

[coulw1.001. Tr.:BJF. 30 August 90: 2nd edited version] Transcription conventions can be found on the last 2-3 pages of each transcript.

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WITTGENSTEIN AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Meeting 1., Thursday, 15 January 87

[Tr: This seminar/discussion-group was organized in response to an interest expressed by a number of persons to become more familiar with the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, and particularly its relation to, and relevance for Ethnomethodology. It was not possible to set it up as a formally organized course due to the teaching and other commitments of the interested parties. It was therefore convened on an extra-curricular basis, and met for a total of 19 sessions, 13 during the spring semester of 1987, and 6 more in the fall of the same year, at which point it broadened into a more general seminar dealing with various topics in the philosophy of the social sciences. Fifteen of the meetings have been transcribed (See Table of Contents), and these constitute the following corpus.]

TOPICS:

Organizational Meeting. The purpose of this meeting was primarily to propose and consider how to proceed; to suggest topics of interest to the assembled parties. In the course of this discussion a number of topics were raised and discussed, as indicated below. The first 16 pages provide an introduction to the seminar organization, and some background material on

Wittgenstein's later work. After this point, the discussion deals with various issues of interest within Ethnomethodology raised by persons who had prior knowledge of this orientation to the study of human conduct. This meeting does not have the focus of topic characteristic of many of the other meetings, but might be of interest to both new-comers and old-hands for the discussion of key issues in Ethnomethodology and the later philosophy of Wittgenstein.

Topics include: Waismann vs. Wittgenstein; The difference between the early and the later Wittgenstein; Attempts to construct a logically perfect language; Wittgenstein's relevance for Sociology; An overview of some of the major considerations dealt with in Wittgenstein's later philosophy; The BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS and their relationship to the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS; Endogenous vs. Exogenous logic; ***** ; Sacks' paper "Everyone Has To Lie"; Wittgenstein and phenomenology; Harvey Sacks' work in a Wittgensteinian context; The notion of 'data' in Ethnomethodology and Wittgenstein; Contrasts with Discourse Analytic work.

MAJOR READINGS FOR THE SEMINAR (Other readings are suggested on a weekly basis):

(1) Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/1958).

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. New York, NY: Macmillan.

(2) Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958). THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS. New York, NY: Harper.

(3) Garfinkel, Harold (1967). STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Jeff Coulter's discussion of the history of formal logic at the beginning of this meeting, and also at the beginning of meeting 2, can be found in a more elaborated form in his paper: Ethnomethodology and the logic of language. (forthcoming) In G. Button (Ed.) ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: A FOUNDATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Jeff Coulter: I'd thought what I would suggest people to read to get into the material was Waismann's THE PRINCIPLES OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY, but that is out of print, and unattainable in bulk. But there is apparently the odd copy around. It's

in the library. It's not absolutely crucial, and in any event Wittgenstein disavowed Waismann's interpretation. So, why would I suggest you have a look at it? The answer is, first of all it's very very clear, it's crystal clear in its own terms, and secondly because it's so clear you can see exactly where he went wrong in interpreting Wittgenstein.

For example, just a simple example, you've probably heard of the notion of an "open-textured" concept. That's Waismann's idea. And what he meant by an open-textured concept was a concept whose meaning cannot be specified in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for proper usage. A "close-textured" concept by contrast would be one that can be specified in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for proper usage, and those were almost always, in Waismann's examples, mathematical or geometrical terms. So that, for example, triangle. Whenever the concept of triangle is invoked, used, mentioned, what it signals is some phenomenon which has three sides whose angles add sum to 180 degrees, and that's it, necessary and sufficient for anything to be called a triangle is that those properties hold of it.

This whole notion of open-texture is a systematic misreading of Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblance" concepts, which we'll talk about later. But it doesn't greatly matter, you see, because the notion of open-texture has its uses. The only thing is, it was really taken from Wittgenstein's lectures on family resemblances, and he got it wrong, and in lots of ways Wittgenstein's analysis is far more sophisticated. It makes far more distinctions and discriminations than Waismann's general dichotomization of concepts into those that are open-textured and those that are closed-textured - not that those are the only analytical contributions Waismann made to the logic of natural language, but in terms of the question of determinateness of sense, and the business of, so called, indeterminateness of sense, Wittgenstein has a more sophisticated analysis which we will perhaps come to in family resemblances.

A related question is that when Waismann sets up this dichotomy with respect to concepts in natural languages as open-textured or closed-textured, he did so under the general heading of "vagueness", the vagueness of most of natural language. He spoke of most natural language concepts as being essentially vague

because they're essentially open-textured. Whereas for Wittgenstein, of course, vagueness is a relational concept, is a purpose-dependent concept, and in no way shape or form would Wittgenstein ever have accepted a generic characterization of natural language in terms of something like the notion of it's being vague, though he's still sometimes read that way, as arguing that language is essentially vague, as distinct from what he argued in the TRACTATUS, and what Frege and the other formal logicians are arguing which is that you cannot have intelligibility unless any and every concept has a determinate sense, which is not to say that Wittgenstein therefore thought that language is essentially precise, because that too is a relational, purpose-dependent concept. But all of these matters we'll come onto later on, that's just to give you a preamble about Waismann and Wittgenstein. And Wittgenstein really repudiated Waismann's interpretations, which is not to say that Waismann didn't make some contributions of his own independently. And in some ways, I think he 's badly done to by Wittgenstein scholars.

Jeff Coulter: Ok, what themes to pick up? Wittgenstein was a great (anti-)philosopher and the major interest, I think, well, a major interest about Wittgenstein is that he changed his mind completely in the middle of his life. So that whilst you can have debates ad infinitum about the early Marx and the later Marx, but really, as far as I can see, on Wittgenstein, though there are some people like Eric Stenius and Anthony Kenny in his old bad days who would argue that really there is a unified Wittgenstein, in fact I think it's fairly clear that there isn't a unified Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's later work is systematically informed by his attempt to completely refute the tradition of formal logical analysis of the properties of language that had reached its apotheosis in his own early work the TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS, and of course in rebutting, and repudiating and critiquing and attempting to destroy the TRACTATUS, as what he called the "sickness of the intellect". He was quite polemical about his early self. He was of course also taking down with him, if the critiques held, taking down with him a tradition of formal logical analysis of natural languages that he had been recognized as the master of.

People like Schlick and the Vienna Circle in the 1930's -- I'd hoped to have this paper ready. I'm doing a paper on logic and Ethnomethodology that I wanted to hand out, but I might get it finished in a couple of weeks and I'll hand it around, because it's got some quotable quotes from various parties -- Schlick, one of the leaders of the Vienna Circle, the Vienna Circle were a group of logicians in the late 20's and early 30's, people like Rudolf Carnap, Morton Schlick, in Britain A. J. Ayer, Fredrick Waismann himself, and the early Wittgenstein.

Schlick says of the TRACTATUS that it was the first to have pushed forward to the decisive turning point in logic whose beginnings had only been dimly perceived by Leibniz and developed by Frege and Bertrand Russell. And of course Bertrand Russell, at Cambridge, was Wittgenstein's Ph.D. supervisor. And the TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS was essentially a doctoral dissertation produced under the egis of Bertrand Russell, who was at that time the English-speaking world's recognized leading logician.

Russell had become really prominent with the publication of his joint work with Alfred North Whitehead of the PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA in which, to cut a very very long story short, he had developed a way of thinking about natural languages that was very current among logicians at the time, which is that they were essentially defective. That in order to achieve clarity of reasoning, especially for the natural sciences, but also for other inquiries, you had to go beyond or in some way clean up or purify natural, ordinary, everyday language. And so you find in the PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA the attempt to construct a logically perfect language, and I'll give you a quote from Russell, from his retrospective on the PRINCIPIA in a paper called "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism".

In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding facts with the exception of such words as 'or', 'not', 'it', 'then', which have a different function. In a logically perfect language there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for the simple things that enter in, one

word for each component. A language of that sort will be completely analytic and will show at a glance the logical structure of the facts being asserted or denied. The language which is set forth in PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA is intended to be a language of that sort. ... It aims at being that sort of a language which if you add a vocabulary would be a logically perfect language. [Tr: Russell, B. The philosophy of logical atomism, I - VII. MONIST, 1918 and 1919. Reprinted in: R.C. Marsh (Ed.) LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE, 1968. Allen and Unwin. Quotes from the latter source, pp. 197-198]

And the search for the construction of the logically perfect language really dates back to Leibniz in the 17th century, whose major contribution to logic was the idea of the "calculus ratiocinator", that is to say the 'thinking machine' whereby what you would work out would be what Leibniz called an "alphabet of humanly possible thinkables". And then the rules whereby, having developed that alphabet, a few of the possible thinkables, which is more or less what Frege later called "the concept", by working out a bunch of rules which are essentially combinatorial rules, hence the notion: the Leibnizian "ars combinatoria", you could generate the set of well formed reasoned propositions that could be acknowledged as intelligible, meaningful, and of course amenable to a clear cut classification in terms of truth or falsity. And that was the project of the 'Calculus Ratiocinator'. And for those of you who know Chomsky, of course, can readily see here, though Chomsky barely acknowledges the fact, that the notion of the generative grammar that projects the infinite set of possibly grammatically correct sentences on the basis of the finite set of rules and lexical items, can see the basis of that notion in Leibniz, although, of course, Leibniz didn't have access to the recursive function theory from algebra that Chomsky used.

Ok, but the idea with Leibniz as well was that languages as we ordinarily speak them need to be purified in some sense. We need to extract from languages the pure thinkables, represent them in an alphabet, and then work out a bunch of rules for producing meaningful and possibly true, possibly false propositions. And of course the idea that language is to be thought of primarily as a set of

possible propositions is one that had dominated logic since Aristotle. The outer most notion of language for logicians was the proposition -- actually not so, the argument, really. But the outer most notion of a linguistic unit was the proposition; the inner most were the connectives like 'and' 'or' 'not' 'then' 'if' 'because' 'therefore' 'thus', and the predicate components: 'is an x', 'is a y', 'could be an n', 'might be a w'.

