bring the question "what is meaning?" down to earth. For surely to understand the meaning of "meaning" you ought also to understand the meaning of "explanation of meaning". Roughly: "let's ask what the explanation of meaning is, for whatever that explains will be the meaning." [Tr: BLUE BOOK,

P. 1]

So to ask "what is the meaning of a word?" in isolation from asking for an explanation of the meaning is rather like asking for the length of an object in isolation from an operation of measurement. That is, as if the answer to the question "what is the meaning of a word?" could be achieved in another way than through giving an explanation of the meaning, would be rather like asking what is the length of something, but figuring that it could be given in a way other than through an operation of measuring. That's important because you see what logicians have tended to do is to think of meaning in isolation from the practice of explaining the meaning, to think that meaning is somehow hidden behind the ordinary vernacular explanations we may give. And Wittgenstein is beginning to remind us here that meaning is a common or garden concept, and that explanations of meaning are things that we actually give, i.e., to give an explanation of the meaning is something we do, it's an activity, and we do it for various purposes, and different sorts of things could count as explaining the meaning of a word for different sorts of purposes. As he then goes on to say [Tr: p. 1. BLUE BOOK]:

Studying the grammar of the expression
"explanation of meaning" will teach you
something about the grammar of the word
"meaning" and will cure you of the
temptation to look about you for some
object which you might call "the
meaning".

As if any explanation of meaning that fails to come up with a characterization of the object for which the word stands is to that extent logically defective, which would be the classical way of thinking about ordinary explanations of meaning, they are logically defective to the extent that they fail to give you the essence, the Simple, the object, the thought for which the word stands, and which of course, is in some sense construed as an invariant, a constant, even if hidden, constant feature of the external word that is now being labelled or named by the use of the words.

What one generally calls
"explanations of the meaning of a word"
can VERY ROUGHLY,

- and indeed this is a rough cut, there's no way that this would be acceptable in the PI, but it get's us climbing the ladder.

.. can VERY ROUGHLY, be divided into verbal and ostensive definitions. It will be seen later in what sense this division is only rough and provisional (and that it is, is an important point). The verbal definition, as it takes us from one verbal expression to another, in a sense gets us no further. In the ostensive definition however we seem to make a much more real step towards learning the meaning.

One difficulty which strikes us is that for many words in our language there do not seem to be ostensive definitions; e.g. for such words as "one", "number", "not", etc.

Question: Need the ostensive definition itself be understood? -
Can't the ostensive definition be misunderstood?

If the definition explains the meaning of a word, surely it can't be essential that you should have heard the word before. It is the ostensive definition's business to GIVE it a meaning. Let us explain the word "tove" by pointing to a pencil and saying "this is tove". [Tr: BLUE BOOK, p. 1-2; italics in the original - indicated here by capitalization]

And then Wittgenstein goes on to note the ways in which an ostensive definition, if it's construed as an exclusive, isolated, mechanism for imparting the meaning of the words, couldn't do it, because independently of a linguistic environment in which it could have its proper home, there's no way that the ostensive definition could: a. be construed as an operation of imparting the explanation of the meaning of a word, and b. even if it was, there's no way in which one could be sure that the child has even the proper syntactic category in which to, so to speak, 'fit' the thing. So, I point to "tove", the definition could then be interpreted to mean: "... this is a pencil, this is round, this is wood, this is one, this is hard, etc. etc" [Tr: BLUE BOOK, p. 2] - just the way we were talking about the cloud in the sky.

Ah hah! But now it seems like we've hit a circle. Because if we say that ostensive definition is really not self-sufficient for getting the meanings of words imparted to people, if ostensive definition is not THE way of explaining the meaning, or the primordial way of explaining the meanings of things, then it seems we're going to be caught back in the circularity of language use itself, because as Wittgenstein says, very roughly, it seems, explanations of meaning are either one of two forms; they are either ostensive or verbal: that's what it is [Tr: JC points], that's a table [Tr: JC points], OR table means something that you put things on, table is something usually made of wood or metal. So, either we're into pointing, or we're back into the maze of words. And both appear to presuppose that the kid already has access to the very conceptual apparatus that would enable it to handle being thrust back into the maze of words, that verbal explanations of meaning are designed to-...