Obviously we can't get into all of that in the detail that it requires. All I want to abstract from that is the idea that first of all in post-Leibnizian logical thinking the notion of natural languages as somehow defective, and as needing at least minimally to be codified in the terms of propositional formats, and also the notion of a formal calculus of rules, of strict rules, governing the combinatorial possibilities of those elements in a language to produce meaningful propositions. These notions were essentially part of the general backdrop that informed the Vienna Circle work, the *PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA*, and the *TRACTATUS*.

George Psathas: Would this be a discovery kind of logic, or is it the imposed kind of logic? That the analysis would be something that the logician would produce rather than discover. Chomsky would claim that that is somewhere embedded in the biology of the organism. Where were they located?

Jeff Coulter: It was an imposition quite strictly; it was an ideal language. Leibniz referred to it as the "ideal language". But it was basically occasioned by the everyday recognition that people as they go about speaking together very often produce propositions, sentences, statements, and so forth, whose logical form they don't bear upon their face, so to speak. So, for example, a whole array of conceptual puzzles can be generated by what Wittgenstein was later to call "the surface grammar of the sentence". So, for example, to take a well known example: 'this train goes to London', and 'this line goes to infinity', seem to be the same kind of proposition. So that you might therefore think of infinity as a place only very very far away.

The argument is that in the way in which we speak we produce sentences for practical purposes and the kind of reasoning that is expressed in them can be given some sort of modal form.

Dusan Bjelic: So ultimately, Leibniz was interested in explicating the universal intelligibility, and he thought that there's a way based upon that universal intelligibility, which is visible the most in mathematics, that we can construct a new language, which can be spoken by everyone. Which would be something like Esperanto which I think partly came from that-

Jeff Coulter: Which can be spoken NOT by everybody but by logicians.

Dusan Bjelic: Well right, but everybody "understands" or as everybody can regardless of language can learn geometry, can learn algebra, so in the same way we can learn the language. Now the only problem was even if we have Esperanto and can have such a humanitarian impact on humankind, so I mean that we can speak one language, very few people speak that language, very few people think in that language, which means that language is a natural phenomenon. People want to think in the language which is, so to say, naturally embedded in their environment. So even if we have that logic, as Leibniz will give, and that language, it doesn't mean that people will really use that to think!

Jeff Coulter: Ok, there's several things involved in the notion of the construction of the ideal logical language. One of them is, for example, the impact of the rise of the natural sciences, where, for instance, ordinary concepts that one might use to refer to things in the world don't suffice for the construction of scientific accounts. For example, a 'heap of copper'. It's fine for whole bunches of purposes to say there's a 'heap of copper' over there, but you want to have something more precise. The thing that happened was that science was sublime as being almost identical with the pinnacle of all reason, instead of being construed, as Wittgenstein was later to give us to understand, as one language-game among many others. So, what is precise for science, the logicians took over to be - And you can still find it clear in Quine. Quine is the living continuation of the Vienna Circle and (all beyond). - What is precise for science is what is precise. What is vague for science is vague; period. So, that's one impetus - that the logicians were interested in codifying forms of expression and rules for constructing expressions, primarily propositions, which could perspicuously be seen to be true or false in respect of their unambiguous absolute precision. But what they forget is that it's unambiguity in respect of the purposes of

certain scientific discourses, and precision in respect of certain scientific purposes. So, that's a part of it. And this was also something that Husserl was independently to attack, and Husserl attacked it by attacking Frege whilst Wittgenstein attacked it by attacking both Frege and his own former self - and thus an important relation between Wittgenstein and Husserl around this question - though they had different ways of characterizing things, and of course Wittgenstein emphasizes our conceptual apparatus, much more than Husserl who emphasizes matters of our subjective, conscious orientation to things.

Ok, a second impetus which is preserved in the later Wittgenstein and which of course I think is in many ways valid, is to note that it's true that the forms of language that we use can be misleading for certain purposes of reasoning. That thread is never repudiated by Wittgenstein, even when he's repudiating much of the formal logical program. The idea that the aspects of the language we use CAN be misleading to our reasoning is preserved. But the cure for the illness is radically different from the construction of a calculus that will now replace natural languages, and will be sort of imposed upon logicians and natural scientists as their apparatus for reasoning. - But, we'll come onto the cure and so forth, and what Wittgenstein calls the "therapy" later. - So, that is maintained and there are many many places in which Wittgenstein speaks of our ordinary surface grammatical sentences, the stuff that's coming out of my mouth now, as requiring in significant respects careful analysis so that we don't get misled. A couple of examples would be something like: "As I was listening to him I suddenly understood what he said". Taking that just as it stands might lead you to construe 'understanding' as an instantaneous mental accompaniment to listening, but, Wittgenstein goes on: Not so! At the depth grammatical level, 'understanding' is not an act, process, mental process, mental act or anything else, and the analysis of that we'll talk about when we come onto the more detailed examples later on. Other instances would be our tendency to be bewitched by analogies and metaphors in ordinary language. So, for example, "A thought suddenly popped into my head" might lead one to construe the concept of 'thought' as a noun that has as its proper referent some internal, intra-cranial occurrence. Not so says Wittgenstein, and he gives a logical-grammatical analysis to show that that is not the case. Or that if it were the case, then a host of other intelligible locutions would suddenly

be devoid of sense, which is absurd. We'll talk about that later, we'll talk about the actual piece of work.

Dave Bogen: You seem to be talking around this one issue and sort of mentioning it in passing, but I think it's another tack at studying the mallow of early Wittgenstein in talking about the sublime character that was accorded natural sciences. Isn't one of the senses in which the ideal languages were proposed, or certain ideal languages were proposed, with respect to the issue of the precise representation of reality of a descriptive language, right? {JC: right} So that language in the scientific sense had come to fulfill, once we accept that Newtonian mechanics is the last story, let's say, had come to fulfill the sort of criteria of an exact description, of a precise description of reality, so that language is seen only in its representational function when it's going to map one-to-one on the facts of the world with certain combinatorial possibilities, 'and', 'but', 'or' etc., that can be described in set theoretic terms, right? {JC: right} So you'd have a combination of exact one-to-one mapping of logical operators with some combinatorial possibilities that can be described within the domain of set theory, or something like that. And that that would run into problems in another set of examples in the ordinary language with such examples as "I believe that x is the case" where belief cannot be analyzed in terms of that representational function.

Jeff Coulter: Although they tried like hell to do so. Where "I believe" is now thought to be a description of an inner mental something or other.

Dave Bogen: It leads along that road.

Jeff Coulter: Absolutely right, that really is a crucial point about all of these, not just the TRACTATUS, but all of these attempts to construct a logically perfect language was that, as I said earlier, that the logically perfect language would consist essentially in a set of "wff's", i.e., well-formed formulae, propositions that would be generated from the core elements of the core intelligibilia and a bunch of combinatorial rules. But these propositions would primarily be fact-stating, and so they would therefore in a sense be propositions about what there is. They'd be, in that sense, descriptive of reality, and for Wittgenstein, as for Russell, as for Carnap, as for various others, the sense of a descriptive

proposition was given by its 'picturing' in words, elements independently existing in the non-linguistic external reality, with the exception of the connectives. As Russell says very clearly, in his discussion of his MATHEMATICA,

In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would correspond one-by-one with the components of the corresponding facts, with the exception of such words as 'or' 'not' 'if' 'then'. In a logically perfect language there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for the simple things that enter in, one word for each simple component.

So, indeed the representational function is formed as the descriptive function, the propositional function, the fact-stating function, and logicians simply lost sight, eventually, much to their detriment. It's not just that they were carving out a domain that had its own autonomous principles of operation and therefore fine, everyman could study part of a language that he wishes to. But the claims that they were making were more generic, and to that extent, many of the claims they were making about the nature of language and reasoning and the laws of thought, which after all was what they were ultimately involved in representing, turn out to be demolishable in reference to a broader, richer conception of the function of natural languages.

In any case, we don't want to get more deeply into a particular issue in our first meeting. So let's just put that in brackets for a moment, while we discuss what we might be doing in the longer haul. We're not going to be reading the TRACTATUS, though I would suggest that you might have a look at it perhaps a bit later, after we've gotten into some of the material.

The thing is, this is not a course in philosophy, nor is it really a course in Wittgenstein qua Wittgenstein. It's a course, or a discussion group, which I think it really should be, on the later Wittgenstein to be used now, let's say as a set of resources for us as Sociologists, and as sociolinguists, and Ethnomethodologists, which is not to say that that countenances any

sloppiness in the exegesis or interpretation of Wittgenstein. But what it means is that we do not, I think, need all the time to be, as the major textual interpreters do, connecting back to a particular point in Frege, or a particular point in Russell, and showing how Wittgenstein thereby undermines an element of the logical calculus, or whatever. That could be done, and that would be interesting to do, but that's for some other time and some other place.