[Tr: tape change]

Jeff Coulter(cont):

One might object to this argument that all these interpretations presuppose another word-language. And this objection is significant if by "interpretation" we only mean "translation into a word-language". - Let me give some hints which might make this clearer. Let us ask ourselves what is our criterion when we say that someone has interpreted the ostensive definition in a particular way. ... Supposing then I give him the order "now pick a banjo from amongst these things." If he picks what we call a "banjo" we might say "he has given the word 'banjo' the correct interpretation"; if he picks some other instrument - " he has interpreted 'banjo' to mean 'string instrument'".

We say "he has given the word 'banjo' this or that interpretation:", and are inclined to assume a definite act of interpretation besides the act of choosing. [Tr: Blue Book, p.2]

All right, what Wittgenstein is there doing, he's there carrying on the discussion in respect of the matter of ostensive definition, noting that one way in which someone might argue how ostensive definition could work in imparting the meaning is that somebody would have to give an interpretation to the thing being pointed at before it could be found to be the meaning of the word being used, and that of course thrusts us back into the word-language.

Let's stop here for a moment, because the next several passages are attempts to undermine other possible candidates for linking the operation of ostensive definition to the acquisition of the concept on the part of the child, different gambits might be tried out. For example, that what happens is the association is set up in the child's mind between the image of the thing pointed to and the word. So that on subsequent occasions, the child has the image in mind, so to speak, stored away that it can now use as a point for INTERNAL ostensive definition on its own behalf. Let's leave that aside for a moment and come back to the matter of being thrust back into the word-language.

For Wittgenstein, of course, learning the meanings of words, or learning a language, learning how to use words is really not a matter of being given definitions whether ostensive or verbal, of course. He is going to eventually argue that the whole problem here is encapsulated in the notion of explaining the meaning in terms of giving a definition, where ostensive definition and verbal definition are seen to be the two possibilities. So somehow or other imparting the meanings of words is a matter of equipping the child with definitions, whether ostensive or verbal. Having undermined the notion that the definitions could be purely ostensively arrived at, he then starts to work on the notion that the definitions could be verbal ones. In the process, what he says is, first of all, that to understand a definition as a definition, or to understand an explanation of the meaning of something as an explanation of the meaning of something, already itself presupposes the acquisition of concepts in the first instance. And explaining the meaning of something, whether by verbal or ostensive definition, can't be the primordial way in which children acquire language, and therefore cannot be the primary way in which the meanings of concepts could be elucidated.

Edith Rosenthal: Is the verbal definition what I think of as the operational definition - the activity of doing something as the definition?

Jeff Coulter: No it's like table-

Edith Rosenthal: -ing words. {JC: uh huh } the thing you put things on.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah. A table is something you put things on, a chair is something you sit on-

Edith Rosenthal: Functional, sort of a functional definition.

Jeff Coulter: Well, yeah, whatever it might happen to be and there are various possible definitions that one can give for things, various possible explanations that one can give for things. Being driven back into the word-language shows you that defining things whether verbally or ostensively can't be the way in which language is acquired because it presupposes language which the child hasn't yet got in order for the practice to make sense as what it is. As Wittgenstein says later, in order to understand a dictionary definition one must be able already to know what a dictionary is, and to have mastered the practice of looking up words, and so on.

So what then is the basis for acquiring concepts? Well it turns out, as Wittgenstein says, that logicians from Augustine to Russell and Whitehead and so on have greatly over-intellectualized the process of language acquisition. Or as we would say these days, it is overly cognitivized. What's involved, at least in the most elementary instances, is a matter of getting kids to engage in practices in which language is interwoven. So that, for example, what is involved in acquiring a concept like 'table', being able to use a concept like 'table', knowing what a 'table' is, being able to explain what a 'table' is, properly, involves such things as engaging in a variety of different sorts of practices involving tables. For example, putting things on them and taking them off, fetching and carrying, obeying commands to clear the table, discriminating tables from things that aren't tables, mastering the various roles that things like tables have in different human practices. And that involves NOT being given ostensive or verbal definitions but rather being trained in operations involving the phenomena, where we are dealing here of course now still restrictedly with those