I propose that what we do is that we try to pick out the- Let me put it this way, the later Wittgenstein is often construed as a very negative thinker, he's a critic, he's attacking misconceptions, he's attacking bad reasoning, he's attacking metaphysics, which for him is not the study of the realm beyond physics but is, as he puts it in THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, for him metaphysics is where bad grammar masquerades as scientific insight, and by grammar there he doesn't just mean school book grammar but the broad notion of logical grammar. What I think we should do is to try pull out the constructive components of Wittgenstein which are dialectically there available, that is to say, if the criticisms of all of these misconceptions stand up then they bespeak alternative ways of construing things. And Wittgenstein was not systematically interested in pulling out these alternative ways of construing things. There's no architectonics, as Peter Hacker would say, about Wittgenstein's later work. It's not given to you as a set of positive defensible theses. What he's doing is he's attacking in sometimes rigorous and intense ways whole orders of what he construes to be misconceptions of things. A primary misconception is, of course, the misconception about the workings of ordinary language that is to be had from a reading of the current history of formal logic, including his own TRACTATUS as the apotheosis of that tradition. But there are lots of other things going on. There's the onslaught against Cartesianism principally that, in some respects, I think it could be argued, wasn't Wittgenstein's primary interest when he set out on his investigations, but follows naturally from his own self-critique. Because in the TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS, it turns out that he says much of these arguments devolve around a notion of what a psychology might be that is totally screwed-up, completely wrong. For example, and centrally, the notion that we, when we speak a language, are implicitly following the precepts of a logical calculus whenever and wherever we may make sense. Secondly, that the meaning of

somebody's remark, proposition, utterance is given to an individual as a mental matter accompanying the physical listening and hearing. He also had several assumptions about the role of unconscious thought, and so forth, in the TRACTATUS. All of these along with the rest of his repudiations are to be found in the picture of the Cartesian notion of the 'subject' that eventually comes to take over his interests.

So there's Wittgenstein the philosopher of language, so to speak, or the anti-philosopher of language, or if you like, the anti-logician of language, where logic is now construed in the former sense, formal logic. Note however that Wittgenstein nowhere says you can no longer have logic. Though Bertrand Russell says of the INVESTIGATIONS: Wittgenstein's thrown logic away. And there are various passages in ON CERTAINTY where Wittgenstein comes back clearly against Russell saying: This may seem to abolish logic but what it does is reconstruct it. So, we've got Wittgenstein, let's say, the thinker about language and meaning. As a result of his reflections and investigations on language and meaning, growing out of them, we have Wittgenstein the philosopher of psychology. And in particular Wittgenstein the nemesis of Descartes and the mind-body dualism. Wittgenstein the underminer, attacker of mentalism, solipsism, the individualization of so many of the things that have been associated with Descartes having to do with our conduct, and our behavior, and our experience. And, of course, it's that Wittgenstein, along with Wittgenstein the thinker of language and meaning, that makes him so relevant for Sociology, and really gives him a right to, though he would never have claimed it and may be spinning in his grave at the idea that somebody might be using him constructively, because he was deliberately destructive, not just of prior logic but of what he thought were diseases of mind that were getting generalized beyond the ivory towers of Oxford and Cambridge; the diseases of the intellect that were generic. For example, Cartesianism, which he really clearly thought was a disease of the intellect, as a systematic set of misconceptions. So, we have Wittgenstein whose standing up against the misunderstanding of the functions and workings of ordinary language, from Augustine through Leibniz, through Frege, through Russell, through his own, and so on. Then we have Wittgenstein the anti-Cartesian, the anti-Cartesian in respect of psychology, in respect of human conduct, emotions, experiences, the cognitive. In relation to that we have Wittgenstein the critic of

skepticism, the anti-skeptic. Remember Descartes: be skeptical of all things. Wittgenstein's whole collection of writings gathered together under the heading ON CERTAINTY - a beautiful little book by the way if you're not familiar with it - is a systematic undermining of the notion of Cartesian doubting.

And at a tangent, we have Wittgenstein the philosopher of mathematics, which we probably won't be able to get much into, and I only know his philosophy of mathematics in a limited way insofar as it bears upon matters having to do with mathematical necessity and rule following. There's a lot in the REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS that I don't understand because I don't know enough mathematics. For example, his critique of Dedekind, and his discussions of Cantor and various other matters, I just can't follow them. And I've never really gotten the sense from anyone who does know that stuff that it's especially pertinent to the sorts of interests that we as Sociologists might have, though maybe down the line there will be people who will make connections.

So I propose then that we concentrate first on Wittgenstein on language and meaning, and show how these sort of things work. And that we all show how they work, because, as I say, I can't do it all didactically. And then we will see how Wittgenstein the philosopher of psychology, or the thinker about psychology, emerges from these considerations in a quite natural fashion. And how devastating those parts of his later work are, particularly the later parts of the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, and ZETTEL, which is German for 'jottings', that's been collected together as a book. And then we can follow from those parts of the PI on rules and rule following, that are followed up in the REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS, to some extent, where he makes some shaper distinctions and discriminations, and then I think it's probably worthwhile considering what the project of Wittgensteinian logical grammar looks like when it's pursued. So those are the sorts of things I think we should focus on. There are other areas of Wittgenstein as well, there's Wittgenstein on aesthetics, Wittgenstein on values, but I think these are the primary things we should work at.

And since we can't all of us get access to Waismann's popularization of the PI, the PRINCIPLES OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY, which is a translation into English from the German original, why don't we start out by picking up copies of the BLUE AND

BROWN BOOKS. And start out by reading the BLUE BOOK, which is the first 74 pages of the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS.

Why the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS? Well, quite simply, what the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS are, they are collected lectures that Wittgenstein himself retyped, and mimeoed, and bound in blue covers and brown covers, and distributed to students at Cambridge. What they consist in, it turns out, are preliminary studies for the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. And when you compare and contrast the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS to the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS you find all sorts of little discrepancies, but almost always you'll find that in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS the treatment of the point now has a meaning immensely more supported. So, for example, in the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, Wittgenstein is still allowing understanding to, on occasion, be something mental. That is totally demolished in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, just as an example. You find that he allows a bit more weight to be given to the role of propositions in language in the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS. So you can see he's on the way in the BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS. It's way beyond the TRACTATUS, it's systematically repudiating the TRACTATUS, there are lots of critical references to the TRACTATUS, but it's not quite there. But it's a very useful way in.

[Tr: omits: arrangements for meeting time, etc.]

[Tr: The paper Jeff Coulter is working on: "Ethnomethodology and the Logic of Language"] which tries to show some of these things in some detail and take them to Ethnomethodology - which is of course where we always end up, right? - as like a proper progenitor, in certain respects but not in all, of Wittgensteinian thought about the way that ordinary language works and the way ordinary reason works as, for example, what I'm calling an "endogenous" realization of the project of logical analysis, as contrasted to "exogenous" logical analysis of the TRACTATUS, PRINCIPIA, Frege and kind. Exogenous in the sense exactly as we've been saying it: looks at language, finds it in various ways defective and tries to figure out what is its internal logic, in fact it's even denied that it really is logical ultimately, but finds there the elements from which to construct a logical language - that's exogenous logic. But with Wittgenstein we are moving toward the notion of an endogenous logic, namely the idea that, as Wittgenstein puts

it in various ways, language is ok as it is. It is often strangely misread by people who should know better to mean Wittgenstein is a gross linguistic and cultural conservative, meaning that everything that's said is fine. This is not what he's saying. You'll find people like Ernest Gellner and various people saying that. What he says when he means that language is in order as it stands, what he's saying is: It embodies its own principles of operation, and that formal logicians have been insufficiently sensitive to its situated, purposeful USE. ...

[Tr: tape change]

Jeff Coulter(cont): ...or the syllogism - there's the first logical formalism - was in a sense a codification of some rules that appeared to govern valid arguments, that were real arguments that people were making. But then in the attempt to purify, abstract and codify in the ways that logic went, partly under the impact of the apotheosis of the natural sciences, partly also under the influence of the developments in mathematics, and the idea that mathematics is a pure symbolic formalism that logicians need to appeal to in order to get some order in their own reasoning about reasoning, in general, it gets lost. The endogenous character of the whole enterprise of logic, i.e., the analysis of 'logos' or reason gets lost in respectable ordinary reasoning. And what you've got in Wittgenstein and the later people is a rediscovery of internal principles. And there I would argue that the work of Sacks is quite a unique contribution here, a sort of realization of endogenous logic not just for concepts but for a whole array of practical matters - which is why Basil Blackwell will want to publish Sacks' collected works, because they are the Wittgenstein publishers.

Dusan Bjelic: I would like to find in this course an answer to why Wittgensteinian analysis ends ultimately in a sociology of logic, and why current natural language study and Ethnomethodology are methodological continuations of his analysis.

Jeff Coulter: That's what I'm interested in trying to do, yeah.

Dusan Bjelic: Because reading Sacks, I see that in his work discussion between Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle is still relevant, and he gives a concrete example of why Reichenbach was wrong with wanting to mathematize language. He says: language is always context-bound, and for instance why "Everybody has to lie". It's an example of how language is always context-bound.

Jeff Coulter: That's a paper I'm going to suggest everybody read: "Everyone has to Lie" by Harvey Sacks, [Tr: in M. Sanchez and B. G. Blount (Eds.) SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF LANGUAGE USE (pp. 57-80). New York: Academic, 1975] because it's one of his most obviously logical papers, in the sense that it's explicitly an analysis of the logic of a proposition: Everyone has to lie. Which first of all contains the universal quantifier, "every". It is a neat crisp proposition that appears to have universality of scope, and all the rest of it. It seems to be either true or false. It seems on its face to be obviously false: Everybody has to lie. It doesn't perhaps have some properties of qualifying as a wholly well-formed proposition by certain standards, but by some standards it can be seen to be a proposition. The point of his analysis is to show that if you take that as a proposition, and just look at it in terms of its logical form in the classical sense, you'll never appreciate its ENDOGENOUS logic which is wholly at variance with what it has on its face. There's another example of an ordinary expression that might seem to have clear cut meaning, and clear cut truth value, or determinable truth value anyway, because if you can find one person who doesn't lie then it's false. And yet in Sacks' hands the analysis is wholly different and clearly more satisfactory in lots of ways. It's wholly his most Wittgensteinian kind of paper. Some people read it for the couple of passages it has on "hello-hello", "goodbye-goodbye" in order to dismiss Harvey Sacks - which is unfortunate. It would turn out that it is very consequential. As, of course, people sometimes do when looking at this stuff, they figure that it's dealing with itsy-bitsy tiny () pieces, and yet always what you come out with are theoremic types of claims that have vast generality. So one of the things we're going to get used to is the notion of "generality" without statistical frequency or distribution. You can have vast generality without counting more than ONE case, provided it is what Wittgenstein speaks of as a "perspicuous representation". But, of course, even Wittgenstein recognizes that in order to know what a

"perspicuous representation" might be, you may have to do a "surview", which is very different from a "survey". A survieu is when you take a collection of variants off of a single kind of form of an utterance, or an expression, or use of a concept, and look at the possibilities, look at the combinatorial tolerances and relations.

Dusan Bjelic: Where does he speak about this concept survieu?

Jeff Coulter: "Ubersicht".

Dusan Bjelic: Oh!, ok.

Jeff Coulter: In fact, there is a chunk on "Everyone Has To Lie" in the paper on logic and Ethnomethodology.

But, of course, the point of the later Wittgenstein and areas of Harvey Sacks - that we'll be getting into - is not just to make an irony about of poor old formal logicians. It should be and can be the beginning of a project, not so much for the sociology of logic concern because it's not that it's a sociology OF logic, it's a sociological logic really, which is what I take to be the strongest suit of Ethnomethodological accomplishments, socio-logos by contrast to sociometry, sociometrics.

And occasionally it will be useful to counterpose, or compare and contrast the later Wittgenstein to the later Husserl, or the middle Husserl - whenever Husserl was speaking about the same things, or similar things. For example, not a lot of people know that Husserl also had a notion of logical grammar, and it had significant similarities to Wittgenstein's notion of logical grammar. But yet it never plays a major part in his thinking. He never really exploits and develops that. For Wittgenstein, it's really a cornerstone. Husserl is thought of as the philosopher of consciousness, and Wittgenstein is sort of the philosopher of ordinary language. But there's a lot of discussion of language and ordinary language in parts of Husserl, and there's quite a lot of discussion of consciousness and mind in Wittgenstein, but they're still very different in lots of ways.

Dusan Bjelic: [Tr(para): See where those two lines of thought have common ground - because there is some common ground] [Tr: very hard to hear on tape]

Jeff Coulter: Absolutely. Wittgenstein a few times says, only half jokingly, but then of course perhaps only half seriously, that he was a phenomenologist. He said it several times to Drury, in Drury's conversations with Wittgenstein. There are places in some of his writings, particularly the PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR - which is an earlier mid-Tractarian, mid-Blue/Brown Books type thing that I'm not going to get into, perhaps that's for Wittgenstein scholasticism - but in there we have lots of hostility to phenomenology. Several paragraphs in which he says phenomenology is bunk because it misunderstands itself, it thinks it can transcend. He thought of it as bad metaphysics. But I think that there's some evidence to suggest that at least when he finished the basic work that went into the PI - which was made available in 1949, but published in 1953, and Wittgenstein died in 1951 - but around that time, when he was having conversations, it seems, though nobody quite knows from where, it seems he began to appreciate that Husserlian, particularly later Husserlian phenomenology was NOT really psychologistic in the way in which some of his earlier remarks have appeared to be construed. And that the notion of "constitution", for example, is not necessarily to be read as a matter of consciousness, but to be read in more subtle ways.

Also you find in J. L. Austin, who was very much in this post-Wittgenstein sensibility, you also find reference to what he calls "linguistic phenomenology", as he says: I would call myself a linguistic phenomenologist except that I'm an Oxford Don and they don't like multi-syllabic words in the south Germanic, and all of that. But that's really what he was, and that's really in significant respects what I think Wittgenstein and Sacks are when phenomenology is understood as 'interested in the logic of phenomena'.

But with respect to the Cartesian elements that persisted in, at least a good deal if not all, of Husserl, Wittgenstein was quite contrastive, finding nothing but a bewitchment of the intelligence by linguistic category mistakes and other kinds of logical errors in the Cartesian conception particularly of mind and the mental. And there are passages where he is talking about understanding, thinking, intending, hoping, etc., that Wittgenstein's discussion can be used almost paragraph for paragraph to destroy. Here's what Husserl says; here's how Wittgenstein refutes it. But then there also other places in Husserl where it's quite different and they appear to be

converging in lots of important respects.

Now, of course, Schutz takes aspects of Husserl without benefit of the later Wittgenstein. So what we get in Schutz, in *THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD*, if not so much in some of the later things, in *THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD* you still have this Cartesian emphasis upon the subjective consciousness, and those matters, where although Schutz argues that Husserl fails really to settle his philosophical accounts with the concept of intersubjectivity, nonetheless in Schutz, intersubjectivity starts to have a very concrete meaning. It's the face-to-face, the I-Thou, the We, and then it ramifies into the structures of the life-world. So intersubjectivity is a matter of empirical relational possibilities vis-a-vis the subject. Whereas intersubjectivity more broadly, and of course Wittgensteinian sense, makes possible, in the first instance, the very concept of a subject, i.e., you couldn't even have a concept of the subject were it not for- And in that sense it has slight distant affinities with George Herbert Mead, and they can be put together in interesting sorts of ways.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Jeff, did Schegloff when he was here [Tr: at B.U. 7 Jan 87] - the thing you were just speaking about - Schegloff seemed to be saying that that was what he found in Garfinkel to be disturbing occasionally - was that very concrete understanding of intersubjectivity.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah. Manny Schegloff doesn't like to talk at these levels about things very often, but when he does I find him sounding more and more like the Wittgensteinian world of Ethno; there's no doubt about it. Sacks certainly was. Though oddly enough you don't get that much explicit reference to the later Wittgenstein in Sacks. It turns out however you're steeped in it. He had thumbed copies, and studied the later Wittgenstein, plus in the unpublished lectures, you can see that it gave him a lot of sustenance. And he certainly - Sacks, in particular, when I used to chat to him - had absolutely no time for the philosophy of consciousness out of Husserl, no interest, repudiated it totally, except some constructive suggestions out of Schutz, but had no time for the philosophy of consciousness. And indeed according to Mike Lynch, who also knew him, would occasionally go around saying that he was doing empirical studies of Wittgensteinian language-games. So, there's a clear conscious recognition of a relationship, though it's very

rarely explicitly mentioned.

And that's been a problem in the sense that it's enabled a lot of people to argue about Sacks' methodology, without seeing it in its Wittgensteinian context. So, for example, a lot of people think that what Sacks was doing with natural language, and sequences, and categorization logic, etc., was intendedly an empirical sociological enterprise in the classical sense. And if you look at it that way then where's the verification, where's the sampling, where's the...? All of those things come to bear on it. For example, the way in which some people have read the rules out of the turn-taking work, as if they were empirical scope generalizations, rather than "modal" logical rules, with 'mays' 'musts' 'cans' 'mights'; they're normative, normative modal-logical rules. [Tr: Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., and Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking in conversation. LANGUAGE, 50(4), 696-735. Version in J. Schenkein (Ed.) (1978). STUDIES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION (pp. 7-55). New York, NY: Academic.]

There's a satirical magazine published in Britain called "Private Eye" which has a column called Pseuds' Corner [JC: from "pseudo-intellectual"] where, like the Fleece Award of Senator Proxmire, they pull out something from an academic journal that's silly. And Harvey Sacks got in there twice, the first time for having made the remarkable empirical claim that one speaker speaks at a time in order to be in conversation. However, a good colleague of mine whom you all know, Dr. Graham Button, wrote Private Eye a little note demanding that they produce the second sentence of Sacks which is in parentheses. - For Pseuds' Corner, by the way, anybody can send in a fragment. So Button sends in. - And, of course, what Sacks said is in brackets, he said: Of course this could not conceivably be taken as an empirical claim because we all know that very often more than one speaker speaks at a time - close brackets. However-, and then he goes on to talk about the point of making that an asserted remark. But they never published that. But you get that sort of thing happening with Sacks and this work often. And it's a real good reason why he should be read in a Wittgensteinian context. And why all of Ethnomethodology, I think, all of it bar none, has got to be seen in terms of the broad interest in the logic of reasoning, and the logic of practices, and the logic of action. The concept of logic

really is involved here.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: With that as a context, I was puzzled by Sharrock and Anderson's comment about the study of conversation, i.e., that one couldn't go about the social world tape recording things and expect to study anything OTHER THAN conversation. That that's not a way to study social interaction. - That's in chapter 6 of that little book of theirs THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGISTS. {JC: yeah} - And it didn't seem quite right. On first blush, I thought I'd missed something in looking at Sacks' methodology, and that I'd grossly overgeneralized. And in some ways I think they're right. But, it also seems as if there's something importantly wrong in that comment, or am I misreading them? [Tr: Sharrock, W. W., and Anderson, R. J. (1986). THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGISTS. London, UK: Tavistock Publications]

Jeff Coulter: Well I think what they're saying is something like this, this is the way I read it: People tend to take the stuff on sequencing, the stuff on turn-taking, and so on, which are designed to account for the organization of conversation, of talk in interaction, but conversation particularly, with systematic exceptions made for certain kinds of non-conversational communicative interaction, like meetings, the pre-allocation stuff, etc., but they tend to take those as templates now for doing other things. An example would be Peter Weeks, who wants to take the error correction work and look at orchestras. Now, Ok, there's nothing intrinsically wrong with that necessarily, because you might find an important relation. So I wouldn't be as dismissive as Sharrock and Anderson are about using these ideas as heuristics for going elsewhere. But what they're really trying to say is: Ethnomethodology as a whole has become too preoccupied with exploiting a machinery that has sort of already been described just because they're rigorous for a given domain and thinking that the only way of now looking at other domains, which might have a wholly different endogenous logic, is to see how far they could be assimilated to the turn-taking system, sequence organization, organization of repair, and so on. And on that point they're dead right. Because there's lots of social phenomena of an interactionally realizable nature for which to discuss them in terms of turn-taking is NOT - it can be done - but it's not the most interesting or informative way of going about it.