concepts that can be used referentially, like 'table', and what's involved here is drill and training. Not drill and training of a merely associative form, in the sense of 'coming up with the word when the thing is pointed to', mastering an association in that sense, but drill and training in practices involving the concept at issue. So the notion is that from the very beginning the child is inducted into a variety of "language-games". So we might as well bring in the notion now... in which the concept in question, the word or phrase or expression in question, is embedded in a variety of conventionally available practices with respect to the, in the case of referring expressions now, the phenomena in the world that you can refer to with the use of the concept. But notice now that involved in these language-games, involving the concept of 'table', are many many other operations, many distinctive operations OTHER THAN 'referring to the table'. So referring to the table, or indicating the table with the use of the word is one among many uses of the concept of 'table'. And in fact it is almost certainly not a primary use. Indeed if you look at language acquisition you really find things like giving explanations of meaning in the sense of verbal definitions or using ostension in the language acquisition process is something that goes on later than the acquisition of elementary concepts. A kid, for example, certainly doesn't learn to call its father 'daddy' by having mommy point to daddy and say that's 'daddy', etc.etc. But it's not just that kids are drilled and trained in these different language-games, but that now, of course, in the explanation of the meaning of a concept, to give the meaning of the concept of 'table' in terms restricted to its possible use in a referring expression is now not really to give you a full explanation of the meaning of the concept of 'table'.

For example, let's say that you wanted to give somebody an explanation of the meaning of a referring expression - We won't use 'table' because there's no way in which somebody could acquire the concept by being given it as an explanation in the first instance - Let's use an esoteric notion, let's use the notion of 'taks'. None of you have ever heard of the notion of 'taks', right? Let's say that we're going to now give you both an ostensive and a verbal definition of 'taks'. Ok, here's an ostensive definition of 'tak':




Figure. 1: A "tak".

Now the verbal definition: tak is an amorphous blob-like object with amoeba-like protuberances.




Figure 2. Not a "tak".

So, is that [Tr: Figure 2] a 'tak'? No. It couldn't be a "tak". Suppose you had not seen that, and you're told it's all this, and I put that on the board and you know very well that that's not a case of it. So I can give you a referentially usable definition, so you can now go around the world and find cases of tak's, or I could give you just that [Figure 1.], and you could indeed now go around the world and find cases of tak's. But what I've given you here in the referential verbal definition, or the referentially usable verbal definition is something that you could perhaps best call, as Kovesi [JC: see MORAL NOTIONS] does, I've given you its "recognitor", I've given you a recognitor for it, I've given you a way, a method, that you could perhaps now use to recognize an n+1 instance. But you still don't know what the word tak means. Now I have to tell you that it is a peculiar sort of cloud formation found over Malaysia in the monsoon period, let's say. Now we're getting to get a sense of what it might mean, and moreover and I can now sort of elaborate upon

the meaning of tak by going into its various properties in respect of its periodicity of occurrence, its availability to the naked eye or not, and so on and so forth. So even when we are dealing with referentially usable bits of the language, and we give ostensive and verbal definitions, we still haven't been able to lay out the rules of use. You still haven't got access to the rules of use. Neither a verbal definition nor an ostensive definition in and of themselves provide you with the rules for use, of the concept of 'tak', say, or the concept of anything.

Seminar Member: Couldn't I object and say that the verbal definition is not a complete definition?, the complete definer, and that's why-().

Dusan Bjelic: Which are based () in mathematically complete definition. I mean that is such a problem everywhere, you will give definition for triangles, squares and other mathematical objects.

Jeff Coulter: OK, in the BLUE BOOK Wittgenstein would, I think, say something like, as he does on page 25.:

We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we don't know their real definition, but because there is no real 'definition' to them. To suppose that there MUST be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules.

Here it seems as if what he's saying is that you could never have a wholly completed definition of something. Later what he's going to say is that you can speak of a complete definition or an exact definition vis-a-vis an inexact or in-complete one only for certain purposes. So for certain purposes like providing you, a mature language user, with the referential usability of 'tak' in a naming language-game, that's [Tr: points to board] sufficient. But in terms of giving the rules of usage, it's certainly not sufficient. But then there's an additional issue: Would the rules of use, when laid out, have that [Tr: points to board] sort of form? Is it possible, in other words, to speak of the rules of use of concepts as sequences of definitions embedded one in the other? That's something that we'll come onto; it's explicitly dealt with in the INVESTIGATIONS. One

of the arguments made is that you cannot specify rules of use in the ways in which you may specify definitions. Why? Because definitions, in the sense of lexicographic definitions, referential definitions, presuppose the possibilities of rules of use that they themselves do not give. They can be embedded into rules of use, but they themselves do not provide rules of use. We'll look at that later; we'll come onto that later on.

[Tr: Pauses for comments, questions; none are raised]

Let me just say this then to sum up. Where we're going with this discussion is to the point at which it's going to be claimed that meaning is importantly connected to linguistic practices, and those linguistic practices are far more ramifying than ones involving verbal or ostensive definitions, and that the meanings of concepts are to be elucidated by adducing the rules for their use in language-games, or linguistic practices. In the notion of a linguistic practice, of course, we've got to encompass practices that go beyond those which the formal logicians had reduced them to, namely, the label-for-object relation, or the naming relation, or the referential functioning language-game, or the referring language-game. And one has to embrace the array of conventionalized practices relating to the concept in question. So, in order to understand the meaning of a word, or in order to be said to have mastered a concept, to have acquired a concept, you have to have developed a practical mastery with respect to the sorts of contexts in which the concept can be sensibly employed, where context includes also what one could call loosely the 'co-text'. That is, in order to have mastered a concept like 'tak', for instance, it's not just now that you can go about the world pointing to 'taks' and saying "tak", or that you could come up with a definition like that [Tr: points] that provides for any next speaker a method of recognition, but you must also know that 'taks' are the sorts of things that are to be found in the sky, they're the sorts of things that meteorologists can talk about, they're the sorts of things that are composed of droplets of water that can bring rain, they're the sorts of things that occur in certain seasons, they're the sorts of things that could in principle be measured, they have mass, they have color, and so forth. In other words, in order fully to understand any concept you have to have some grasp of what other concepts can and cannot connect with it. So if you hear somebody saying that he has a tack in a box, you

know he's really talking about a t-a-c-k and not a t-a-k. So, the point is that the capacity to understand and use a concept requires along with it the capacity to understand and use other concepts, in order to know which concepts can and which cannot intelligibly connect with the concept in question. And it's in this sense that Wittgenstein says, page 5.:

The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language. [Tr: BLUE BOOK, p. 5]

That's not quite right. What he will later say, which is much more perspicuously correct, is that to understand a concept presupposes mastery of a conceptual apparatus, which is not quite the same as saying to understand a sentence means understanding a language. Because, of course, kids can start to understand particular sentences without us being able to say of them that they now understand 'English', they can now speak 'English'. It's not yet a sufficient criterion for attributing the mastery of the language that they can come up with simple sentences, like: "mommy's gone". That's a sentence. Like it could say that before I'd ever dream of saying of it that she could speak English. What is being touched on here, what is being anticipated, is the 'holistic conception of language', that concepts belong to an articulated array of concepts, and so to understand any given concept fully, properly, to have mastery of it, to be able to provide the rules for its use requires that you have mastery over other concepts. So, for example, you can be suddenly surprised by your kid if you think that he or she has gotten a hold of the meaning of the word 'bed', say, or any other word, and suddenly puts it in a sentence in combination with a wholly inappropriate concept. We're not prepared usually to grant that the child is engaged in 'metaphor', because to be engaged in explicit metaphor presupposes the possibility of proper literal usages, or proper non-metaphorical usage. Metaphor is a later art and craft. So what we do is we start correcting kids. Hanna Pitkin in WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE has some lovely examples of that, where she figured a kid had understood - I forget what concept it was -

Edith Rosenthal: Something about coffee, I can't do without my coffee in the morning.