For example, the work on classroom interaction, as a good case in point. Almost all of that work that's been inspired by Ethno has unfortunately restricted itself to turn organization, and turn allocation, and hardly ever looked at what makes this a chemistry class as distinct from a math class, say, or how does pedagogy work? And involve yourself in importing your pre-understandings like Sacks was happy to do, and Wittgenstein, provided that at a certain level you can produce an inferential warrant for those things. The inferential warrant not having to be restricted to finding it explicitly in a turn, say. And that thinking about the logic of reasoning does not always involve explicit empirical demonstration, but occasionally a perspicuous argument. Just a perspicuous argument that connects a few things that come from left field even. Like "Everyone Has to Lie" connects up such superficially disparate matters as conversational openings, greetings and greeting substitutes, universal quantifiers, complaints and excuses, Tarskian truth conditions, etc. And it's by no means demonstrated as a set of logical arguments in and through some explicit transcript; that's not always necessary.

A lot of the work on categorization comes from the Suicide Prevention Center calls [Tr: see Sacks, H. (1972). An initial investigation of the usability of conversational data for doing sociology. In D. Sudnow (Ed.) STUDIES IN SOCIAL INTERACTION. New York: The Free Press] and yet the elucidation of a logic for member categorization obviously can ramify elsewhere. And not every point that Sacks is arguing about trades off of a specific observable empirical instance of a 'something'. Or rather, let me put that another way, whilst it might trade off of it, it goes way, way beyond it, and starts appealing to your commonsense intuitions. But it does so argumentatively, and then suggests: well if you see those connections then THAT, for example, 'The baby cried. The mommy picked it up' [Tr: Sacks: "On the Analysability of Stories by Children" in R. Turner (Ed.) ETHNOMETHODOLOGY, Penguin, 1974] now can be seen to instantiate the same sort of logical principle as in an introduction sequence "Hi. I'm from Boston.; Hi I'm from Milwaukee"; vis-a-vis "Hi. I'm a lawyer. ; Hi. I'm from Boston". That is, the consistency rule for categorization of persons. So, in other words, Sacks had a more liberated, creative intellectual imagination than some of the people who want to restrict Conversation Analysis to exactly and only what's on

the damn page, and if they do that then ALL they'll be doing is elucidating conversational structure. That's what they meant, I think. And all they'll be doing then..., which is ok, but that there's more to be done.

Dave Bogen: Not to belabor the point, but I'm curious then about: Let's say I'm sitting here with a sequence of talk, something that I've been looking at and am sort of interested in, and I start imagining ways it could have gone, and working then a sort of conversational analytic exercise, along the lines of what you were talking about in Wittgenstein's concept of the "Ubersicht". So what I'm doing then is pretty much inventing what for Conversation Analysis would have been data, except I'm inventing it. And my argument is that these are sequences that were possible. Why are they possible? Because they are intelligible. You can see how that would work that way.

Jeff Coulter: As long as you're not trying to make points about actual conversation structure from hypothetical cases, which is where, I think, there is a clear bound, and a correct bound, because our imaginations are not accurate, or our memory is not accurate enough, or our imaginations may not be fertile enough to come up with stuff that's usable for that. But where it's in use in terms of making some more abstract points, say, about the orders of presupposition, or other aspects of reasoning, I see no reason, and I've never seen a good argument ever against using hypothetical cases. The only thing is that the things should have their grounding in the first instance in real stuff, otherwise somebody might come along perversely and say: Well the whole thing's made up. But if you start out with real things, and then you invoke hypothetical other possibilities that people can say of: "Yeah, people could say those things and I could understand it". For example, I have a little piece that I made up, but it's based upon a dim recollection of some actual conversation. But for the point that it makes, it's perfectly Ok to do this I would argue. It goes like this: "My landlord's pretty bad tempered", or "My girlfriend's pretty bad tempered", and "Yes so's my landlady / or my girlfriend, she's a redhead as well". Now the point that's made out of that purely made up - but that wasn't purely made up, it happened to have some sort of distant analogue in an experience I had, which I vaguely remember, because the person got cross about the stereotyping of redheads, yeah? That's how I remember it. The

only point to be made there, a hearable contrast works at the level of presupposition; that's all. Now a simple point like that, when then plugged into a lot of other points, and you get an apparatus for the organization of presuppositions in talk. Because to hear it as a contrast - it doesn't just work because of the appositional 'but'. A 'but' is a signal that a contrast might be coming. Now, what makes it a contrast, or what makes it work is that 'redhead' has associated with it as a category something like: in certain domains of belief and orientation in the culture, being ill tempered. And if you don't hear that at all, then there's no basis for you to get annoyed, and no basis for your annoyance to get read as intelligible annoyance. Since nothing's been said; all that's been described is hair color. You see stuff of that sort.

Or, another one. "Do you need a lift." "My car's right outside." - is offer/reject, and yet there's been that too working at the level- So for that sort of stuff you can make up lots of examples, and they're quite real-worldly. But if you want to make claims about overlap, repair, interruption, turn-taking, recipient design, then you can get into difficulties with hypothetical data, no doubt about it. But then again it depends, you know, maybe for some things you can come up with an invented case and see something that somebody else has a real case of; I've found that happen.

The thing is, of course, here is the whole question of data, data for Wittgenstein, in the sense of he's talking about ordinary language, and he's talking about USE. And here's Ethnomethodology talking about ordinary language, practical reasoning, and use, and the real interaction. What's data for them? And what are the arguments? What I would like to advance, later on in the day, is that data, in a sense, logically speaking, is at the same order, i.e., it's treated in very, very, very similar ways. There are some differences, but they're not highly consequential. They are in other words DATA for Ethno and data for ordinary language philosophy, and clearly an issue of division, of course, is that data for ordinary language philosophy is almost always hypothetical scenarios, invented constructed cases, whilst for Ethno it's almost always real-worldly, transcribed, actually, naturally occurring things people say and do together. That's obviously a clear difference, what could be more different you might say; end of discussion.....and, right, Ethno's superior to

Ordinary Language - actually not so. Because if you look at the data that Ethnomethodology uses even when it is in the most intricate transcription data, it seems to me that when it is addressing itself to questions of reasoning, primarily, that the data almost always operates as a 'reminder', and not as data in the sense of an instance from a set that has been gathered according to principles of sampling, or data from a set that is now standing as an empirical case which now has to be augmented by other empirical cases to a certain level about which we might have confidence for its universality in the real world. You see the difference? Well we'll talk about all that later in more detail. That is, neither of them are empiricist in that sense though both of them are empiriCAL in a sense. And Wittgenstein is being empirical, and the mathematicians are being empirical, when they are looking through instances, even if the instances are conjectured. When they're looking at instances of things, they're being empirical, because you can talk clearly about abstract objects, about abstract phenomenon. Cantor, when he comes up with his famous theorem about the odd numbers [Tr: for any n , the sum of the first n odd integers = n squared], did that by putting numbers on pieces of paper in front of him and shuffling them around. That is how he did a lot of his elementary mathematical theorem production. What do we do? We put utterances, we put bits of concepts, and we shuffle them around, and we look at them, and we repeat them over and over. We don't go out and do probability sampling off of some preconceived theory. So we're neither doing inductive nor deductive work on these things, in a sense, in the classical sense.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: It's just that sometimes I have the real thing, that you can find someone who actually really did say it, when you run into those arguments about "people don't talk like that".

Jeff Coulter: That's to satisfy a rhetoric that's generated from an alien conception of the work.

Dave Bogen: Then your analysis is trying to fulfill that representation function into some sort of congruence.

Jeff Coulter: ()

Dave Bogen: -supposed real-worldly (). It would seem to me then that you're talking about the rhetoric of an alien language-game, in other words an alien narrative structure. In that case the requirement that having the data seems to be fulfilling is something like the representational function of a perfect language, that you're moving towards a somewhat representational description of the real world when you're done. There's a 1:1 mapping, or something like that. I was thinking about Goffman when I was asking this question.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah. But if you treat data as the transcript stuff and as instances in the classical sense of data in sociology or in behavioral sciences, then you can start to think that you've got some basis for making determinate claims like 'They are now doing that', and 'This is what they actually are up to'. Whereas what you're doing is constructing a logical apparatus in the logical grammatical sense about the possibilities of intelligibility, what the options are.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: It reminds me of the old arguments that we used to get about if this is the turn-taking sequence, if this is the structure of the pre-, then where is that? And then you can get Chomsky folks misinterpreting that and saying THAT is what is encoded in the brain.

Jeff Coulter: You see the thing about an endogenous logic is not that is (), it's still the logicians work, or the sociologists work. So it's still a construction, of course. But it's not a construction like an exogenous logic. Now you might say: "Well what's the point of an endogenous logic? Where is it? What do you do with it?" Since it deals with modals, the possibilities, and so on. Well the simple fact is that the modals and the possibilities ARE instantiated. We might not be able to tell exactly when and how in some ultimate sense, but they are instantiated, we know them to be instantiated. It's just that you can't usually from transcripts make a sort of determinate attribution with respect to something like orientation to a pre-. Though in some cases you might, since it really is no other way except by being perverse could you read the thing, but in some cases it's not wholly clear but you're damn sure it is. Now, if your analysis stood or fell on the basis of having to say "Well it is", then we're all in trouble. But for most practical things in the world it's OK to have that sort of orientation to it. You can get a long way like that. Because what you know is that if it isn't a 'that,' then it

can't be an infinite set of other possible things. And if you've got a fully developed, in some infinite sense, the WHOLE thing, then you've got one of the things it's got to be, and usually your ordinary common sense will tell you in actual occasions which one it most probably is. In other words, the construction of the abstract apparatus, whilst you might for some data not be able to pin it down on those speakers and hearers, the fact that you have an optionality order, or a preference order, and so forth, first of all is satisfying because we're not after all dealing with people but with practices, and secondly if you want to concretize it to the level of people, knowing what it COULD be is a lot better than not knowing what it could be at all. Knowing what it IS may be only available intuitively in certain occasions, but that's ok. That's more than we've ever had in Sociology - knowing what it may be.