Jeff Coulter: "I can't function", yes, "I can't function without it mommy", or something like that, for which Hanna Pitkin suddenly figured that: well maybe the kid understands 'function', a use of 'function'. But then encounters the child using the concept in connection with other concepts that showed that in fact this wasn't the case. For example, maybe: "I had a long function Mommy", or a short function, or "My function's upside-down", or whatever.

Now notice here that Wittgenstein is speaking about a "system of signs", and "the sign (the sentence)... understanding a sentence means understanding a language." [Tr: BLUE BOOK, p. 5] There's no doubt that these kinds of passages in the BLUE BOOK, in particular, are showing still the influence of Frege. It's time to talk a bit about Frege.

We've already encountered Frege in the distinction between 'sense' and 'reference', which was a very good initial cut of the cake. Before Frege, sense and reference were pretty well scrunched together in the history of logical reasoning about language.

Frege also made some other distinctions of critical importance that Wittgenstein incorporates into his thinking, but will eventually transcend in significant ways. One of these is Frege's famous dictum: Only in the context of a sentence does a word make sense. And only in the context of a language does a sentence make sense. Two of Frege's famous logical dictums. Why are they important? Because Frege's attempting to smash Logical Atomism, the idea that a word is given its meaning by its standing for something. What he's saying in these famous dicta is: A word only makes sense in the context of a sentence. And in the examples he gives to show how this must be the case, he's hinting at the sorts of things that we've just been talking about, namely that to really understand a word means to understand what kinds of other words could be connected with it in the production of speech, in the production of intelligible speech, in the production of well-formed sentences. And to understand a sentence presupposes that you know whatever kinds of sentences can be related to that sentence. So, for example, if you're given an order "go over there" and you say something like "no thanks", then

either you're making a joke or you simply haven't grasped the meaning of what's being told to you which is: You've been given an order to move yourself from one place to another, but you have taken it to be something else. So that in a sense to understand a sentence as 'an order', as 'giving you an instruction', presupposes that you know the kind of other sentence that characteristically or conventionally relates to being given an order is to obey it. The primary point of ordering or commanding is to obey, and that something that counts as disobedience is not the sort of thing that in the first instance counts as treating the matter as other than an order. Though later it's a way of disobeying an order to treat it as not having been an order. What you expect from your kid when you give your kid something that sounds like it should be construed as an order is a response that shows you that the kid is orienting to the thing as indeed an order. So in one sense what's being said here by understanding a sentence, only in the context of understanding a language can you understand a sentence, is the notion that sentences relate to other sentences. This is all in Frege. A word has meaning only in the context of a sentence, and a sentence has meaning only in the context of a language where for Frege a language is understood as a set of sentences. Not so for Wittgenstein. Except here in the BLUE BOOK it's still being thought of in a very sentential kind of way. And language is still being thought of in a very systemic kind of way. But that's fine, because the holism of language remains in the later Wittgenstein.

[Tr: Brief interlude to discuss the depth of the snow that is falling]

Jeff Coulter: The bottom of page 4.: "...if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use." And yet having said all that, go back to page 25. and you see that the rules of use are not to be construed as a formal calculus of rules. And in the BLUE BOOK we are in the peculiar position of objecting to the various non-praxiological conceptions of meaning, the non-use based conceptions of meaning, ostensive definition whether it be physical or mental, verbal definition. We've had the notion of language as a holistic array of signs, concepts, but we still have the sentential, the business of the sentence coming out of Frege. We have an initial introduction of the notion of 'criteria' for proper use in the passages just preceding the one I've

read on page 25., but we still don't have a clear sense of what Wittgenstein could be talking about when he talks about rules of use. And the concept of 'logical grammar' has not yet been fleshed out in the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS. Logical grammar being the notion of rules of use that is to replace the notion of a formal calculus of rules of use.

Let's stop there, since we're nearly at the end.