Is anybody following me {D.D-S.: yes} or am I just talking to myself? {D.D-S.: no, no} I sometimes wonder whether I'm making any sense. It's elliptical I know. I'm speaking to people really now who know what this is about from trying to do it. It's these teasers about: Is that a 'suggestion' or a 'proposal', for example, what are they doing here? Well if you're not really sure, like we came up with the other day: "Is that a guess or an answer?", in Manny's talk. [Tr: Emmanuel Schegloff's colloquium, 7 Jan 87] Well, Manny's absolutely right, for the purposes of his analysis, it didn't matter that you couldn't determinately say it there, because you know very well that elsewhere if it's a 'guess' then the thing still works. If it's an 'answer' here, then it might not be the most perspicuous data for instantiating the case, but by god sometimes you can build a logical formalism off a piece of data that doesn't fully instantiate that. It doesn't matter because you know damn well it's right. That's why it was such a brilliant paper, because you know that that trajectory for 'tryings' and for 'guessings' and for 'alignments' toward the bad news occurs in the world, and there it is, perhaps not in its most perspicuous case, but it doesn't matter.

Dusan Bjelic: Not only that, but he was saying also about Sacks that, for instance, Sacks was sometimes misinterpreting things. {JC: yeah} But he will use that as his data to build up very reasonable logical argument even if doesn't work, it's error. So you can still build good logical argument based upon error, if you use error as the

starting point.

Jeff Coulter: Exactly! So it goes like this. [Tr: writing on board] In terms of prediction, you can predict that "someone will" even if you can't tell "which one when". That's where we're at with this stuff. So we do have predictive power, but it's not the predictive power of physics, of course not. {D D-S: Possibilities} Yes. But it is that there is a predictiveness about it. It's not completely up there [Tr: pointing to board]. So then people say : Is it a construction? I'm answering that question. When people say : Is it a construction? Yes, it's a construction, but persons instantiate it in their practices. I can't tell you "which ones when", absolutely, but I know that "some ones do". That's more than we've ever had in the behavioral sciences. And personally I think it's more than enough, because if we ever got down to predicting "which one when" we're in a totalitarian bloody universe, and of course we cannot be in that kind of universe because we're basically free and creative beings.

Dusan Bjelic: Well an empirical example of that is that when we give an assignment to our students to use a recording machine on a telephone, or a telephone answering machine, and they should record a kind of conversation that would be on their side, like for instance they will just record "Hello. Oh you are. How are you?, Uhuh. Uhuh" - just record that. So that when somebody calls he will get those answers and that person will accept that as conversation. Just because we can predict that if we organize his part within our knowledge of turn-taking position, that people will accept that as conversation.

Jeff Coulter: Exactly! It's like with any conventional machinery, you're going to find cases that don't instantiate the conventionality. But the whole point that Schegloff makes, and this is why it's a classic piece, the summons-answer piece. His point there is methodological. [Tr: Schegloff, E. A. (1968). Sequencing in conversational openings. AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, 70, 1075-1095.] If you've got a deviant case, or something that doesn't seem to be conventional, see to what extent it can be accounted for in terms of a conventional apparatus, and you may need to change your description of that logical or conventional apparatus. But in many cases you don't, you just find that it falls out as the exception that proves the rule, so to speak, or the exception that is an exception in virtue of, or

detectably an exception, in virtue of the conventionalities that you've discerned. But sometimes not, sometimes you have a deviant case that alerts you to the fact that the whole structure, this time 499 cases. But as he says, and will now admit, he could have got it from ONE, had he been thinking in the right way. But it just so happened that it took him 499 to get it. It took Cantor hundreds of hours of shuffling to get the theorem. But it could have been gotten from one had he been smart enough, or insightful enough, or whatever. So it's not that he needed 499 cases. He's not doing a statistical analysis of telephone openings, he's doing an analysis of the logic whereby they can be done, and whereby they can be done intelligibly, and in an orderly fashion. So that one that doesn't fit, it turned out in his case, he had to reconstruct the apparatus. You remember how it went, he had 499 telephone openings where: The phone rings, somebody picks up, and says "hello". So he got this simple "distribution rule" for telephone openings: Answerer speaks first. Sometimes an answerer might not speak first; one knows that that might be the case. He had no such case until he came across one. So here's a case where though you might have imagined it, to have it was really compelling. If he'd stuck with his 499 cases, he would have been proposing a rule that's very powerful: Answerer speaks first in telephone conversation. Then he got one where it wasn't the case. So what he did, he played around with his rule, he tried to append exceptions to it: Answerer speaks first, UNLESS... And then he got into ad-hocing, it was all over. As soon as you get into that kind of contextually specific ad-hocing, you don't any longer have your real powerful formalism, even for something as simple as telephone openings. What he found was, that of course THAT notion of a distribution rule is not as powerful as the notion of a summons-answer sequence. And the thing that really was the insight, that made the paper the classic that it was, along with the methodological upshot of it, was to see the telephone ringing as a surrogate summons. As soon as that had been construed as a surrogate summons THEN the analysis can go like this: Summons : telephone rings; "Hello" : answer to summons. Now in the case where the answerer didn't speak first it goes: Summons, Gap, Second summons. So the caller's speaking first is really a case not of violating the answerer speaks first rule, but rather of recycling an adjacency pair of summons-answer. Where you have made the initial summons, the telephone rang, you got no answer, what do you do,

one option when an adjacency pair second pair part is not produced is to recycle, so you recycle the summons this time, by saying "hello" yourself, and indeed it had an upward intonation, and it came off as a summons. So now it's all clear, summons-answer sequences are organized in terms of adjacency pair structure with a recycling provision, handles all 500. Whereas 'answerer speaks first' is a simple distribution rule, couldn't handle all 500, and even if he tried to ad-hoc it, it wouldn't have led him to that satisfactory analysis of adjacency pairs, and their recyclability, for that domain, or for many other domains, because now, of course, you've gone way beyond telephone openings, and you can go into all sorts of other areas. So the notion of "conditionally relevant" next utterance comes out of that.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: That makes sense that THAT then is one way to answer some of the Discourse Analytic arguments about how their arguments are just as valid as ours for a particular piece of data, which is an argument I've heard at different conferences where the DA people have been around, is that their explanation of how the thing works is just a valid.

Jeff Coulter: Well I don't know what you're particularly referring to.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: I was in a seminar at one point where there were a number of DA people participating who were looking at a transcript - and I'm trying to remember their analysis - but it was something like: Well I know my interpretation of this is right, because I've been in those sorts of settings and that's what happens.

Jeff Coulter: Well that's a good initial cut; isn't it? It's NOT an analysis. {D.D-S.: right} Was that delivered as the analysis?

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yeah. {JC: Well that's silly} Yeah. But they could not see the relevance of an alternative form. That is: Why should they look at any other way of looking?

Jeff Coulter: You mean why should you use silly odd ideas like adjacency pairs. {D.D-S.: right} Primarily because that characterization is, in fact, itself a logical formalism for representing an orderliness to a whole variety of things.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: And it's much more powerful.

Jeff Coulter: Right. But it's ONLY a contribution to a program of LOGICAL analysis. I don't see that discourse analytic people are interested in logic at all. They're interested in speakers and hearers and their intentions and motives, as far as I can tell.

But CA's [Tr: Conversation Analysis] whole conceptual apparatus ONLY makes sense to me if it's construed as a contribution to logic. In large measure it's a contribution to a kind of combinatorial logic for conduct, as far as we have it. There are other promises out of CA that don't make a contribution of that kind, but are still making a contribution to the logic of things. For example, I like to say first off that I'm not interested in people, as a logical analyst. I'm not interested in people. Aristotle wasn't interested in Ctesippus the arguer. He was interested in a valid argument as a thing in the world. So Wittgenstein-...

[Tr: tape change]

Jeff Coulter(cont): ... as categories, and the lesson of course here is that Sacks does a BEAUTIFUL undercutting of the whole thing by proposing that there is a logic for member categorization ALSO. Which sociologists are just operating at the pre-logical level in their vernacular use of these categories, with no relevancing rules, no procedures for warranting their claims. The fact that somebody may correctly be called a 'so-and-so' is by no means to say they are properly or appropriately so called. For example, what's it got to do with anything you've been listening to this afternoon that I happen to be a 'father'. Now suppose somebody were to count up cases of father's doing things. They might include THIS as an instance of something fathers do. How silly. And yet if you look at the way they talk about variables, they go about the world that way. So that's one other thing discourse analysts do, they talk about people in the vernacular. Which is not to say, of course, that you can't talk about ALL of these things in the vernacular. CA, Ethno, everybody has to, but that's pre-analytic. That just gets you going. Once you've done that then you turn around and say: Now how does all of that work? I've heard that to be a so-and-so saying so-and-so, and doing

so-and-so, commonsensically. How come? How does that all work? How do I get that category connected with that hearing of that utterance, connected with that characterization of that action, and how does it fit into the logical stuff we've got already in Ethno? - because we don't have to start from de novo.

Dusan Bjelic: That also has to, in a sense, has to reformulate that notion of 'intelligible analysis'. You said before well as long as it's intelligible, it's alright.

Jeff Coulter: What do you mean?

Dusan Bjelic: Well you said before that if you make an intelligible analysis, then it's acceptable. If your argument is intelligibly defended then it is acceptable.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, you've got to have an argument.

Dusan Bjelic: Right. That's () what would Weber say, () what is true is what is intelligible.

Jeff Coulter: But we don't need the notion of truth here at all. It's very misleading.

Dusan Bjelic: No, no, he is also not accepting truth as something given but what is intelligible, so in that sense it's a very changeable entity.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah but that's not what truth means. [Tr: this issue dropped].

Dusan Bjelic: My argument is that what is intelligible seems to me is that that operates based upon what Sacks called 'generative grammar', which is the socially organized reasoning which, for instance, encompasses using membership categorization devices. For instance he did an analysis of social workers sticking with a client who can guess after a second turn what is the problem of that person. So it is almost like intuition. And he analyzes why social worker can know what is the problem.

Jeff Coulter: CAN know, maybe does but not necessarily, but we don't necessarily know, sometimes we do.

Dusan Bjelic: Right. But then he explains then because he operates on the membership categorization device, what kind of practices are bound to the certain category. Therefore he's able to make an intelligible conclusion. Now that goes back to discourse analysis. They can say something that sounds logical, sensible, but if you analyze their way of reasoning, then you can find out that what Sacks called 'generative grammar' or grammar of culture, which is not grammatic, then that is intelligible. Because otherwise that becomes very-

Jeff Coulter: Ah, yeah, but then don't let's overly relativize the argument here because it seems to me that a lot of discourse analysis is defective to the extent that, taking as an example Labov and Fanshel [Tr: THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE: PSYCHOTHERAPY AS CONVERSATION, Academic Press, 1977] or Pittenger, Hockett and Danehy [Tr: THE FIRST FIVE MINUTES: A SAMPLE OF MICROSCOPIC INTERVIEW ANALYSIS, Paul Martineau, 1960], as kind of classic things, or some of Coulthard's work [Tr: see e.g., AN INTRODUCTION TO DISCOURSE ANALYSIS, Longman, 1977; or Coulthard and Montgomery (Eds.), STUDIES IN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981]- It seems to me defective in so far as it's wedded to determinate- First of all, it's wedded to making determinate attributions of properties to persons. Secondly, many of those attributions are made of a psychologistic nature without fulfilling even the ORDINARY criteria one would have to have access to to make them. Because it's not that we are barred now from ever making an attribution of an 'intention', or of a 'purpose'. It's just that often in transcript data we don't get the criteria for even ordinarily making those attributions satisfied. Now if we did in some transcript, and sometimes you do very clearly, what then turns on it? Well what would presumably turn on it would be the interest one might have in how that could now be seen to satisfy criteria, what the criteria might be. Not that we can now sit back and say "Ah ha! Now I'm a god. I can see into his mind and that's what he was REALLY doing all along", because that then is to slip back into a different mode of interest. And a mode of interest that, by the way, cannot be sustained. It cannot be sustained with any clear warrant. As Schegloff said the other night at the MIDAS meeting [Tr: Massachusetts Interdisciplinary Discourse Analysis Seminar; meeting at MIT on 7 Jan 87], we can't come up with clinically authoritative versions of what people are meaning to be doing, or trying to do, or intending to do, or even actually doing, necessarily. But that the analysis doesn't

stand or fall on that. If we have a logical apparatus for those practices, it may be defective, you may have a new thing that we need to extend our apparatus for, or it may simply be another one of those. And a lot of CA is boring because exactly it consists of another one of those. Like the 10 millionth demonstration of adjacency positioning that fill the literature. But we all know that. What about something new? So we get 'virtual servo-mechanisms', [Tr: introduced in Schegloff's colloquium in the B.U. Sociology Department; 7 Jan 87], and now we have to go away and think about that.

The logic is not a logic of how people work in a determinate sense, though you've always got to be careful because insofar as you have a logic for practices, it's a logic for how they could be working at any time and in any place. It's a logic for how they could be doing whatever they do, where someones of them WILL be doing it THAT way, and could even perhaps avow a vernacular equivalent of it.

Take the repair work. [Tr: See for example: Jefferson, G. (1974). Error correction as an interactional resource. LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY, 3(2), 181-199.; Schegloff, E. A., Jefferson, G., and Sacks, H. (1977). The preference for self-correction in the organization of repair in conversation. LANGUAGE, 53(2), 361-382.; and Francis, D. (1986). Some structures of negotiation talk. LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY, 15, 53-80.] The repair work talks about what in vernacular terms somebody might characterize after their conversation as having been 'a mess'. "We engaged in messy talk and never got back to the point." "I can't interact with that bloke." Whereas when you look at it, what you can find is that it is a clear beautiful case of the next-turn-repair-initiator, candidate repair, reject, second candidate repair, reject, and it just runs off in that format and fashion that we already know about the repair apparatus. So it's not that you even have to have an alignment of the two, the vernacular with the technical, to warrant the technical.

Jeff Stetson: Didn't you implicitly criticize that aspect though, is that the analyst looking at the beautiful logic within it, when to the participants themselves it was just a 'mess'. That very example you used.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, deliberately chosen, but the point I then went on to make there is that sometimes analysts slip into the mode of attributing the analytical description to the members, when they say, for example, things like {JS: I see} 'He now hears it-' or "He heard it as a next-turn-repair-initiator'. You have to be a sophisticated conversation analyst to hear it as a next-turn-repair-initiator. I bet you even Gail Jefferson, when she's involved in repair talk, doesn't always hear the prior non-targeted or targeted repair initiator as THAT. But that's a tendency in the analysis. And it's got to do with this sort of concession to psychology and sociology as traditionally conceived, where what we want to be doing is saying things about "people". But people are not interesting for THIS work, except, of course, insofar as they instantiate the logic of all of the things we know about them, like all of their possible attributes, all of their possible conduct, all of their possible whatevers. So people now are like a collection of logical possibilities, at best.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: I think a lot of people misread the whole clinical interest too, because I think what they see is that someone is really trying to come up with, as Manny Schegloff would say, a clinically definitive reality. That's not the interest. The interest is to try and understand how possibly can this person be seeing or doing what they're doing.

Jeff Coulter: No. {D.D-S.: Yes!} Well,... now, how possibly can these practices have the order they have?

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yes! And that to me is the clinical perspective that is absolutely essential, that I think is absolutely missing out of a lot of clinical practice these days. And so you get what are touted as clinically definitive readings, and as Manny says, that's really dangerous stuff because people get locked up.

Dusan Bjelic: Maybe he has in mind a different level of analysis. Like do you necessarily always have to stick with the conversation or you can go, for instance, on the level of generative grammar, which is the grammar of the culture. It is like, for instance, the way members categorization devices are organized, and then we can hear how they operate in the given language. So it is, as Sacks said, we're not interested in grammatic, we're interested in

ANOTHER grammar.

Jeff Coulter: Shorn of its Chomskian connotations.

Dusan Bjelic: Right, which is the grammar of the culture. And then we as analysts, as Sacks (), is somehow attuned with that grammar. Like in the analysis of children telling stories, say I hear they are that way. Now how can he hear, because he hears, or somehow is attuned, with the way that those categories are organized. He's attuned with the logic of the culture. And that's what I think constitutes one intelligible analysis, and then intelligible prediction, for instance, then given a patient, or whatever. So it is not necessary to start with that particular piece of talk, but rather to be attuned with the culture and the logic of the culture.

Jeff Coulter: That's absolutely it , yeah.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Just as an example which blew me out of the water. I had a client the other day who was sitting there, and could not figure out how it was that she began to feel responsible for having done something that was described to her by her brother. And I'd just been reading Lena's book [Tr: Jayyusi, Lena. (1984). CATEGORIZATION AND THE MORAL ORDER. Boston, MA: Routledge and Kegan Paul] on opaque and transparent descriptions, and over-attributions and under-attributions. And what he does is drop out contextual particulars of her doings, redescribe, over-attribute it with a transparent description done AS ascription.

Jeff Coulter: Opaquely true, right.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Yeah! And so as soon as I explained it to her, she grasped IMMEDIATELY the import of that description for her understanding of her situation, and she felt a lot better.

Jeff Coulter: Gee::z, if this stuff does have clinical use... {D.D-S: That's right!} That'd be fascinating. I mean there's no real reason why it shouldn't, it's just that that can't be the thing that motivates the analysis. Then it's a distraction. That's an application. It can't motivate the analysis, I think. {D.D-S: But if you want-} Look maybe in your eyes it can, because you know both camps. All I'm thinking of is like clinicians sometimes, like psychology grads.,

sometimes they come in, they get to read a bit of Ethno, and they figure "Right! Here's a BETTER way of finding out what people think, and how they really go about it. {D.D-S: The really real, yeah.} Which is all right, but then what it can tend to do is to inform the following sort of bad practice, which is: "He's definitely being sarcastic". And nobody else can much hear it, it's a possibility, but it's not.... So then build an apparatus for generating sarcastic remarks. What sorts of things are they? How do they get put together? What's a logic for sarcasm? "No, no, no, the thing is that by doing that he's undercut her self-image" the student may say, and so we immediately get into a whole other set of relevances, about which Pittenger, Hockett and Danehy get into, classically, and the whole point is lost. So all I was saying is that the clinical interest in helping people can't be what should get this stuff off the ground. In fact an interest in people as people,... You've got to bracket your compassion, in a sense. Just treat them as sets of logical possibilities, and then they re-emerge, of course, in some way. But insofar as you've gotten the logic for how they could re-emerge, as distinct from just coming back in as mysterious Cartesian subjects, with egos that we really after all can never quite get access to, so we're really only scratching the surface of it all.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: It's the difference between, it seems to me, that piece that Schwartz did where he talks about clinical work being done at a different level, to take one step above or beyond where things are happening. [Tr: Schwartz, H. (1976). On recognizing mistakes: A case of practical reasoning in psychotherapy. PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 6, 55-73] And it seems to me that that's exactly what the DA people are doing, and you're critique of their focus on people, and intention, and motive. And I don't think that in order to help people that one NEEDS to do that. I think sometimes it is adequate to explain, or to provide a way in which something is comprehensible or understandable. So people are sitting there going "How could I possibly be thinking like this? How did I get here? How is this-". "Well it might have been like this".

Jeff Coulter: OK, no reason why not, as long as it's not why we want to analyze the stuff in the first instance. That's later. All that's later. Maybe it has all sorts of hitherto undetected uses.