I've skipped quite a bit of the stuff on the role of things going on in the mind here, which we could take up again next time. That was deliberate because you can't do everything at once. And I've also skipped various other things, but-

Eileen Crist: In relation to this knowing a concept, is there some hint of an irrational aspect, that there's knowledge- that at a certain level that you can't put into words a concept that you know? Is there some hint of that at all in Wittgenstein?

Jeff Coulter: I don't find it. I think I find instead that if something has a meaning that it must be possible to explain the meaning, because meaning is connected to explaining meaning.

Dave Bogen: But then it's still (the) proposition?

Jeff Coulter: No, of course not-

Dave Bogen: Which would be- the point of that is the () construe this proposition {right!} that you couldn't take (). [Tr: very hard to hear]

Jeff Coulter: In the TRACTATUS you've got that, that conception where if you can't say something in terms of a proposition with a truth-function, true or false, then where of you cannot speak there of you must be silent. But that's because in the TRACTATUS Wittgenstein is wedded to the notion that only propositions with truth-values, or truth-functions, have sense, have intelligibility. And that ordinary language consists of things that need to be cleaned up and tidied up so we can understand the propositional core and propositional functions of language. And of course that excludes a good deal of human experience, but Wittgenstein says those things are beyond the logic of language, and can't properly be said. Though we may think we make sense when we make like theological, moral or ethical statements,

or other kinds of claims that appear to lack truth-values, though we may think we understand them, in fact we don't. But that was of course the logician's own self-imposed limit.

Dave Bogen: I have a passage on page 17 that I wanted to see if I could make something of too - where's he's talking about language-games, I think it gets into what seems to me a tension between sort of the systemic conception of language and whatever he's going to move into - just the bottom of that first paragraph.

When we look at such simple forms of language the mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language disappears. We see activities, reactions which are clear-cut and transparent. On the other hand we recognize in these simple processes forms of language not separated by a break from our more complicated ones. We see that we can build up the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms.

It seems that in that there's the beginnings- or the leftovers of some sort of foundational claim. And then there's the question as to the relationship of what he's doing here to something like a systematic conception of language is what building off of that last thing actually means. We see that we can build up - whether it's sort of like transformations, for instance, which would be to say a transformation off of basic forms, or whether it's sort of like somebody shovelling mud into a big pile and the mud sort of falls in some way that might be described as a 'mud-pile'- then out of that some of it can be moved more easily, and some of it - at bottom and center - less so. But I'm not quite sure where this passage sits then in relation to this 'mud-pile' conception. What is it going to be ()?

Jeff Coulter: In the BLUE BOOK, the notion of language-game is pretty well restricted to what he calls primitive forms of language that kids are going to be inducted into. In the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, language-games include both the most elementary forms and an array of other things. In the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, language-games are restricted pretty much to those simple forms.

Dave Bogen: But I mean to the extent that there's the understanding of certain elementary or primitive forms, then that conception is a sort of foundationalism, (), it could be used that way {JC: mmuh), I've never seen it done that way with those foundational claims. I think it's open to not only that same sort of reading but what would be an analytic program, say, of uncovering the primitive forms, something like that. Now is that part of the later Wittgenstein? [Tr: ? head shake] No.

Edith Rosenthal: He repudiates the idea of analysis to basic forms, doesn't he?

Jeff Coulter: I don't think he would have very much to say about a study of childhood language acquisition. In one place he says: it may seem like we're doing child psychology, and we're not. What we're doing when we make reference to the acquirability of concepts is all the time showing that concepts belong in systems of public practices. And that it may well be that you can build more complex language-games from simple ones, but then there is a point at which you might be inducted straight away by training and drill and practice into a new language-game, but there'll always be relationships to prior ones, to prior language-games. There couldn't be such a thing as a-

[Tr: snow report - class begins to break up]

[Tr: someone makes a comment or asks a question to which Jeff begins to respond, but the first part is inaudible]

Jeff Coulter: () like with 'slab', which means 'bring me the slab'. And what Wittgenstein says is that there's no reason why you should think of slab in that context as an elliptical form of 'bring me a slab'. After all you could equally well think of 'bring me a slab' as an extended form of 'slab'. In other words, whilst you can have an extension from a simple language-game to a more elaborate command like 'please bring me a slab' or a request like 'please bring me a slab', he doesn't get into the detailed ontogenesis of language as a purely EMPIRICAL issue.