By the way Roy Turner has a lovely paper that reanalyzes a whole chunk of the Pittenger, Hockett and Danahey book. Do you know that exposition? {D.D-S.: yes, yes, it's lovely.} [Tr: Turner, R. (1976). Utterance positioning as an interactional resource. SEMIOTICA, 17, 233-254] Where he suggests that to discern how this interaction could have the intelligibility that indeed it does for all of us, you don't NEED to-. In fact what he ends up saying is that all of that's overbuilt for what you've got. And it ends up turning upon a much more parsimonious apparatus of- It's got to do with a sequential property.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: It seems that in using that kind of an explication, then one can back off of some of the over-built character attributions that I think the clinical field is fraught with.

Jeff Coulter: And DA. {D.D-S.: yes} They want to talk about "good teachers", and "good doctors", and they want to talk about bad "male chauvinists". Candy West and Don Zimmerman are into that. Like, bad male chauvinists go around interrupting women more than women interrupt men. [Tr: West, C., and Zimmerman, D. H. (1983). Small insults: A study of interruptions in cross-sex conversations between unacquainted persons. In B. Thorne, C. Kramarae, and N. Henley (Eds.) LANGUAGE, GENDER AND SOCIETY. Rowley, MA: Newbury House Publishers, Inc.] Which may be true at some level, though I don't know quite what, but the whole point is they certainly haven't shown that. And the way they go about showing it is a travesty of Conversation Analytic methodology, nothing less. Because what they do, first of all, there's no warrant, there's no relevancing procedure for the gender categorizations of the speakers, except feminist theory, which is an insufficient warrant in and of itself, only because someone can come along and say 'class theory' or 'religion in the culture': "Were they Jews, Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, Presbyterians? - That's what's really going on". And then we're into this sort of game. And even if you do shoot right away to gender, what about the modifiers, hows about 'rude male' what about 'impertinent male', what about 'excessively touchy woman'. I mean there's all these things that we've got vernacularly available too. Oh no, they never get into the analysis. So we've only got a PART of the vernacular incorporated into their thinking, and they then use those "VARIABLES" to parcel out their analysis of the social world according to

their preconceptions of it. And it just doesn't work. And Schegloff has finally said as much in "Between Micro and Macro" which is about the role of categories and their relations to action attributions. [Tr: Schegloff, E. A. (1987). Between macro and micro: Contexts and other connections. In J. C. Alexander, B. Giesen, R. Munch, and N. J. Smelser (Eds.) THE MICRO-MACRO LINK (pp.207-234). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press] None of which is to say in the least that there aren't maybe more male chauvinist male speakers than there are non-male chauvinist male speakers, I have no idea and I don't much care, but it can't be demonstrated THAT way.

In any event, for god sake, there's an indefinite set of conversations going on in the world. What sort of sample have you got? You'd have to get into that, right? You'd HAVE to in order to make that sort of determinate empirical generality claim, start talking about your data sets as samples, as representative samples. You can't have a representative sample of interactions. That's absurd, that's insane.

Dave Bogen: Unless your recording devices were incredibly sophisticated and you had a computer analyst to do the analysis for you.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, even then. How so, you don't have a universe, from which you've got the subset.

Dave Bogen: I don't know, just a sort of Brave New World vision of discourse analytic work.

[Tr: General laughter]

Jeff Coulter: I didn't hear the irony in that, I should have known better.

What is becoming especially difficult is to inter-relate the logics of membership categorization with activity, with various categories of practice. It's becoming extremely hard to do, and we've got the stuff on category-boundedness, category-constitutive, but it's very hard to make them interpolate, interlock. Much more difficult than it has been to make the turn-taking system with the sequential organizational rules interlock. Those are now interlocking very nicely.

Darleen Douglas-Steele: Well it's like the difference between doing a logical grammar, and doing a sequential analysis.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, because one is the logical grammar of concepts i.e., categories, and the other a logical grammar of activities.

Jeff Stetson: Don't those distinctions break down?

Jeff Coulter: I would suspect so. But nobody quite knows how to do that, at least I don't think it's really systematically been done. There's stuff on the ACTIVITY of categorizing, but there's nothing that sort of inter-relates the apparatuses at the more abstract level.

Dave Bogen: But isn't that very much akin to the "sense/force" distinction that Baker and Hacker are working?

Jeff Coulter: I'm not sure, say some more.

Dave Bogen: The "sense/force" distinction seems to be that at the level of linguistic analysis a distinction between illocutionary acts, which are more like sequential analysis, and sort of the locutionary aspect of an utterance, which is much more akin to categorization devices. This sort of thing. A conceptual analysis. The breakdown of the two sorts of analyses seems to me to recreate that distinction.

Jeff Coulter: Yeah, I haven't taken it like that, I'll have to think about that one. I was thinking of it in terms of the different properties of membership categorization, that have been analyzed, i.e., the consistency rule, the economy rule, category-relevance rule, preference for opacity, transitivity, all of those rules, all of those properties - to connect those in some orderly fashion with the rules governing action production, and sequencing, and turn-taking. I haven't seen that, at the abstract level I haven't seen that done. Are we talking about the same thing?

Dave Bogen: Yeah, in a certain sense we are, although I'm subsuming the categorization work under a sort of broader category of conceptual analysis, or something like that. And saying that what's going on there, I think, is still a recreation of the sort of analytic distinction. So when people go about analyzing sequences, what they do is ignore the fact they're using all these

conceptual categories to get on with it. They just ignore that. And they say it all comes from sequencing. {J.C.: yes} And it would be that unanalyzed domain that would provide some of the connections between them.

Jeff Coulter: Yes, absolutely, exactly right. I was just proposing that I don't think that has been done much.

Jeff Coulter: Anyway, it's getting late.

We won't be- For those of you who haven't had access to Ethnomethodology much, and have found a lot of what we have been talking about arcane, it's not a problem, I promise you, because we will recycle. We've just been having a chat.

What we want to do fairly systematically is to go through some of the things in Wittgenstein, and plug in occasionally, where relevant, pertinent things from Ethnomethodology later on. And perhaps this paper will help introduce you ["Ethnomethodology and the Logic of Language"].

This paper is a discussion of how logic began in ancient Greece with people making arguments, and how people like the Megarians and the Eliatics were interested in codifying the rules that appeared to have been informing or organizing the ones that won - the winning arguments. So, the argument is that the origin of logic is Sociology. That is to say that logic begins - has its life - as an attempt to codify the normative order for a particular practice, namely argumentation. Then, by a progression of steps, it gets idealized and abstracted away from argumentation, and even further from the components of argumentation - like 'propositions' and their relation. Then around about the 1940's, after all of this sort of formal logic of reasoning and investigation of the laws of arguments and thought has reached its apotheosis in Wittgenstein, in the TRACTATUS - he smashes it effectively. That's not to say he undermines everything that logicians have found out, but he attacks the direction of the program as it has claimed to render perspicuously how human beings reason and think and act, and wants to substitute a different concept of logical analysis. And then we will lead from the later Wittgenstein, as this paper does, into some examples from early writings of Harvey Sacks, who was an American thinker, and

Ethnomethodologist, on membership categories, which is how people refer to people or describe people, and what the logic of that is. And the second instance of it will be the logic of correction: how people correct, or repair, or handle a situation when there has been something gone wrong with its intelligibility. They are two quite different problems in lots of ways but they have been handled by Sacks, among others, and they show what kinds of things you can do when you bring logic back into sociology.

So, BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, first 74 pages for next time.

TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

These transcriptions were prepared from an audio recording, the auditory quality of which was not always optimal. Participating members, especially Jeff Coulter, have reviewed initial drafts of the transcripts and have attempted to clarify portions that were particularly difficult to hear, and also provided assistance in correcting errors in transcription that were made during the production of the first draft of each session. The generous assistance of all those involved is gratefully acknowledged. Particular appreciation goes out to Jeff Stetson who took on the laborious task of copy-editing. Unfortunately, not all errors in transcription, and not all inaudible portions could be corrected given the time lag in producing the transcriptions. The transcriber apologizes for any remaining typographical errors.

The following are conventions employed in producing the transcriptions of these meetings:

- [x] square brackets: Text in square brackets is for the most part that of the transcriber. Such text is indicated by "Tr:" at the beginning of the brackets. It includes: 1. paraphrases of talk, 2. clarification of indefinite references, for example pointing, drawing or writing on the chalk-board, producing a behavioral display etc., 3. information about references to texts referred to in the talk, 4. other general remarks and clarifications and 5. indications of omissions and tape changes. PLEASE

NOTE that there is almost always some bit of talk missing at the points of tape change. On occasion, comments in square brackets are insertions offered by those who have edited the text and are indicated as such by the initials of the person in question, e.g., [JC: xxxxxxxx]. Also, if additions or deletions are made in text quoted during the class, then these changes are noted in square brackets, with the speakers initials included within the brackets.

- { x } braces: Text in braces is the talk of persons who are commenting on or responding to the talk of another person who currently has the floor. This talk is introduced by the initials of the person making the remark and/or comment, e.g., {JC: xxxx}.
- (x) parentheses surrounding text: Text in parentheses is the transcriber's best guess as to what was being said when there is some doubt about exactly what was said due to the poor auditory quality of the tape.
- () empty parentheses: Parentheses containing no text indicate a portion of the talk which is not transcribable due to the poor auditory quality of the tape, although it is possible to tell that something was being said.

CAPITALIZATION: Capitalization is used to indicate titles (or partial titles, e.g.: INVESTIGATIONS for the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS) for books. It is also used to indicate vocal emphasis by the speaker in question, i.e., something which is spoken noticeably louder, or with more emphasis than the surrounding talk. It was not possible to underline text in the editing/text-formating system employed, which is why capitalization rather than underlining was used in the above cases. This also influenced the forming of terms in languages other than English, e.g.: Ubersicht, vis-a vis, etc, which are neither capitalized, nor underlined, although occasionally are explicated in square brackets following the text in question.