Dave Bogen: () so for instance if you wanted to argue that certain sequences were logical transformations off of more basic structures, which is to say this is a transformation off of some base.

Jeff Coulter: No, no, you can't bring those two together. {D.B.: what, these two issues?} No, because a language-game is nothing like a sequence structure in conversation analysis.

Dave Bogen: () When you talk about base structure, you're talking about a logical relationship that is one of transformation, right? {JC: right} Now is that just a part of the logic of the argument or is that a part of something that would in principle need to be acquired in order to pull this thing off like this?

Jeff Coulter: I never thought about it in terms of language acquisition issues.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: I'm not sure either that a relationship to a base sequence is necessarily a transformation off of it.

Jeff Coulter: Let's keep CA out of it until much later.

Dave Bogen: No, that's why I was asking the question. I mean that's the way you had expressed was in terms of transformations-

Jeff Coulter: By the analyst.

Dave Bogen: That's what I'm asking.

Jeff Coulter: That's going to take us off into a digression, but let's talk about it.

[Tr: Please Note: A snow storm was moving into the Boston area during the end of this class. The members of the class were trying to sort out their ways of getting home through the end of this discussion.]

TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

These transcriptions were prepared from an audio recording, the auditory quality of which was not always optimal. Participating members, especially Jeff Coulter,

have reviewed initial drafts of the transcripts and have attempted to clarify portions that were particularly difficult to hear, and also provided assistance in correcting errors in transcription that were made during the production of the first draft of each session. The generous assistance of all those involved is gratefully acknowledged. Particular appreciation goes out to Jeff Stetson who took on the laborious task of copy-editing. Unfortunately, not all errors in transcription, and not all inaudible portions could be corrected given the time lag in producing the transcriptions. The transcriber apologizes for any remaining typographical errors.

The following are conventions employed in producing the transcriptions of these meetings:

- [x] square brackets: Text in square brackets is for the most part that of the transcriber. Such text is indicated by "Tr:" at the beginning of the brackets. It includes: 1. paraphrases of talk, 2. clarification of indefinite references, for example pointing, drawing or writing on the chalk-board, producing a behavioral display etc., 3. information about references to texts referred to in the talk, 4. other general remarks and clarifications and 5. indications of omissions and tape changes. PLEASE NOTE that there is almost always some bit of talk missing at the points of tape change. On occasion, comments in square brackets are insertions offered by those who have edited the text and are indicated as such by the initials of the person in question, e.g., [JC: xxxxxxxx]. Also, if additions or deletions are made in text quoted during the class, then these changes are noted in square brackets, with the speakers initials included within the brackets.
- { x } braces: Text in braces is the talk of persons who are commenting on or responding to the talk of another person who currently has the floor. This talk is introduced by the initials of the person making the remark and/or comment, e.g., {JC: xxxx}.
- (x) parentheses surrounding text: Text in parentheses is the transcriber's best guess as to what was being said when there is some doubt about exactly what was said due to the poor auditory quality of the tape.
- () empty parentheses: Parentheses containing no text indicate a portion of the talk which is not transcribable due to the poor auditory quality of the tape, although it is possible to tell that something was being said.

CAPITALIZATION: Capitalization is used to indicate titles (or partial titles, e.g.: INVESTIGATIONS for the PHILOSOPHICAL

INVESTIGATIONS) for books. It is also used to indicate vocal emphasis by the speaker in question, i.e., something which is spoken noticeably louder, or with more emphasis than the surrounding talk. It was not possible to underline text in the editing/text-formating system employed, which is why capitalization rather than underlining was used in the above cases. This also influenced the forming of terms in languages other than English, e.g.: Übersicht, vis-a vis, etc, which are neither capitalized, nor underlined, although occasionally are explicated in square brackets following the text in question.